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Abstract 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), institutions and “credible commitment” are three terms that 
relates to one another. The perfect harmony between them can lead to great fortune and 
prosperity, but if one is absent, too weak or faulty, the dynamics break down and this lead to 
unsatisfying results. FDI has often been applied as a development strategy by developing 
countries. The strategy implies an opening of markets and economy, but the necessity of 
strong and stable institutions, and a certain level of credible commitment, is evidently 
important to achieve a successful application in the same countries. The Cuban case is 
comparable to some cases in the Asian region (Vietnam, China), but the results have so far 
failed to materialize on the Caribbean Island.   
This thesis seeks to address Cuba´s ongoing search for FDI to acquire capital that can 
sustain their rigid socialist system. The thesis explores the obstacles the system and 
institutional framework provides for foreign investors, and the processes for investment, 
which again affects Cuba´s credibility. 
A central argument throughout the thesis is that for Cuba to further develop their FDI 
sector, they need to improve their credible commitment, their investment environment, and 
the informal norms and rules within the institutions that handle FDI. The main issue is related 
to how they maneuver within their own system of norms, rules and laws. Cuba is a single-
party state, and all power rests with the party and the leaders, there are no other powers that 
can control the Cuban Communist Party (CCP) and the authorities. This gives the government 
the possibility to do as they see fit in cooperation with foreign investors. Also, as the world is 
approaching Cuba with propositions and guidelines in a period of transition, Cuban 
authorities stress to underline that the ongoing transformation is progressing within a Cuban 
context. It is not a complete change of the political and economic system to comply with 
international understandings of democracy and economy. Cuba wants to find their own way, 
experimenting with possible wealth accumulating strategies to finance and develop the 
“Cuban Socialism”.         
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1 Introduction 
This is a case-study of Cuba, a Communist state that has not had FDI (except Soviet 
subsidizes and trade with COMECON) in their economy since the revolutionary takeover in 
1959, and the expropriation of foreign properties the first years of the revolution. In this thesis 
I claim that the fall of the Soviet bloc led to a reorientation of Cuban policies and economy, 
without any real and profound changes being made. Since the initialization of normalizing the 
diplomatic ties between the U.S. and Cuba, there have been many debates on the path Cuba 
may take economically as well as politically. Cuba is especially focusing on attracting FDI as 
a strategy to develop their economy. FDI is considered both from capitalist countries, and 
communist states as Vietnam and China, as a valid development strategy. It is relevant both 
from a classical neoliberal view, and in the modernization of single party states that are 
ideologically close to Cuba. FDI as a development strategy is applied to generate “spillovers” 
that will develop economy, technology and society. We will look closer on how this takes 
place in the theory part of this thesis.  
Though FDI is attracted, it does not necessarily mean it will generate the spillovers 
that the host nation is hoping for. This could be the result of external or internal factors, and I 
will especially be focusing on the internal factors of the Cuban case. To attract investors, 
there needs to be a friendly investment environment that secures the investor market access, 
transfer of profit and expansion possibilities. For this to happen, investors need safety through 
law, strong and safe institutions, and a certain degree of credible commitment to international 
law and practices, to ensure the investors that their investments are safe. Through the thesis, I 
will establish what the signs of continuity are, and what the sings of change are in the Cuban 
institutional framework. These signs can help to prove the validity of Cuba´s reforms and 
level of credible commitment. Also, this study helps to localize some of the obstacles 
investors face as they invest in Cuba, and how these obstacles affects the inflow of FDI to the 
island.       
Despite substantial reforms initiated since Raúl Castro´s takeover in 2006, Cuba has 
failed to encourage more foreign investment into the country´s crippling economy, and is now 
putting the goal of sustainable growth in danger unless extensive and profound changes are 
made. The market-oriented reforms that have taken place since 2007, with its Soviet-style 
political system, are supposed to make the investment environment friendlier, but investors 
have still been cautious and hesitating. Cuba needs to sustain a higher rate of investment to 
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close the gap where Cuba only have had an annual investment of just 13 % in recent years 
compared with an average of 23 % in the rest of Latin America and the Caribbean. Cuba´s 
rhetoric towards FDI has changed, and many countries such as China, Russia, Brazil, 
Singapore and various EU members have expressed interest in investing, despite the U.S. 
trade embargo. However, many obstacles still remain.  
In this thesis I address the obstacles that investors face when Cuba, as a communist 
state with a static economic system, introduce a capitalist tool as FDI to accumulate capital. 
The literature on FDI, (effects, dynamics and results) is vast and must be understood in the 
context of the investment one seeks to analyze. It is difficult generalizing on the basis of 
whole countries that use FDI as a development strategy. A number of scholars have 
elaborated on the subject, but I wish only to give an introduction to the subject, which 
clarifies what theories developing countries rely on when they adapt and transform policy to 
attract FDI. As we will see in the theory, even though different countries experience different 
results with FDI, and the literature on the theme is vast, some general trends can be observed.  
Since Fidel Castro transferred power to his younger brother Raul Castro in August 
2006,
1
 we have observed some trends of reformation in the rigid regime of Cuban policies and 
bureaucracy. Are they really profound transformations in the Cuban system? Or do these 
transformations exist solely to make Cuba appear more lucrative to foreign investors at the 
international arena? We especially observe economic reforms and measures taken to enhance 
economic growth through initiatives as the “Puerto Mariel”,2 and the new decree law 118 of 
2014, which seek to enhance the flows of inward FDI through improving the environment for 
investors. Still, while the transformations appear to be genuine and real, we observe little 
mobility for domestic private actors and long and bureaucratic approval periods for foreign 
investors. The Cuban government has been accused of caring more about retaining power 
than to improve economy.
3
 They are committed to the ideas of José Martí, the stand against 
capitalism and the social political stands of Marx, Engels and Lenin (which is firmly 
constituted in the Cuban constitution),
4
 
                                                 
1
 Carmelo Mesa-Lago, Cuba En La Era De Raúl Castro: Reformas Económico-Sociales Y Sus Efectos (Madrid: 
Editorial Colibrí, 2012). P. 19 
2
 René Tamayo León, "Zona Especial De Desarrollo Mariel 
Una Obra Sólida Y Favorable," Juventud Rebelde  (2013). 
3
 Joe Cardona, "In Normalization Talks, U.S. Gives, Cuba Takes " Miami Herald, 
http://www.miamiherald.com/opinion/op-ed/article23693629.html. 
4
 Ministerio de Justicia, "Gaceta Oficial De La Republica De Cuba," (http://www.cubadebate.cu/wp-
content/uploads/2009/06/go_x_03_2003.pdf2003). 
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I address this “in between state” where Cuba are right now, between simultaneously 
trying to maintain and liberalize a highly ideological political and economic system. Talks 
with the US about normalization of their relationship, and the reopening of embassies, can 
very well be the security investors need to invest in the Cuban economy. These last events 
will require the Cuban government to show commitment on a whole different level than ever 
before, as this is the first time the US takes a “bottom-up model of change” approach to Cuba 
since the collapse of the Soviet Block.  
This thesis relevance should be considered in the light of recent events on Cuba, and a 
contribution to the research on Cuban economy and future perspectives for the island.  
 Background: FDI in Cuba 1.1
When Fidel Castro triumphed in Havana in 1959, he had no clear political or economic policy 
or reforms. The object was to achieve a change within the distribution of wealth and the 
existing benefits, and education, health services and nutrition to the people. The social 
revolution was realized by Soviet military protection and economic aid, as they in 1960 
entered an economic and ideological cooperation where Soviet subsidized the Cuban 
socialism.
5
 Some trends became clear within Castro`s second year in power: the 
nationalization of the economy, a sharp turn towards the Soviet bloc, the establishment of an 
authoritarian regime, and the start of an egalitarian social economic policy.
6
 Foreign direct 
investment was considered an imperialistic repressive means to extract resources and wealth 
from their “colonies”. The foreign owned properties were expropriated, and FDI was kept out 
of Cuban economy the next three decades.    
The last 20 years, Cuba has embraced some degree of transformation in the system of 
law and the economy in order to adapt to the world economy. At the same time their economy 
has been under an embargo from the only superpower in the world, the U.S.A. This has been 
an external factor with significant effect on the Cuban economy, and will be addressed 
properly later in my thesis. FDI is one of the few sources of foreign capital available to Cuba, 
as aid from foreign governments and international organizations is virtually non-existing.
7
  
 
                                                 
5
 Thomas E. Skidmore and Peter H. Smith, Modern Latin America, 6th ed. ed. (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2005). P. 320 
6
 Ibid. P. 311 
7
 Matias F. Travieso-Diaz and Charles P. Trumbull IV, "Foreign Investment in Cuba: Prospects and Perils,"  
(2003). P. 904 
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 Defining the Case 1.2
“Minister of Foreign investment and Trade” Rodrigo M. Diaz stated that the economy needs 
to grow at around 7 percent per year, and 25-30 % of that needs to be used for investment.
8
 
However, numbers from the World Bank (WB) suggest a less ideal result and a more 
pessimistic future, as seen in figure 1. We observe that (“the miracle of”) China is the only 
country with this kind of growth the last decade (some African states have also had high 
growth rates, but they are initiating reforms from a different level of development, which 
makes the growth rate artificially high as investments takes place). Still, statistics and future 
result, especially in closed countries as Cuba, are difficult to foresee as the predictability of 
such countries is not tied up to a democratic system of rules and laws. The World 
Development Indicators of the World Bank are probably the most current and accurate global 
development data available concerning national, regional and global estimates. 
Figure 1: GDP growth (%) according to World Bank expectations 
Source: The World Bank Global Economic Prospects
9
 
The most important means within the control of the Cuban government, trying to obtain such 
growth rates, and foreign capital, is FDI. Even though Cuba firmly adheres to its socialist 
political and economic framework, the government has taken a series of measures to promote 
FDI in the country. Since the disappearing of the socialist bloc and the economic crisis that 
                                                 
8
 Marc Frank, "Cuba Cuts Taxes for Foreign Investors," Financial Times  (2014). 
9
 World Bank, "Global Economic Prospects," in 2010-2017, ed. World Bank (2015). 
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followed, representatives of the Cuban government have frequently expressed the national 
interest in attracting foreign capital to boost the economy. New laws concerning FDI were 
passed in 1995 and 2014, special economic development free zones were created, and former 
ties to the EU and U.S reopened.  
Since Raul Castro came to power in 2006, several reforms have been initiated to 
facilitate economic activities and to release some pressure on restriction on civil society. 
10
 
Still, Cuba struggles with its credibility, which affects inward flow of FDI significantly. For 
investors, it is questionable if the reforms are as “deep” as they formally appear through 
written laws. Also, the economic experimentation happens within free zones where the 
“normal Cuban” is held outside of participation. The experimentation with market economy, 
and the opening of “all” sectors to FDI, seems to be favored only as a possible way to finance 
the existing political and economic socialist model.  
Cuba is a communist state, which gives the country a level of “short term” 
predictability as all power rests within the party. This creates uncertainties for investors, as 
there are no independent juridical bodies to control power, or condemn it if needed. In 
addition, the process of approving investor prospects is long and bureaucratic, which all affect 
the rate of “credible commitment” the country enjoys. 
 Objective and Research Questions 1.3
Academics and politicians frequently present “opportunities”, “future perspectives”, “past 
(own) experiences”, and comparative suggestions of other communist states that have made a 
transformation towards a more open economy, while still withholding a communist political 
system with centralized power structures. However, Cuba demands an understanding of their 
cultural, historical, political and economic context. The Cuban state spends a lot of time and 
consideration of every reform and decision they make, to make sure it complies with the 
socialist agenda. That is, not letting go of fundamental principles of the Cuban socialism at 
the same time as they wish to “renew”, “develop” and “fortify” this political direction. It is a 
long, slow and careful process, which many thought would accelerate considerably as 
communication with the US reemerged on December 17, 2014, but the results are still minor. 
On the other hand, some political and economic transformations that have begun would be 
hard to retract without creating social disapproval amongst the people. However, large 
                                                 
10
 Mesa-Lago, Cuba En La Era De Raúl Castro: Reformas Económico-Sociales Y Sus Efectos. 
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transformations need real institutional change, which is an even longer process that I will 
address later in my thesis. 
The objective of this case-study is to investigate some of the main institutions handling 
FDI, and the formal/informal rules and norms of which the institutions consist. Further, I 
investigate how these formal/informal rules and norms affect Cuba´s level of credible 
commitment, which also affects the country´s inward flow of FDI. Based on the theoretical 
framework in chapter 2, these are the questions that appeared most relevant, and will be the 
guide for my study of Cuba: 
1. Why does Cuba want FDI as a development model, and how does FDI provide Cuba 
with the proper spillovers? How do formal/informal norms and rules of the Cuban 
institutions affect the country´s credible commitment and FDI? 
2. Have the obstacles been the laws, or the execution of the laws?  
3. What are the Cuban political, economic and cultural contextual experiences, and how 
do they affect credible commitment and FDI? 
Due to the limitations of a master thesis there are several laws and elements I have left out. I 
choose to focus on elements that I mean have the greatest impact on credible commitment and 
inflow currents of FDI. 
 Overview of the Thesis 1.4
In this first chapter I have given a brief introduction to what this thesis will be about. In 
chapter 2, I will go through standard theoretical presumptions about “FDI”, “Institutions” and 
“Credible Commitment” referencing to authors commonly recognized as well embedded in 
the respective theories. Figure 2 in the theory section will be a guide to the construction of 
this thesis, whereas table 1 will give us an overview of the elements investigated in this case-
study.  
In chapter 3, I present the methodology of this thesis. I explain what is beneficial with 
a case-study based on limitations, possibilities, and theoretical framework. I use some general 
theory of case-study research, but instead of focusing on the general theory, I specify what is 
good, and not so good, with my case-study. 
Chapter 4 gives a contextual background with special emphasis on economic history 
and how it affects credible commitment and FDI. This chapter presents the formation of 
Cuba´s institutional framework through its economic, societal, and cultural history from the 
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beginning of the revolution until today. I use the political cycles of Mesa-Lago as a 
framework to the historical context, because the “cycle-framework” generates a better 
understanding of complicated history, and illustrates the inconsistency of Cuban policy. 
In chapter 5, I analyze the empirical material and data of this thesis with chapter 4 as a 
contextual base. I present institutions, rules and norms, and how they affect credible 
commitment and FDI, which again explain why Cuba has had little or no success with this 
capitalist strategy for development. In the last part of this chapter I discuss, based on the 
analysis and my findings, how Cuba´s credible commitment and inflows of FDI are affected 
by formal and informal rules and norms, which leads me to the conclusion in chapter 6.      
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2 Theoretical Framework 
 FDI 2.1
In this chapter I will present a theoretical framework for the thesis. In the first section of 
theory I will present the most important features of FDI for host economies. The literature on 
actual functions of FDI is vast and contradictory, but I will present the most common 
understanding of theory concerning benefits, and an adequate critique of how host countries 
focus on policies towards FDI. Second, I address conditions that need to be in place for FDI 
to work, by presenting theory of credible commitment and institutions and some elements 
relating to these factors. 
2.1.1 Authors and relevance. 
I will mainly use Theodore H. Moran, Edward M. Graham and Magnus Blomström and their 
extensive volume of new (2005) research on FDI and host-country economic performance in 
“Does Foreign Direct Investment Promote Development?”11 Several investigators contribute 
to this research, and their research is presented in their separate chapters. The book addresses 
themes important to understand as we explore the Cuban case; as the impact of inward FDI on 
host countries, FDI and externalities, FDI and local economic development, Multinational 
Companies (MNC) and backward linkages, how FDI affect host country development and 
other important topics. I will not explore or elaborate on the different topics in detail, as they 
all are extensive case-studies, but instead present the general understanding of what FDI is, 
how it works, and why states wish to avail themselves of FDI as a development strategy.   
I will also use some theoretical framework of Giorgio Navaretti, Anthony Venables 
and Frank Barry, who present a comprehensive analysis of the economics of multinational 
enterprises. I include their work in the theory chapter to enhance the theoretical findings. 
They thoroughly assess what they are, why they exist, and what their economic impact on 
home and host countries is.
12
. Also, Elisabeth Grøvan Ruud preferred Navaretti, Venables and 
Barry in her master thesis on;   
                                                 
11
 Theodore H. Moran, Edward M. Graham, and Magnus Blomström, Does Foreign Direct Investment Promote 
Development? (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 2005). 
12
 Giorgio Barba Navaretti, Anthony J. Venables, and Frank G. Barry, Multinational Firms in the World 
Economy (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2004). 
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“Gir bilaterale investeringsavtaler Mer Utenlandske Direkteinvesteringer? En 
Gjennomgang Av Det Teoretiske Og Empiriske Grunnlaget” (2013)13.  
 
In her thesis she gives a presentation of the theoretical and empirical foundation of 
bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and FDI. As a secondary source her findings are relevant 
to the degree it verifies, or contradicts, the general perceptions on FDI that I present by 
Moran, Graham and Blomström, but mostly I used it as a guide to other relevant primary 
sources. 
Furthermore, I found Sanjaya Lalls working paper on “FDI and Development: Policy 
and Research Issues in the Emerging Context”, beneficial to use.14 Some of the more 
important subjects Lall address deals with the benefits and costs of FDI to development, and 
the market failures that affect their impact on developing host countries. It focuses on the 
impact of FDI on local enterprise development, static versus dynamic benefits and bargaining 
with Multinational Enterprises (MNEs). I use Lall, not only because his findings are 
compatible with the other theory applied, but because his work is of good quality and is easy 
to comprehend. His working paper sums up the main points of the other authors as well, in a 
comprehensive and efficient manner. 
In order to address institutions and credible commitment, I mainly use Peter North, 
who is a leading academic on the field. Most of the literature on institutional theory I found 
referred to North as main source. To make practical use of the theory I also introduce J.P. 
Singh who measures the degree of credibility and liberalization.  
2.1.2 Functionalities of FDI  
Addressing FDI, I use the definition of “Advocates for international development” in their 
legal guide on “Governing Foreign Direct Investment in Host Countries”, as it covers the term 
extensively.  
 “Foreign investment can be generally understood as the transfer of capital to a country, commonly 
referred to as the host country, by a non-resident entity. FDI is one form of foreign investment 
characterized by a certain degree of influence and control over assets in the host country. It is 
distinguished from the provision of cross-border bank loans and portfolio investment (where there is 
no active involvement in the management of the enterprise, for example, shareholdings in the host 
country’s companies through managed funds”).15 
                                                 
13
 Elisabeth Grøvan Ruud, "Gir Bilaterale Investeringsavtaler Mer Utenlandske Direkteinvesteringer? En 
Gjennomgang Av Det Teoretiske Og Empiriske Grunnlaget," (2013). 
14
 Sanjaya Lall, "Fdi and Development: Policy and Research Issues in the Emerging Context,"  (2000). 
15
 Slaugher and May Srijanee Bhattacharyya, "Legal Regimes Governing Foreign Direct Investment (Fdi) in 
Host Countries," Advocates for International Development  (2012). P. 3 
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However, there is no detailed, authoritative and universal legal definition of what 
constitutes direct investment. The sufficient degree of control and influence varies in scope 
depending on applicable law in a particular jurisdiction, and some jurisdictions do not make 
distinctions between different forms of foreign investment. Therefore, when dealing with a 
particular legal regime governing FDI, it is important to check how FDI is defined. The 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has recognized the need 
to agree a standardized definition of FDI for the purposes of compiling statistics, and has 
produced its own Benchmark Definition of FDI to which the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) refers in its Balance of Payments Manual. The OECD’s Benchmark Definition states 
that: 
 “…a key characteristic of FDI is the presence of a ‘lasting interest’ in an enterprise, 
consisting of a ‘long-term relationship’ and a ‘significant degree of influence’, and 
considers ownership of at least 10% of the voting power to be evidence of such 
influence.”16 
 
As mentioned in the definition, there is no detailed, authoritative and universal legal 
definition of what constitutes direct investment. One has to explore the definition of the term 
within the host nation in which one wants to invest. Most nations will be close up to the above 
mentioned definition where the basic is a foreign investor, state or private actor, that wish to 
penetrate a host nation´s local market and economy. It can also be the other way around, a 
host nation seeking state or private actors to invest in their local market and economy. 
However, advocates for international development also mentions four methods of making 
FDI: 
 the creation of a new subsidiary and/or manufacturing base in the host country (often 
referred to as ‘greenfield FDI’); 
 mergers and the acquisition of existing businesses in the host country; 
 participation in joint ventures; or 
 Re-investment of profits into projects in the host country.17 
 
 Among the four methods of making FDI, I will especially be addressing “joint 
ventures” later in this thesis as it is the preferred choice of method by the Cuban government. 
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In the relationship between FDI and host nations, my focus will be on the internal 
environment of the host nation rather than the foreign investor. I will not direct an extensive 
amount of attention towards theory of capitalism and extraction of capital and resources, 
social corporate responsibilities etc. This thesis addresses the Cuban case and internal factors 
that affects inflow currents of FDI.   
2.1.3 Spillovers 
FDI has various effects on host economies. Navaretti and Venables divide the effects, which 
are transmitted through different channels, into three groups: (a) “product market effects”, 
where a FDI project may cause the firm to change the quantities of goods that it buys and sells 
in the host and home country market. If a MNE enters by merging or acquiring an existing 
supplier, the effect may be anti-competitive, harming consumers, but it may also increase 
competition in the market, and perhaps also variety or quality, which tends to raise consumer 
welfare. If the MNE has higher productivity than local firms, then some of the benefits may 
be passed on as a price reduction. (b) “Factor market effects”, which can arise in both capital 
and labor markets. There is general capital inflow, augmenting local supplies of capital, but 
the more important impacts are in labor markets. The questions are as follows; how does it 
affect the overall demand of labor, and if the MNEs raise employment? Does outward 
investment by FDI reduce the demand for labor? Does the presence of MNEs raise the 
demand for skills in host economies? Does the expansion of activities abroad raise the 
demand for skills in host economies? Does the expansion of activities abroad raise the 
demand for skills at home, and what happens to factor prices? The last group is (c) spillover 
effects which are arguably the most important benefits to accrue from FDI.
 18
  The importance 
of these effects depends on the form of the investment, whether it is horizontal or vertical, and 
the characteristics of the countries. In this chapter, I will elaborate further on the latter group 
(spillovers). A further explanation of product market effects is of less relevance for my thesis, 
and will to some degree be covered through the theory. The labor paradigm within the factor 
market effects is an important element that I elaborate in chapter 5. 
The “spillover” effect is crucial for host economies when they seek to attract FDI. 
“Spillovers” is the term used to describe the benefits host economies aim to take advantage of 
as a FDI enters and develop in the economy. Host nations do not only seek to gain access to 
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foreign capital, but also to develop industry and to acquire “know how” on technology and 
management (amongst others). The desire is that knowledge and know-how “spills over” on 
the host country economy in the forms of technology, salary, competition, productivity, 
competence etc.
19
 The spillovers from FDI occur as MNE enters and increases the 
productivity of local firms in a host nation. The spillovers can occur as local firms improve 
efficiency through absorbing technology and market strategies from the foreign firm. This can 
be done by observing or hiring employees who have worked for the MNEs. Another form of 
spillover occur when the existence of a MNE creates greater competition on the local market, 
and in that way forces the local firm to use their existing resources in a more efficient way, or 
to search for new technology.
20
  
What happens if there are local firms in the same sector, and how can they 
survive/adapt to the competition? If a foreign and a local firm compete in the same sector, the 
foreign firm will have no reason to share technology or know how through spillover. They 
may protect themselves through a formal protection of intellectual property, paying higher 
wages to the employees so they will not leave to competitors, or by just establishing 
themselves in host nations where the knowledge and production level are so weak that there is 
no real competition. Still, MNEs have positive influence on local firms that function as 
suppliers in “downstream” industries, but no effect on competing firms in the same sector. 
The downstream industries can enjoy spillovers as they provide the foreign firm with some 
parts or services necessary for their line of production. It is beneficial for the foreign firm as 
well that a supplier is effective in both their management production and economy. This gives 
a foreign firm the incentives to share know how and technology with the supplier in order to 
make their production more effective. In the end, the foreign firm will profit by sharing know-
how, management and technology by making their supplier more cost efficient.    
As mentioned before, the results vary, and there is vast literature on FDI and its 
function in host economies. I will not elaborate on the function of each spillover effect as it 
would require a proper case study to address each spillover actual effect on host economy. 
However, I will scratch the surface of some of the more important spillovers.  
According to Lall, the host country can induce the spillovers and transfer their 
advantages in appropriate forms: 
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 Capital: FDI brings in investible financial resources to capital scarce countries. 
Compared to commercial debt or portfolio investment, the inflows are more stable and 
easier to service. TNCs invest in long-term projects, taking risks and repatriating 
profits only when the projects yield returns, in comparison to other sources of capital. 
 Technology: Developing countries lack the proper technology to efficiently produce 
goods and compete on the international market. The technology is often outdated, 
even in mature industries. The efficiency they operate with, compared with the 
technologies they use, is often relatively low. However, part of their productivity gap 
is compensated for by lower wages and technical inefficiency. Also, obsolescence 
affects the quality of their products and handicaps their ability to cope with new 
market demands. TNCs bring modern technologies not available without FDI, and 
raise efficiency in the use of technology. The foreign firm may adapt technologies to 
local conditions, drawing on their experience, and in some cases set up R&D facilities. 
The foreign investment can stimulate efficiency in local firms, both suppliers and 
competitors, by providing assistance, acting as role models and intensifying 
competition. 
 Skills and management: The advanced skills possessed by TNCs, MNEs and foreign 
firms can be transferred to host countries by bringing in experts and by setting up 
training facilities. They also possess new management techniques of top quality, 
whose transfer to host countries offer enormous competitive benefits. As local firms 
and affiliates are integrated into foreign firm networks, they can develop capabilities 
to service the regional or global system in specific tasks or products as new markets 
opens. 
 Market access: TNCs can provide access to export markets, both for existing activities 
and for new activities. They are by definition the only way to enter the international 
production systems that increasingly dominate trade in sophisticated and high-tech 
products. There are also many important benefits in export activity such as: technical 
information, realization of scale economies, competitive stimulus and market 
intelligence. 
14 
 
 Environment: TNCs often possess environmental technologies that can be used in all 
countries in which they operate.
21
 
 
Spillovers in form of increased salaries show that most of the foreign companies pay a 
higher wage than local firms, in both developed and developing countries. Also in those cases 
of a foreign takeover of a domestically owned firm, the salaries rose. In the opposite case, 
where a foreign owned firm experiences a takeover from a domestic firm, it showed the 
opposite effect on wages. This illustrates that foreign takeovers produce wage increases. Still, 
the effect of wage-spillovers is not exclusively positive. Mexico and Venezuela showed 
negative effect on foreign firm spillovers in form of wages. There are several plausible 
explanations, but restrictive labor market conditions seemed imperative to the outcome. An 
“employment laws index” produced by the World Bank, showed that Mexico and Venezuela 
were ranked among the most restrictive countries when it came to legislation on employment 
and dismissal of labor. 
22
 A highly protected market and a locally owned sector can be 
inefficient and lacking entrepreneurship, which makes it difficult for local firms to compete 
with foreign investments that may have received incentives from the host nation to produce in 
their economy.
23
 As I will elaborate later in this thesis, the Cuban institutions which manage 
employment, and the legislation concerning it, are both restrictive and bureaucratic.  
2.1.4 Does FDI work? 
Here I address some theories concerning to what degree FDI actually provides the spillovers it 
promises. FDI is considered by most developing countries as a vital resource for 
development. Still, the economic effects of FDI are very difficult to measure accurately. The 
econometric analysis of FDI and development is of long standing, but its conclusions remain 
unclear. While some analyses show a positive impact, others remain agnostic. Growth 
depends on many factors whose effects are difficult to disentangle, and since FDI itself affects 
several of these factors, an agnostic conclusion is probably the most sensible according to 
Lall. 
24
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 “Multinational enterprises have encountered hostility and resentment in all countries that host 
substantial foreign investment, but nowhere more than in less democratic countries (LDCs, or as in the 
Cuban  case, a non-democratic country), where they get blamed for the national economy`s manifest 
shortcomings, not to mention that historical sins of colonial domination. Economic analysis has 
played no great part in resolving disputes between critics and defenders of the MNE`s (FDI) role in 
development processes. There is little consensus on what institutions and policies most effectively 
promote the goal of economic development…”25 
 
The quote has relevance to our Cuban case, as the governmental suspicion towards 
foreign activity on the island is one of the major obstacles. Still, in the last 20 -25 years the 
attitude towards FDI has changed, not only in the development literature, but also in the part 
of the national governments traditionally strongly hostile to MNEs and FDI. The appreciation 
of the nature and advantages of FDI in host countries rose, as some developing countries had 
exceptionally successful rates of development drawing heavily on FDI. Many regimes 
restrictive to FDI had to rethink their role as FDI appeared to lead to a higher income of 
capital, and host developing countries improved their capabilities to deal with FDI. The more 
advanced ones showed capability to absorb leading-edge technology transferred by the 
foreign investment, and to attract research and development (R&D) facilities. 
26
 The value of 
manufactured products grew much faster than the value of unprocessed primary products. 
High- tech exports were the fastest growing group and resource- based products the slowest, 
and in high-tech exports, MNEs played the dominant role in most countries. 
These developments occurred and coincided with growing liberalization of trade and a 
more general reduction in the role of the state in economic activity. Liberalization removed 
many inefficient and uneconomic interventions, but in some cases, the shift to market forces 
may have been carried too far, and possible deficiencies in free markets were ignored. The 
neoliberal approach (the Washington Consensus) led many governments not only to remove 
all restraints to FDI flows, but also to abrogate tools to attract, target, guide and bargain with 
the investors. The objectives of a foreign investor can differ from those of host governments, 
as governments might seek to spur development, while the investor wish to enhance their 
profitability and competitiveness.  
Even though the results of FDI are unclear, the presence of a foreign actor with 
superior knowledge and technology brings something to the host economy; it is necessary and 
imperative, on the part of host countries, to improve national competitiveness. That means the 
ability of the economy to sustain income growth in an open setting. Growth can be sustained 
only if countries can create new, higher value-added activities that hold their own in free 
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markets. It requires a lot, but the ability to use new technologies efficiently and furnishing the 
requisite skills and strong institutions, are central to the host nations.
27
A certain level of 
economic freedom is also crucial to appear attractive and committed to the investment.  
Lall addresses an issue that would appear to be of importance for host nations such as Cuba, 
especially the second set of market failure, namely that: 
 
“Policies on FDI are needed to counter two sets of market failures. The first arises from information 
or coordination failures in the investment process, which can lead a country to attract insufficient FDI 
or the wrong quality of FDI. The second arises from divergences between the private interests of 
investors and the economic interests of the host country  This can lead FDI to have negative effects on 
development, or to positive but static benefits. Private and social interests may of course diverge for 
any investment, local or foreign. However, some divergences are specific to foreign investment. FDI 
differs from local investment in that the locus of decision-making and sources of competitiveness in 
the former lie abroad. The foreign investor has less commitment to the host economy and is also more 
mobile. Many governments feel that foreign ownership has to be controlled on non-economic 
grounds, for instance, to keep cultural or strategic activities in national hands.”28  
 
Cuba has been very cautious in regards to who they allow to invest, and within which 
sector. Many would call Cuba paranoid when it comes to conspiracy theories about 
espionage, and Cuba has arrested foreign businessmen accusing them for bribery and other 
charges which severely hurt their level of credible commitment.
29
 I will return to this matter 
in the analysis.  
What Moran et.al, recognizes is that where FDI can operate within an open framework 
for trade and investment, it positively affects the economy and the development of the host 
country. FDI in an environment where local affiliates produce for the domestic market behind 
trade barriers, with joint ventures and strict rules and laws for the foreign investors, has had a 
much less positive impact on host economy and welfare.
30
 Our Cuban case would be placed 
under the latter strategy; we will return to this subject as we treat the laws on FDI from 1995 
and 2014. 
Although we have established some of the positive effects of FDI, they do not 
automatically provide spillovers and benefits to host economies without the creation of a 
proper environment for absorption. If the environment is not in proper condition, the countries 
may have to choose between investments that offer short as opposed to long term benefits; the 
former may lead to static gains but not necessarily to dynamic ones. Cuba appears unprecise 
about what gains they really want from FDI.  
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A large inflow of FDI can add to foreign exchange and investment resources in the 
host economy, but it may also lead to a crowding out of local firms or crate exchange rate 
problems. If the government wants to generate employment, they might favor labor-intensive, 
low technology investment, and if they were to promote technology development it would 
favor more sophisticated investors. There are many “trade-offs”, and there is no universal 
answer to how they should be made; there is, so far, no ideal policy on FDI that applies to all 
countries at all times.
31
  
The most attractive immobile assets for export-oriented foreign investors are primary 
resources, good infrastructure, skilled and productive labor, and a line of efficient suppliers, 
competitors, support-institutions and services. Cheap unskilled labor still remains a source of 
competitive advantage, but its importance is diminishing, and it is not a base for sustainable 
growth since rising incomes erode the edge it provides, which has been the case in China 
lately. Natural resources are similar: they provide a rent as long as the particular commodities 
are in demand, but without upgrading technologies or setting up downstream industries, they 
may suffer of stagnant prices or substitution. However, attracting FDIs mobile assets requires 
host countries to improve the quality of their immobile assets and create an unhostile 
investment environment.
32
 What is relevant for our case is the general understanding of why 
host countries choose FDI as a development strategy when they look at the existing research 
on theories and functionalities of FDI. Also, which requirements need to be fulfilled to create 
an attractive investment environment in the host economy, is of interest.  
In the globalized world, developing countries wish to appear as suitable host nations, 
with a favorable environment for investment, to international actors. The A.T. Kearny Foreign 
Direct Investment Confidence Index (FICI) was established in 1998. The FICI ranks the top 
countries for FDI based on how changes in their political, economic, and regulatory systems 
are likely to affect foreign direct investment inflows in the coming years. To be a part of this 
list creates credibility through reputation, as well as confidence, as the FICI is considered a 
trustworthy index by investors.
33
 
Dani Rodrik, on the other hand, criticizes this system where states consider FDI as the 
ultimate yardstick for evaluating government action, and seek to enter such indexes as 
mentioned above. It should not be necessary to appeal to “investor sentiment” or 
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“competiveness in world markets” to get policy maker´s attention. He criticizes the universal 
understanding of trade and investment policies as the surest way to achieve economic growth 
and poverty alleviation, as insertion in the world economy is more complicated than just 
removing trade and investment barriers. Countries also have to comply with a long list of 
admission requirements, and comprehensive institutional reforms, supposedly to maximize 
the gains and minimize the risks of participation in the world economy. Global integration has 
become, for all practical purposes, a substitute for a development strategy. 
 Rodrik says that complying with the first order of business diverts human resources, 
administrative capabilities, and political capital away from more urgent development 
priorities as education, public health, industrial capacity, and social cohesion. It will 
undermine democratic institutions by removing the choice of development strategy from the 
public debate.
34
 Bilateral and regional trade agreements impose tight prerequisites on 
developing countries in return for crumbs of enhanced “market access” in the larger partners. 
The institutional reforms needed to join the international economic community are 
expensive and preclude investments in other crucial areas, but supposedly these costs will be 
more than compensated by the cash increases in economic growth results from insertion into 
the global marketplace. The East Asian tigers or China have often been used as an example of 
what FDI and trade can achieve, but in these countries, trade liberalization was a gradual 
process over a period of decades rather than years. They combined their outward orientation 
with high levels of tariff and non-tariff barriers, public ownership of large segments of 
banking and industry, export subsidies, domestic-content requirements, import-export 
linkages, patent and copyright infringements, directed credit and restrictions on capital flow. 
Such policies are precluded by today´s trade rules, or are frowned upon by IMF and the 
World Bank.
35
 It was not until after there had been a transition to high growth that significant 
import liberalization took place. Few of the national success stories of economic growth are 
taken from the “Washington Consensus” economic policies. Development strategies need to 
be tailored to prevailing domestic institutional strengths, according to Rodrik. 
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“Policy makers that look to Washington and financial markets for the answers are 
condemning themselves to mimicking the conventional wisdom du jour, and eventual 
disillusionment.”36     
 
However, what is economically wise for states opening their economy is not the same 
as what is needed to appear attractive to foreign investors. Given that states have decided to 
attract FDI, and wants to appear as attractive host nations on the international market, the 
theory states that it is important that host nations establish legislation favorable for 
investments that comply with international agreements like those of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) and BITs. Also, investors require a labor force, location, access to 
market, tariff barriers, respect for international agreements on trade as “The Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights” (TRIPS), personal security, possibility 
of expansion, political stability, competiveness, financial regime and system, conditions for 
export and import, authorization processes, establishment costs, law, property rights, and 
more as they seek to invest. These requirements add up to the degree of “credible 
commitment” a host country has on the international arena. Credible commitment is the key 
term for attracting FDI. The term covers all the important factors that need to be in place in 
order to appear attractive to foreign investors. The level of credible commitment and inflow 
of FDI are again affected by the host country´s institutional framework. I will return to the 
concept of “credible commitment” and institutions in the next sections of the theory chapter. 
The factors affecting investor choice of location relate to efficiency and 
competitiveness. The sites that will receive most FDI are those that allow foreign companies 
to set up facilities able to withstand global competition. The host country has to provide 
competitive immobile assets through skills, infrastructure, services, supply networks and 
institutions, to complement the mobile assets (financial capital, skilled workers, household 
with external incomes) of foreign companies.
37
 Large markets will continue to attract more 
investment than small ones due to transport costs and taste differences, and few countries can 
afford to take a continued inflow of FDI (especially high quality, export oriented FDI) for 
granted. Lall says it well: 
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 “This means that the ultimate draw for FDI is the economic base of the host 
country: just offering incentives for investors cannot compensate for the lack of such 
a base.”38 
  
Let us keep Lall in mind as we in chapter 5 address the economic base of Cuba and the 
FDI sector. 
 Conditions for FDI to work. 2.2
In this section, I will address which conditions need to be in place for flows of FDI to occur 
and function. There is an existing debate of what kinds of conditions are needed, and there are 
many conditions to consider. Central to these conditions is the term credible commitment, 
which again is affected by the institutional framework of a host nation. The institutional 
theories address the importance of the relationship between formal and informal rules and 
norms, state and economy, and society and cultural heritage. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Factors affecting C.C and FDI 
Source: Own figure. 
 
                                                 
38
 Ibid. P. 9 
Formal/ informal 
Rules & norms 
Economy/State 
& 
Society/Cultural   
heritage 
Credible 
Commitment 
FDI 
Institutions 
21 
 
In Figure 2 we have an overview of the conditions I will be addressing in this thesis 
and how the various factors affect each other. The state economy, policy, and the social and 
cultural heritage form the institutions which constitutes of different sets of formal/informal 
norms and rules. The norms and rules can create changes within the institutions, which may 
affect economy, policy, social and cultural behavior. All of them have an effect on the degree 
of credible commitment, which again affects the amount of FDI attracted. The other way 
around, FDI may also strengthen credible commitment through the inflow stream of “heavy” 
actors, giving the host nation credibility on the international arena. 
2.2.1 Credible Commitment 
What kind of “commitments” are we talking about when we relate the term with FDI? An 
investor that wishes to invest money into a state`s economy, or other another company, will 
need safety through legislation and strong institutions to be sure that the values that are 
invested are safe. Also, the possibility that future profits can be retracted or reinvested into the 
host economy`s markets.  
Economies that have developed institutions, and can provide a high level of credible 
commitment, will enable more complex contracting. Throughout most of history and in much 
of the present world, institutions have not provided the credible commitment necessary for the 
development of low cost transactions in capital and other markets. There exists little evidence 
to support the view held by many economists, which is that the necessary institutions will be 
the automatic outcome of getting the prices right through elimination of price and exchange 
controls.
39
 What is interesting with North´s study is that it seeks to discover how institutions 
evolve through time, and why institutions that produce poor economic and political 
performance can persist. This should be interesting to apply on this case-study on FDI in 
Cuba.  
The problem, according to North, is simple: 
 
“How to bind the players to agreements across space and time?”40   
 
It is the informal norms that follow the formal rules that need to be revised. The 
existing literature concerning informal restrictions has focused on how these restrictions can 
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modify or enhance formal rules in both politics and economy.
41
 My understanding of North is 
reformation, or restructuring of the economy, without informal norms to support the formal 
norm changes, will not lead to a “deep” enough change. This again will not create the credible 
commitment a state seeks to build or improve. The strength of property rights, formal and 
informal rules, affects the degree of credible commitment a host nation appears with on the 
international market.  
To achieve a satisfying degree of safety and to have low cost enforcement of contracts 
in international trade, you have to have a third party enforcement, which ultimately means 
polity or the state. You have to create a political system that will create rules and laws and 
enforce them at a low cost.
42
 What investors need is a certain level of credible commitment. 
This also applies for the host country seeking serious actors. It is a two-way relation. This is 
what makes it possible to have a successful impersonal exchange worldwide, with 
international organizations as WTO and the International Centre for the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID) to monitor trade and punish those who do not follow the game. 
International law enforcement, though, will always be difficult when players are autonomous 
states. Those are also imperfect institutions trying to control a difficult situation of world 
trade and globalization.  
Singh agrees with North´s perspectives, and mentions in his case study that “optimal 
credible commitment” entails rules or property rights that are impartial, transparent and 
legally binding. Rule of law, an independent judiciary, and an effective regulator are keys to 
ensuring that property rights meet all these conditions.
43
   
The degree of commitment represents the variation of FDI that exists in a country. 
Both domestic and international states can make commitments toward reformations. Most 
existing commitments at the international level often reflect domestic commitment level. One 
of the formal ways to conclude international commitments is through the framework 
elaborated by WTO, the “General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)”, at the Uruguay 
round in 1986-1994.
44
 Such commitments are important for investors looking for up-and-
coming markets. 
We see that creating and strengthening credible commitment and property rights is 
important when we want to explain variations in flows of FDI. International commitments are 
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important because they make one country`s commitments transparent. The enforcement of 
commitment is contingent upon the domestic institutions. When domestic institutions can`t 
successfully realize the commitments, they will lose credibility. An international commitment 
alone will not be enough to attract FDI. The degree of divergence from the national 
liberalization program is reflected in the degree of variation of flows of FDI.
45
 Furthermore, 
Peter North emphasizes the time it takes to establish a credible reputation as crucial. Time is 
important for the investors since the uncertainty about the ruler´s behavior can only be 
diminished by the ruler establishing a reputation.
46
    
Low trust societies, which are struggling to realize the gains from trade and gains from 
innovation precisely because of the prevalence of predation, will have the most difficult time 
establishing credible commitments and signaling the content of that commitment in a way that 
solicits confidence that promises will be kept.
47
 In order to realize the great benefits of social 
corporations under the division of labor, credible commitments that bind the behavior of 
public officials must be established; this binding of government must be done in a way that 
signals to citizens that promises made will be kept. Also, in terms of the institutional design 
and with respect to the consistency with the underlying belief system in that society, the 
constitution being put in place must be self-sustaining.
48
 
2.2.2 Institutions 
In this section, I will explore the meaning of the term institution, how it is applied and what is 
considered to be an institution. This is important for the thesis because the very essence of 
achieving successful reformations and absorption of FDI is, according to theory, the existence 
of strong institutions. I will mainly be using Douglass Cecil North´s discussion paper
49
, and 
article
50
 on institutions, Gretchen Helmke and Steven Levitsky book on “informal institutions 
and democracy” (partially building on North),51 and the case study of J.P Singh on “FDI 
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variation in Emerging Markets”.52 I use the above mentioned works on institutions as I find 
them applicable to our case. North talks about two main issues:  
 
“What makes dysfunctional economies or economies that do not work well, and what 
we can do about it”53  
 
The problem with institutional economics, and the reason it has faded from sight, is 
that it did not address explicitly the issues that had to be solved. According to North we have 
to understand what make economies work the way they do, which is a necessary precondition 
to say something about how we can make them work better.
54
 Therefore, I begin with a 
presentation of what institutions are, how they work, and why they work the way they do. 
Revising the whole institutional paradigm within politics, economics, society and cultural 
heritage would have given us a greater perspective on Cuba´s institutional framework, but this 
would demand a study of greater scale. I will address them in chapter 4 within the framework 
of “idealist and pragmatic cycles” of Mesa-Lago, with the perspective of how they affect the 
credible commitment and FDI. 
Opening the market for FDI was one of the key points in the “Washington 
Consensus”, but North argues that neoclassical economics never was intended to deal with the 
issues of economic development. It evolved in the late nineteenth century and its objective 
was to explain efficient resource allocation in developed economies. It had two failures 
though,  
1. It was frictionless; 
2. It was timeless, static rather than dynamic in terms of its issues.  
North´s presentation of institutions starts with some very basic assumptions, but gives us clear 
directions when we try to interpret and analyze our Cuban case. He says: 
 
“Institutions would not exist in a frictionless world where there is no uncertainty. Institutions exist to 
reduce uncertainty in the world. In a world without institutions we would not know how to deal with 
each other. Institutions are the incentive system that structure human interaction. They can make 
predictable our dealings with each other every day in all kinds of forms and shapes. They thereby not 
only reduce uncertainty in the world but allow us to get on with everyday business and solve problems 
effectively. When we say institutions structure human interactions what we mean is that they provide 
incentives and disincentives for people to behave in certain ways; and if they are effective they 
structure and provide incentives and also structure economic, political and social activity. One cannot 
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make sense out of the world with just economic reasoning. You have to know political and social 
theory and, as you are going to see, you must also know cognitive science.”55 
 
 
The reason one needs to know all of this is that we do not live only in an economic 
world, a political world or a social world, but in a world that consist in a mixture of all of 
them. The institutional theory should embody all of them and not only integrate various 
disciplines. It should also be able to integrate the analysis with those parts of neoclassical 
economic theory that are useful and helpful in solving problems. I will be addressing the 
formal and informal rules and norms that follow the various institutions to see how they affect 
Cuba`s credible commitment and flows of FDI.  
Peter Boettke agrees with North´s presumptions, but elaborates on the notion of 
society and cultural heritage.  
 
“This evolution of thought from prices to institutions to culture should not be interpreted as 
superseding what was learned during the earlier stage. But instead the stages should be viewed as the 
outgrowth of delving deeper into the original question of how to get an economy on track to provide 
generalized prosperity to the people within that economy. Generalized prosperity cannot be had 
without a private property market economy, but such an economy cannot be established on a wide 
scale without a system of governance bound by general rules and strict limits established on state 
action, and a country cannot meaningfully institute general rules and strict limits unless the informal 
beliefs and institutions of the people in question legitimate those rules and limits.”56 
 
 
The general lessons learned from the post-communist experience, is that we must see 
beliefs that legitimate the ends of governments; limits on the stakes of politics must be in 
place; property rights and personal rights must be defined; and credible and binding 
commitments to respect these rights must be established. The key to political order (according 
to North) is the establishment of credible bounds on the behavior of political officials. Private 
incentives may thwart economic progress by curtailing the progression from personal 
exchange networks to the extended order of impersonal exchange and realizing the gains from 
specialization, exchange, and social cooperation under the division of labor. To explain the 
wealth and poverty of nations, we must look towards the fundamental institutions of 
governance that “curb the predatory proclivities of man”.57 Also, a government strong enough 
to establish a constitution is almost by definition strong enough to break the constitutional 
                                                 
55
 Ibid. P. 1 
56
 Boettke, "Institutional Transition and the Problem of Credible Commitment." P. 46 
57
 North in ibid. P. 48 
26 
 
bindings any time it desires for political expediency. The tying of the rulers’ hands in politics 
appears to be more difficult than presumed, especially in autocracies and totalitarian states.
58
 
2.2.3 Formal/informal norms and rules 
In this section, I will look closer at the “formal” and “informal” sides of norms and rules. 
Helmke and Levitsky use the term “informal institutions” in their theory, which are socially 
shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created, communicated, and enforced outside 
officially sanctioned channels.
59
 Other authors would call for an own interpretation of 
informal institutions, but I understand them as informal norms and rules. Informal norms and 
rules are often enforced by actors and institutions within the state itself. I see institutions as a 
form of existing organization, office or equal, with formal and informal norms and rules that 
regulate and affect efficiency. Formal norms and rules are procedures that are created, 
communicated, and enforced through channels that are widely accepted as official.  
The way actors perceive the issues that confront a society will shape the policies that 
they pursue. Surely, 70 years of communist policies should persuade economists that ideas 
matter and that there is no guarantee that the mental models, that models human construct to 
explain the world around them, will converge into a common denominator. Or that this 
denominator makes them develop a common interpretation implied by a rationality model. 
Surely, Fidel or Raúl Castro would benefit from a common set of ideas implemented through 
institutions within each sector of society. The interaction between the mental models that a 
society possesses, the institutional structure of formal/informal norms and rules, and 
consequent organizations, is the key to path dependence.
60
  
The rulers must also signal specific content to the actors in the economy who have 
experienced public predation by the state far greater than the private predation the state was 
created to ward off. The citizens of the former Soviet Union had many times before heard that 
reforms were being introduced that would grant them more freedom in economic and political 
life, only to have those promises broken almost as soon as they were uttered. The relation 
between the citizens and the state was referred to as the “Big Lie”. To establish credible 
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bounds on their behavior, the rulers must do so in a manner that credibly signals to citizens 
(and investors) that they will keep their promise.
61
 
In many contexts, informal rules and norms shape more strongly political behavior and 
outcomes than the formal, through bureaucratic and legislative norms of clientelism and 
patrimonialism. Scholars often fail to consider these informal rules of the game, thereby 
missing many of the most important incentives and constraints that underlie political behavior 
and economic outcomes.
62
 
In our case, the Cuban way of doing things economically, politically and socially are 
central. North have a similar understanding of the terms; he thinks that in many ways the 
“informal norms” are more important than the “formal rules”. Institutions are made up of 
formal rules, informal constraints and their enforcement characteristics. Formal rules are those 
put into place as laws, constitutions and regulations, and have the character of being specific 
and defined precisely. Informal norms and constraints do not show up in formal terms, but 
may have a great effect on end results of formal legislations. They are ways of doing things, 
and the kind of formal rules that we have occupy a very small proportion of the guides to 
everyday behavior and actions compared to the informal.
63
 
We observe that formal/informal institutional relationships are dynamic. Informal 
institutional elements often serve as a catalyst for change in the formal institutional elements. 
Formal rules may be created to entrench informal norms that actors find beneficial. The 
formal rules may also be modified to close loopholes exploited through informal norms. The 
informal elements may again lead to formal institutional collapse, by drawing public attention 
to the ineffectiveness of formal rules, and they may also contribute to formal institutional 
stability by enhancing the performance or increasing the benefits gained by working within 
them.
64
 In political science, the world of informal institutions have been elaborated within 
different fields of study as “prismatic societies”, “moral economies”, “economies of 
affection”, “legal pluralism”, “clientelism”, “corruption” and consociationalism. Some good 
examples of informal institutions, rules and norms are the Mexican “dedazo” (“big finger”), 
an unwritten code that gave the sitting president the right to choose his successor and 
prohibited potential candidates from openly seeking the job. In addition, the Japanese strict, 
but unwritten, rules of “Amakudari” (“descent from heaven”), through which retiring state 
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bureaucrats are awarded top positions in private corporations, have survived decades of 
administrative reforms.
65
 We will be crossing some of the above mentioned fields of study in 
this thesis.   
It is difficult to create change to enhance performance. While formal institutions, rules 
and norms can be elaborated and established, the informal ones are often portrayed as highly 
resistant to change. Like culture, they are often assumed to possess a tenacious survival 
ability, which allows them to endure regardless of the formal institutional context. Change is 
expected to be slow and incremental because they do not possess a center which directs and 
co-ordinates their actions, however, Helmke and Levitsky argue that change within informal 
institutions may be more frequent than we often assume (as we will see in the idealist and 
pragmatic cycles of Cuban policies in chapter four). This would happen by actor beliefs about 
the opportunities and threats they face. If actors´ shared expectations about the costs or 
benefits of an informal rule should change, then informal institutions, even long established 
ones, may change quickly.
66
  
North argues that “organizations” are the primary source of institutional change; the 
greater the competition between organizations, the greater is the incentive to invest in skills 
and knowledge to enhance the organizations survival opportunities and hence the greater the 
rate of institutional change. In the case of Cuba, all economic organizations are state 
institutions; I therefore choose to refer to them as institutions. Since organizations are the 
agents of change in an economy, a change in the bargaining power of existing organizations 
will lead to alterations in the institutional framework. A decline in the perceived effectiveness 
of existing organizations will weaken their ability to maintain and support the existing 
institutional structure.
67
 Changes in the formal rules come through the polity (broadly 
encompassing the judicial, executive and legislative branches). Successful economic growth 
has historically been linked to the evolution of representative government, and secure 
property rights through the rule of law. What is not accounted for is how we explain growth in 
some modern economies which have not evolved representative institutions and has had 
government corruption and mismanagement strangle economic opportunities (Cuba, Vietnam, 
China).  
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On this notion, I present some basic assumptions of what needs to be present to 
enhance the credibility of an actor. First, as mentioned above, formal rules are an important 
part of the institutional framework. For them to be effective they need to be accompanied by a 
set of informal constraints (conventions, norms of behavior) that supplement them and reduce 
enforcement costs. Political instability occurs if the formal rules and informal constraints are 
inconsistent with each other. The political consequence is that it takes more time to develop 
norms for behavior than it does to shape formal rules, and for the economies without any 
traditions for these types of norms, the reconstruction process is long and the result 
unknown.
68
 Second, the objective by reconstructing must be the creation of an adaptively 
efficient economy that over time will provide an institutional framework for a wide menu of 
alternative choices for organizational innovation and also wipe out failures, and to create an 
institutional framework that will get the prices right over time. 
69
 A successful restructuring of 
an economy entails a restructuring of property rights to provide the “correct” incentives and a 
restructuring of the mental model of the players to induce choices that are complementary to 
such incentives. To restructure does not only mean to create formal rules, but also to create 
and implement a legislation that will be impartially enforced.
70
 It may be too much to demand 
from a state under reconstruction to comply with all of the assumptions above, but to a certain 
degree, it would enhance the credible commitment of a host nation. 
2.2.4 State/economy/ & society/cultural heritage 
This section should be read in context with chapter 4. North addresses the complexity of the 
nature of states, economies, societies, the interplay between beliefs systems and their cultural 
heritage, and how they interact with institutions. Borrowing rules from other societies that 
have different informal norms and different enforcement characteristics is a guarantee for 
failure. One has to be conscious about the role of changes in formal rules and how they are 
complemented, supplemented or influenced by norms of behavior. This may be different in 
every society, and neo-classical economists have gone into countries and said that all you 
have to do is to set the “prices right” and everything will work (over simplified). Too many 
times this has had negative consequences for the country`s economy. Not only do you need to 
know about the background and the cultural heritage of a society to have an understanding of 
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the relationship between formal and informal norms, but you also need to be aware of the 
margins where changes will be effective and what the implications of those changes will be 
for complementary informal norms and enforcement characteristics.
71
  
The economic institutions that directly shape our world derive from political 
institutions. Economists might not like to think they are dependent on political sciences, but 
they are. The interesting thing about the institutional theory is that it wishes to address who 
makes the rules and for whom, as well as recognizing the formal rules like constitutions, laws, 
rules and regulations. Therefore, we need to see who make the choices that matter, how they 
get aggregated, and how that turns into polity that makes the rules which in turn shape the 
economy. The economic rules of the game are made and put in place by polity. This concerns 
property rights, and this is important to our case because property rights do not only 
encompass rules about how property is used, alienated and owned, but also the effectiveness 
of enforcing contracts and agreements in laws. It is a political structure that in turn puts in 
place an economic structure that shapes how that society works.  
Many Latin American states have failed to uphold or enforce the rule of law; the laws 
and rights are therefore not executed in a proper manner. The effectiveness, and the extent to 
which rules and procedures that exist on paper are enforced or complied with in practice, is 
important. Where formal rules and institutions are effective, actors believe there is a high 
probability that noncompliance will be sanctioned by official authorities. Where formal rules 
and procedures are ineffective, actors believe the probability of enforcement to be low.
72
 
North also points out that polities are the fundamental obstacles to our ability to improve 
performance because we do not know how to get polities to work well, and Cuba has a long 
history of ad-hoc policies to make economy and socialist ideas comply with each other. Cuba 
being a communist state with all power gathered in the party, and above all in one person, the 
enforcement of law appears dubious at best.  
The set of rules, norms and beliefs that have survived through history are deeply 
embedded in our cultural heritage and society. The cultural heritage produces a mix of good 
and bad that shapes the way in which we make choices and the ways in which societies and 
institutions evolve.
73
 This is important as I address what is the Cuban contextual point of view 
as they introduce reforms to facilitate FDI inflow, and why the obstacles that exist have 
occurred. The rich institutional heritage of political, economic and social rules combined with 
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a belief system have evolved and together shaped the way we see the world, the Cuban 
socialistic way of seeing the world included.  
The cultural heritage and belief system produce results with respect to the way 
problems are approached in the world. This implies that we started with a set of beliefs that 
we derived from the past, then we got new experiences that modify that belief system over 
time. The heritage itself and experiences shape the way we understand the world around us. 
Beliefs are, according to North, everything in the world. Where they come from and 
how they evolve is the key to understanding the evolution of human condition, they are 
generally derived from the historical experiences of human beings in different physical 
settings. There are numerous factors that shape how people make choices, bear in mind that 
by people, we mean everyone from head of state to policemen, economists, terrorists, beggars, 
doctors, etc. In addition to the cultural heritage and experiences they have had, there are 
political systems. As economy moved into politics it carried over the principles of economics 
and applied them to politics, but politicians are never disinterested, and they are always 
concerned with a certain kind of objectives, the Cuban government included. However, we do 
not know how to create polities that work; even if we have a lot of practice around the world 
trying to restructure polities, we have very limited ability to do so.
74
 
Lower information costs now make us more aware of alternatives around the world, 
and therefore increase our ability to see different kinds of experience and different 
experiences of success or failure. To some extent, we have increased knowledge about the 
sources of productivity and what makes polity work. When we put all the previous factors 
together, we have forces operating in conflicting ways. Bad performance arises from 
institutions that are inherited from the past and constrain our behavior, or from a polity that 
does not work well and has in place people with a vested interest in perpetuating inefficient 
rules of the game, but it also has generated lower cost information, and an improved 
understanding of what makes economies work.
75
 The Cubans also look outward to find the 
best ways to incorporate an economic transformation that Fidel swore never to be a part of, 
the neoliberal capitalist game that turned the world into a casino. Their cultural heritage, 
though, may make them search for other things than the “western countries” assume they will 
be searching for. 
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To the degree problems are evolving, we must evolve political, economic and social 
institutions, which will solve those problems. North calls for the need of “adaptive 
efficiency”, which occurs when there are flexible institutions that provide a maximum of 
choices at a given moment of time. In a world of uncertainty, in which nobody knows the 
right answer, you need to try many of things and hope you will find one that works. You also 
need laws and rules, such as bankruptcy laws, that eliminate those that do not work. A society 
with such an institutional framework has a good chance of being successful in surviving and 
continuing to perform well.
76
 
2.2.5 Level of commitment and liberalization  
While North focuses on the importance of institutions, organizations and the informal norms 
that needs to accompany the formal, J.P Singh investigates what is the key to attracting FDI 
by strengthening ones credible commitments both internationally and domestically towards 
liberalization reforms in different sectors. Singh focuses especially on the Asian 
telecommunication market, but we are able to draw general conclusions on the results 
presented by Sing. He focuses on the formal reformation processes that contribute to 
strengthening credible commitment through international, and domestic, treaties and 
liberalization reforms. 
 
The degree of commitment is categorized by:  
 
 “Strong commitment” referring to those states that open their markets in a 
considerable number of sectors and areas.  
 “Reasonably strong commitment” is those who seek to adopt measures to open 
markets in various areas and sectors two to four years after having committed 
themselves to GATS.  
 “Weak commitment” is those who delay the introduction of reforms to after four years 
with a weak commitment to future regulations.  
 
The degree of liberalization is categorized by: 
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 “Strong liberalization”, means basically private competition, and a significant 
presence of foreign actors.  
 “Reasonably strong liberalization”, means at least liberalization of markets in value 
added and specialized services with some foreign entry for operators and users 
allowed.  
 “Weak liberalization” refers to those countries still waiting to introduce any 
significant competition in any market segment, and that still wait to pass major laws 
changing the role of their monopoly operators.  
 Those countries that executed a considerable liberalization of their domestic markets 
were also considered to have strong commitment. The same connection could be 
drawn between reasonably strong commitment and reasonably strong liberalization, 
and weak commitment and weak liberalization.
77
  
 
Still, as mentioned in section 2.2.1, an international commitment alone will not be 
enough to attract FDI. The degree of divergence from the national liberalization program is 
reflected in the degree of variation of flows of FDI. Most existing commitments at the 
international level reflect commitment level domestically. The question is: where does Cuba 
locate itself in Singh´s categorization and are the results compatible with this theory? Cuba´s 
signing of the GATS (General Agreement on Trade in Services) agreement in 1995 could be 
used to determine the grade of liberalization and commitment shown by Cuba. It was a good 
tactic to promote law 77 on FDI in hope of attracting investment. Still, I suggest that in our 
case we first look at the period between 1995 and 2006 to establish the initial grade of 
liberalization and commitment. Secondly, we address the period from 2007, and the “cycle of 
restructuration” that Raúl initiated (also referred to as the “liniamientos”) until present day. 
 Summary    2.3
We have already established that FDI does not automatically lead to prosperity and growth 
without the creation of a proper environment for absorption. If the environment is not optimal, 
the countries may have to choose between short term and long term beneficial investments, 
which may lead to static gains, but leaving dynamic ones out. The reasons for host nations to 
use FDI as a strategy for development can be measured in direct and indirect effects;  
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1. FDI as a direct effect brings capital that can be used on the international market. 
2. The indirect effects of FDI come through spillovers to society from wages, 
technology, skills and management, market access, environmental policies and 
technology, and more.   
 
The sites that will receive most FDI are those that allow foreign companies to set up 
facilities able to withstand global competition. The host country has to provide competitive 
immobile assets through skills, infrastructure, services, supply networks and institutions, to 
complement the mobile assets of foreign companies. Growth can be sustained only if 
countries can create new, higher value-added activities that hold their own in free markets. It 
requires a lot, but the ability to use new technologies efficiently, and furnishing the requisite 
skills and strong institutions are central to the host nations.  
With this in mind, it is clear that Cuba does not comply with all of the demands the 
theory presents. Rather, Cuba has its own way of understanding how FDI should be 
implemented and explored. They are currently using a much criticized method of “free trade 
zones”, at the same time as Raúl himself have declared all sectors of the economy opened 
except health, education and the military.
78
 If FDI is to flow into Cuba, we need to take a look 
at how it could work on Cuba. It may be that the idea Cuba has of FDI will not work when put 
to life, though it would work perfectly in a vacuum.    
Addressing institutions in section 2.2.2, we notice that they are slightly more difficult 
to classify than what is FDI. They exist in every form in our daily lives and are central to our 
understanding of the world. Institutions reduce uncertainty in the world, so that we can know 
how to deal with each other. On the philosophical level, institutions are the incentive systems 
that structure human interaction, reduce uncertainty in the world as we go on with everyday 
business, and solve problems effectively. They provide incentives and disincentives for 
people to behave in certain ways. 
What is interesting for our case is that if the institutions are effective, they can 
structure and provide incentives and structures for economic, political and social activity. We 
do not live only in an economic world, a political world or social world, but in a world that 
consists of a mixture of all of them. The institutional theory I am using in this case will 
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embody all of them on some level, but I will focus on those affecting the FDI paradigm. Also, 
the interplay between beliefs systems and the cultural heritage, and how they interact with 
institutions, is of a highly complex nature. It will be impossible to give a whole definition of 
actual factors affecting FDI inflows, but I will elaborate on the very central formal/informal 
rules and norms that we can identify.    
The economy, politics, and society are the three central factors I will be focusing on in 
the analysis, see table 1. Within the three of them, we can find a path to realize a higher 
degree of credible commitment. The institutions are made up of formal rules like laws, 
constitutions, regulations, and have the character of being specific and precisely defined. The 
informal norms and constraints are ways of doing things, and compared to formal rules they 
have a much greater effect on everyday behavior and actions. They do not appear in formal 
terms, but may have great effect on end results of formal legislations. One has to be conscious 
about the role of changes in formal rules and how they are complemented, supplemented or 
influenced by norms of behavior. What follows is a model I have constructed to help us focus 
our attention towards the FDI sector.   
 
Factors Formal Rules and 
Norms 
Informal Rules and 
Norms 
Institutions 
Economy 
 
 
 
 
Central Planned     
Market mechanisms in 
free zones                   
Law 77 and Law 118 
Property rights 
Commitment trough law 
Constitution 
Behavior                
Actions          
Commitment  
The State                    
CCP                   
MINCEX 
Politics Law 77 And Law 118 
Free Zones            
Property rights 
Commitment trough law     
Constitution 
Behavior              
Ideology               
Rhetoric                                 
History 
The State                    
CCP                    
MINCEX 
Society & Cultural 
heritage 
Education                  
Laws                             
Constitution 
Belief 
History 
  
The State                  
Education system            
Belief system (Cuban 
Socialism)  
Table 1: Factors to be considered 
Source: Own table 
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On the basis of the theory, this model should help us as we address the Cuban case. As 
formerly mentioned in this chapter, we need to see who makes the choices that matter, how 
they are aggregated, and how that turns into polity that makes the rules, that in turn shapes the 
economy. In our case, that means the Cuban government, the “Ministerio del Comercio 
Exterior y la Inversión Extranjera” (MINCEX) institution and the laws enacted the last 
decades. The economic rules of the game is made and put in place by polity. It is a political 
structure that in turn puts in place an economic structure that shapes how that society works.   
In section 2.2.1 we elaborated on the term credible commitment; it is the degree of security a 
host nation can give to foreign investors or “how to bind players to agreements across space 
and time”, as North puts it. In accordance with the institutional theory, I find that there are 
four points important to elaborate in my case. 
 
1. To investigate the formal rules and the set of informal constraints that accompany 
them, and how the outcome on the level of credible commitment will be if they are 
inconsistent with each other. 
2. Reviewing the existing organizations/institutions that deal with developing the FDI 
sector, and analyzing the assertion that the competition and bargaining power between 
them causes alteration in the institutional framework. Also, to look if the objective of 
structural reforms really is to create an adaptively efficient economy that will provide 
an institutional framework, or to maintain political status quo on one hand while 
generating wealth to the state on the other. 
3. To address if the changes in formal rules have contributed to successful economic 
growth; or if there is a need for a more representative government and enhanced 
property rights. 
4. Also, to elaborate if cultural heritage and mental models affect the outcome of the FDI 
sector and if Cuban government is prepared to actually reform, or whether they will 
turn back to “idealism” in the context of the inevitably painful period of 
reconstruction. 
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3 Methodology 
The methodological outline of this thesis is presented in this chapter. I will start by giving a 
description of the case study, based on the literature of Robert K. Yin, 
79
 and justify why it is 
applicable to the case of FDI presented in this thesis. Then I will present my research design 
to give transparency to the various steps of the study. The validity and reliability of the data 
applied is discussed in the following section, as is how the data was collected. At the end of 
this chapter, I discuss various biases and limitations of the chosen methods, empirical data 
and analysis. Though I use general theory of case-study research, I focus on presenting what 
is specifically good, and not so good, in my case-study.  
3.1.1 Why a Case Study? 
The case study is one of several ways of doing social science research. Each method has its 
advantages and disadvantages. Yin presents the case study as a preferable method when three 
conditions are in place;  
 
(a) When “how” and “why” questions are being posed, (b) the investigator has little control 
over events, and (c) the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within a real life context. 
80
  
 
This situation distinguishes case study research from other types of social science 
research. Still, methods all overlap in many ways, and are not marked by sharp boundaries. 
The case study is considered a “soft” form of research. Still, as there will be many more 
variables of interest than data points, an essential tactic is to use multiple sources of evidence 
with a triangular conversion of data, which makes case study “hard”. It has been a common 
research method in psychology, sociology, political science, anthropology, social work, 
education, nursing, and community planning, and even in economics. All disciplines have 
their distinctive need for a case study approach to understand a complex social phenomenon. 
The case study method allows us to retain the holistic and meaningful characteristics of real 
life events. 
81
 This case study is conducted with qualitative research, because it is used to 
uncover essential features of a case (FDI, credible commitment and institutions) and then 
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illuminate key relationships among these features. However, the case study method goes 
beyond being a type of qualitative research. It uses a mix of quantitative and qualitative 
evidence, which I take advantage of in this case when I focus on numbers and statistics on 
FDI.       
Due to the economic limits and timeframe, the case study approach suits the objective 
of this thesis. It allows for an exploration of different aspects of the Cuban struggle for 
credible commitment through analyzing the authority´s goals with the FDI policy and the 
existing obstacles within the institutional framework. This approach also takes contextual 
factors into account. The difficulty of accessing credible data also makes the case study 
especially suitable, as case study research does not discriminate between different types of 
data collection methods. As this thesis focuses on contemporary (last 20 years) events, the 
case study is the preferable choice of method. However, I also use the historical context to 
establish the “economy/state” and “society/cultural heritage” background to the case. It is 
manageable as the case study and history relies on many of the same techniques.
82
 In 
conducting a case study, my goal is to expand and generalize theories (analytic 
generalization) and not to enumerate frequencies (as in statistical theories). The central 
tendency among all case studies is that they try to illuminate a decision or set of decisions: 
why they were taken, how they were implemented, and with what result.
83
 This is exactly 
what I do when I analyze policies and the execution of policies towards the FDI sector by the 
Cuban government. Yin´s technical definition of case studies is that: 
 
“A case study is an empirical inquiry that a) investigates a contemporary phenomenon 
in depth and within its real-life context, especially when b) the boundaries between 
phenomenon and context are not clearly evident.”84 
 
The Cuban contemporary struggle for credible commitment and FDI is based on the 
boundaries that exist between the context of Cuban institutional development and the 
execution of formal rules through informal norms. Therefore, I chose to use the case-study 
approach to understand a real-life phenomenon in depth, but it encompasses important 
contextual conditions. I use Yin´s fifth “rationale” for a single-case study, where I study the 
case at two different points in time (1995-2006 and 2007-2015). With the established theory, I 
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specify how certain conditions change over time. It is a holistic design, which studies the 
nature of Cuba´s FDI paradigm.   
The case study is also a form of inquiry that does not depend solely on ethnographic 
data (long periods of time in the “field”) or participant observer data (also a circumstantial 
investment in the field). It is possible to do a valid and high quality case study without leaving 
the telephone or internet, depending upon the topic being studied.
85
 Because I wish to 
understand complex social and economic phenomena, the case study method allows me to 
retain the holistic and meaningful characteristics of real life events, such as behavior, 
international relations, maturation of industries and organizational and managerial 
processes.
86
 There are many well-elaborated studies on the Cuban economy, and FDI is a part 
of it most studies, by “Centro de Estudios de la Economía Cubana de la Universidad de La 
Habana” (CEEC), and also external institutions. However, there is no extensive amount of 
literature investigating Cuban institutions and the relation between institution, credible 
commitment and FDI on Cuba.  
3.1.2 Research Design 
I am studying why the inflow currents of FDI have been absent even though the Cuban 
government has introduced a variety of different liberalizing reforms. I do this by analyzing 
formal and informal rules and norms within the institutions that handle FDI, to see how it 
affects Cuba´s level of credible commitment, which reflects investor´s will to invest in the 
island economy. To do this, I examined several studies on similar topics within the FDI and 
institutional paradigm before I narrowed down my interest to a key topic, which I formulated 
in the questions in chapter 1.2, “defining the case”. I created the questions on the propositions 
that formal and informal rules and norms affect Cuba´s credible commitment, which again 
affects inflow currents of FDI.  
Even though the case study does not demand a clear preference of research design, 
certain steps had to be taken to advance from initial research questions to concluding answers. 
This had to be done in an order that firmly addressed the questions. I chose to introduce a 
general theory on the FDI, where direct and indirect effects of spillovers were the main focus 
states look to as they wish to introduce FDI to their economy. Second, I presented theory on 
what kind of conditions need to be in place for FDI to work. Here, I chose institutional theory 
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on institutions and credible commitment to elaborate on what I would like to investigate 
concerning the lack of inflow currents of FDI to Cuba. Chapter 4, is a contextual chapter that 
help us understand how the institutional framework and political design of the Cuban system 
has evolved. I use the idealist and pragmatic cycles of Mesa-Lago as a framework. In this way 
I establish what is Cuba´s context as the government introduces new reforms to attract FDI, 
which makes it easier to analyze formal and informal rules and norms, and reflects the 
proposition I made in the introduction.  
 
Figure 3: Research Design 
Source: Own figure 
The research design in figure 3 appears more neat and consistent than the actual process has 
been. In reality, I have gone back and forth between the different stages as the thesis gradually 
formed itself, and it became clear which questions I could answer based on the existing 
material and timeframe.  
Initially, the general topic of my thesis started with a plan to write about FDI and 
Cuba. Through literature on Cuba´s economy, it appeared to me that there were several 
obstacles to why FDI remained hesitating, and the same obstacles were generated through the 
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institutional framework of policy and economy concerning FDI. In the beginning I spent 
much time reading theory on FDI to get a general understanding on how it works and how I 
could use it without involving unnecessary information about its effects on society. I 
participated in the Norwegian Latin America Research Network master course, once before I 
had found a topic and a second time where I got help narrowing down and focusing the topic I 
had chosen. The course was initiated by the center of development and environment (SUM) at 
UIO. The institutional theory and the theory on credible commitment I mostly found through 
the works of Peter North. His theories and works were frequently mentioned, or built on, by 
other authors writing on similar topics. Finally, I investigated several books, articles, reports 
and official information on Cuba´s political and economic history since the revolution, with 
the emphasis on the FDI sector. With the literature on theory in mind, I extracted events and 
actions by Cuban government I found important to the forming of the institutional framework 
for FDI that became relevant with the introduction of law 77 in 1995. 
I have favored a broad approach to the research, wanting to study the case from at 
least two different angels: the investor´s angle, which mainly appears in chapter 5; and Cuba´s 
angle, mainly presented through their political, economic, societal and cultural heritage 
context in chapter 4. A third approach to the case is the objective research, building on what 
theory on FDI, institutions and credible commitment states, and the findings I have made in 
the last part of chapter 5.  
 Sources of Data 3.2
This case study is mainly of a qualitative nature, and this method is best understood as a data 
enhancer. This means that when the data I used is enhanced, it is possible to see key aspects 
of the case more clearly. However, this depends on how I search for hidden meanings, non-
obvious features and multiple interpretations. When certain aspects of the data are enhanced, 
it is possible to see certain aspects more clearly. When qualitative methods are used to 
enhance social data, researchers see things about their case they might miss otherwise. The 
key to bringing in-depth knowledge to light is through data enhancement.
87
  
Because of the limits of a master thesis, it was important to consider which theory and 
material I wanted to work with. I chose several academic articles on Cuban economy as they 
are thoroughly elaborating important elements concerning FDI and my thesis. To get a better 
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understanding of investor´s position towards investment on the island, I have used articles and 
interviews in “Financial Times” and a report written by CEEC. In terms of the investment 
environment on the island, I particularly wanted to analyze the two laws specially constructed 
for FDI: Law 77 of 1995 and Law 118 of 2014. These two laws are the main contributions 
since FDI was permitted into the economy. However, the legal framework includes several 
more laws and declarations as seen in appendix II and III.   
As mentioned above, the most available data I found in books, articles and archival 
records, while data that was harder to retrieve was statistics from governmental institutions, 
reports and interviews. On the basis of the data used, I have enhanced information that 
contributes to build my case, in favor of or against it.    
3.2.1 The Unit of Analysis 
The unit of analysis in this thesis is Cuba´s FDI sector. I have delimited the unit by focusing 
on functions within the institutional framework that contribute to a low credible commitment 
at international levels, which affects the inflow current of FDI. I chose specifically law 77 of 
1995 and law 118 of 2014, as they were essential reference points for the timeframe in which 
most of the development in the FDI sector, since the start of the revolution, has taken place. I 
have narrowed down the analysis of Cuba´s FDI sector by presenting specific research 
questions and by selecting a theoretical framework that could provide structure for my 
analysis. The formal and informal rules and norms within the institutions, Cuba´s level of 
credible commitment, and the effect of, and on, FDI have been emphasized to the expense of 
other elements to Cuban economy concerning the FDI sector. Table 1 in section 2.3 gives a 
more detailed overview of factors considered to be of importance to the analysis.    
3.2.2 Validity and Reliability 
We need to have some criteria for trustworthiness, credibility, confirmability and data 
dependability in the thesis. This is done by taking “validity” and “reliability” into 
consideration as we ensure the quality of the research design and the investigation in the 
design process of the case study. According to Yin, to construct validity we have to use 
multiple sources of evidence, establish a chain of evidence and have key informants review 
draft case study report.
88
 I found that to construct validity I had to execute two steps: 
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1. Define the formal and informal rules and norms of the specific institutions (and relate 
them to the original objective of the study) and  
2. Identify operational measures that match the concepts (preferably citing published 
studies that make the same matches).
89
 
 
Furthermore, it was important to discuss how the shortcomings would not bias my 
study. Especially, since there are few studies dedicated to the change in informal rules and 
norms. I have generated validity in this thesis by using multiple sources of evidence and 
applying operational concepts commonly recognized within the FDI and institution paradigm.    
According to Yin, for a study to be reliable, it has to minimize the errors and biases in 
the study to be sure that if a later investigator follows the same procedure and conducted the 
same case study all over again, the later investigator should arrive at the same findings and 
conclusion.
90
 The general way of approaching the reliability problem is to make as many 
steps as operational as possible and conduct a thorough analysis. True reliability could be 
hard to achieve in a case studying informality in institutions, therefore I have narrowed 
“informalities” to address “decision-making and actions” made by Cuban authorities toward 
FDI and foreign investors. The reliability is generated through the elements; formal rules and 
norms, credible commitment and FDI, which are well accounted for in the theory section in 
combination with transparency for the choices I have made, and the operationalization of data. 
Also, people central to this thesis, such as my supervisor, have read and commented on all 
parts of the thesis. 
 Collecting the Data 3.3
I am member of the network “Ethno Cuba”, a group of academics that have written or are 
currently writing about Cuba. In this network there are academics from all over the world, 
within all categories, most of them with a PhD (Most of the work generated from this network 
can be found on http://cubacounterpoints.com/). I was able to establish connections with 
several academics that could help me with data. However, few of their contacts were willing 
to contribute by giving an interview. Eventually I found the timeframe of the thesis too short 
to be able to find sources and conduct sufficient interviews that could generate a 
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representative group. I also contacted Sherrit International, Nestle and Melía, where two of 
them politely rejected and the last never returned my requests. However, different embassies 
(Spain, Norway, Italy and Germany) could help with some “suggestions” if one were to invest 
on the island, and all of them referred to a report conducted by CEEC. I was able to retrieve 
this report from Ricardo Pérez Torrez, a CEEC professor of economics, who attended the 
conference I arranged with Vegard Bye in Oslo 2015.  
In the theory-section I presented a wide array of literature concerning FDI. I decided 
to choose literature that covered most aspects of FDI as in Moran, Graham and Blomström
91
 
and generalize on these findings concerning effects of FDI. I also used commonly accepted 
definitions of FDI used by the OECD and the “Advocates for international development”, also 
emphasizing the importance of investigating host nation´s definition to avoid any 
misunderstandings of the meaning.  
Through key-words like FDI, institutions, credible commitment, used in archival 
records, digital databases, libraries and search engines, I found a wide range of information. I 
identified authors and themes that were frequently emphasized and referred to, and included 
them to establish a wider range of literature. To a larger degree I retrieved literature through 
tips from connections established throughout the thesis, and some documents from 
connections on Cuba not available through other digital searches. Because I master Spanish 
fluently, I was able to address, and include, documents and literature exclusively available in 
Spanish. This contributed to a more nuanced set of data, enabling me to address Spanish and 
Cuban writings on related themes. All in all I spent much time and effort reading and 
reviewing literature. 
Conducting research in Cuba, and accessing informants, can be difficult. Through 
contacts established through former studies in Cuba during my 6 month stay in 2009, I was 
able to get in touch with some official sources. In contact with Cuban official sources, I 
presented the thesis as an objective research on how and why Cuba had not achieved a higher 
level of FDI inflows. I emphasized that even though there were external elements, most 
elements could be found within the Cuban system regarding the FDI sector. I was mostly 
directed to the official site for statistics on Cuba “http://www.one.cu/”, which was not 
particularly helpful as it is highly unstable and the data outdated. Also, as travelling to Cuba is 
expensive I tried to use my private tours to conduct interviews and data collection. 
Unfortunately my last trip ended with me being hospitalized in Havana due to a bacterial 
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infection. Fortunately, I had the opportunity to visit several embassies before I got ill. As 
mentioned earlier, back in Norway, I organized a closed conference on the topic of Cuba´s 
future together with Vegard Bye (Norwegian writer and academic who specializes on Cuban 
economy), where several Cuban, and international, academics with special expertise on 
Cuban economy and political science participated. Ricardo Torres Pérez, whom I was to meet 
in Havana when I got ill, also came. I made important acquaintances, and received 
information on good and valid literature for my thesis. The conference made it possible for 
me to have detailed conversation about my thesis, and about limitations and biases that may 
appear during the investigation. I maintained e-mail contact with several of the participants, 
and used this means of communication with several of the authors I have used in the thesis. 
This conference treated the topic of Cuba´s future. 
 Analyzing the Data 3.4
There are especially two conditions that could be considered to weaken the data validity: the 
lack of interviews and a more thorough stay in Cuba, being closer to events and people 
dealing with the elements of this thesis. However, I chose not to include interviews as I 
considered much of the existing empiric material good enough to be analyzed and to answer 
my research questions. I had also established good connections that could provide me with 
relevant literature though they did not wish to be interviewed. Also, as mentioned above, the 
case study provides us with the possibility to study a large quantity of data without having to 
leave the PC or telephone.  
The amount of data increased especially after 17
th
 of December 2014, when the U.S. 
and Cuba began opening for normalization of the diplomatic ties. I had to narrow it down, as 
much of the material was of normative nature, trying to predict possible outcomes and ways 
for Cuba to proceed in the future. Still, it contributed to connections to literature and material 
that could be used in this thesis.  
First, I wanted to analyze the material categorically by addressing FDI, then credible 
commitment, and finally, formal and informal rules and norms within the institutions. 
However, I found that the interconnection between the categories led to elements of them all 
being found in the material I studied. They are not mutually exclusive, so instead of isolating 
them, I tried to make apparent the interaction between them through data enhancement.  
46 
 
It was particularly difficult to decide which historical elements to include in this thesis. 
History should not be something “briefly introduced” if it is a part of the thesis. I therefore 
wrote the contextual chapter four several times, trying to emphasize elements which made the 
Cuban political, economic and institutional system what it has become the last 20-25 years. At 
the same time, I tried to angle it towards the FDI sector, but as this sector was excluded from 
the island much of the time covered, it was important to locate the events and policies that 
would later affect FDI. I found the idealist and pragmatic cycles of Mesa-Lago
92
 to be a good 
framework in which I could create this contextual framework. When the context was ready, I 
found that the present state of the political, economic and institutional system had to be 
analyzed. First, I wanted to address the economic freedom, as this was an important obstacle 
for investors, and contributed to explaining the lack of FDI. Second, I found that analyzing 
Cuba without comparing it to similar cases, would damage the validity of the thesis. At the 
same time I did not wish to do a comparative analysis of two cases, I therefore mention 
Vietnam and China as ideologically close to Cuba, and the FDI sector of Dominican Republic 
to show a more or less same sized economy. The poor Cuban results, concerning FDI, became 
clearer in this context.  
It was difficult to find quantities of empirical data on informal norms and rules; this 
made me change tactics. I found that I had to address the formal rules and norms and see if 
they were consistent with what the Cuban government actually did decide. I found Law 77 
and 118 to be the most important formal norms and rules concerning FDI, even though there 
were several other pro-market economic reforms that concerned the topic. During the process, 
I also learned that the decisions and actions made by the Cuban state (including state 
institutions) were the most important informal elements. You may say that Cuba, being a 
single party state with a centralized political and economic system, made the analytical 
process “easier” as decisions and actions had all been taken from state level.  
There were also two overlapping themes that I found important to address in order to 
elaborate further on the investment environment for FDI. First, both Cuba and the foreign 
investors saw the U.S. embargo as an obstacle of considerable size. Secondly, the special 
development and economic free trade zones were, in the minds of Cuban authorities, a 
measure that should be acknowledged as “willingness” and “dedication” to further, develop 
the investment environment. However, the free trade zone had not generated the results that 
Cuba had planned for, as the investors mention several obstacles of informal nature. 
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Therefore, these two themes became relevant as they contributed to establishing that the 
obstacles for FDI went beyond the formal initiatives. 
On the basis of the empiric material, I found that what needed to be discussed was the 
level of credible commitment and how Cuba was perceived as an actor amongst investors. I 
used the theory and the analysis to generate the results on how inflow currents of FDI were 
affected by how Cuba scored on the level of credible commitment. This again I used to 
establish a conclusion. 
 Biases and Limitations 3.5
Perhaps the most difficult part of the thesis was to get a hold of statistics on official numbers 
and reports. I had to go through informal channels to meet representatives of the CEEC. Cuba 
is known for being a closed source of information, and will direct you to their official 
statistics located in the webpage mentioned above. I had to rely on sources not directly 
involved with day-to-day activities in the Cuban FDI sector or other official institutions. This 
thesis addresses a somewhat sensitive topic as it implies that there are errors in the system that 
handles FDI, which gives root for critique of the regime. Critique of Communist and 
authoritarian states is not always welcomed, but I do not focus on errors of the system by 
constructing the thesis as a critique, rather I investigate the Cuban context and match them 
with theory on FDI and investor´s concerns. 
In my readings and reviews of literature, I found that several authors emphasize the 
difficulties of extracting exact data. Spadoni states in his book “Cuba´s Socialist Economy 
Today”: 
 
“Any attempt to carry out a study of foreign investment in Cuba is hindered by the lack of 
comprehensive and reliable information on the activities of foreign firms and their contribution in 
terms of capital. Due to what Cubans call the “US economic blockade” against the island, public 
disclosure of data on the presence of foreign capital in Cuba is mostly limited to statistics on the 
evolution of international economic associations by year, by sector, and by country. This method of 
reporting the level of foreign investment in the country offers no idea of the value or strategic 
importance of the deals involved.”93 
 
 
I use some of Spadoni´s statistics as he makes use of official reports that are not easily 
accessible, along with additional information collected from a variety of sources. Even 
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academics and professors employed at the CEEC struggled in their report
94
 to retrieve 
trustworthy data. 
 
“La elaboración del presente documento también ha sufrido la dificultad en el acceso a datos 
estadísticos sobre el sector de IED en Cuba, por lo que su mayor valor tal vez radica en la recopilación 
y organización de información que en la mayoría de los casos se encuentra dispersa, así como, en los 
análisis y criterios que se van exponiendo sustentados en investigaciones académicas y en intercambio 
con especialistas, actores claves y representantes de los Estados Miembros de la Unión Europea en la 
Isla. Los datos utilizados en muchos casos son estimaciones considerando distintas fuentes, por lo que 
no tienen que coincidir con las estadísticas oficiales de Cuba y la UE.”95 
 
 
This does not imply that there are no strategies to reduce the bias of the study. Yin 
states that one test of selection bias is to assess your degree of openness to contrary findings. I 
mostly found contradictions in theories of FDI functionalities, and to some degree different 
understandings of the definition of “institutions”. On the other hand, most of the literature 
concerning the FDI sector had the same conclusions regarding what needs to be done to 
liberalize the economy. However, many of the authors focus on the formal elements, but I 
introduce, focus and build on the informal elements North addresses in his theory.   
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4 Cuban Political, Economic and 
Cultural Context 
Referring to figure 2, I will in this chapter be elaborating on the “right” part of the model and 
the section of “Economy/State & Society/Cultural heritage”, also found under “factors” in 
table 1. In the next chapter, the “center/left” part of the model and the elements concerning 
formal/informal norms and rules within the institutions, and the effect on credible 
commitment and FDI, will be elaborated upon.  
In this chapter, I address some of the Cuban revolutionary history with capitalism and 
the “western” democratic system before I address the historical events that shaped the mental 
models that came with the belief system that institutionalized itself from the revolution until 
the fall of U.S.S.R. This will be of importance as many fail to understand the Cuban 
experience with capitalist functions and dynamics, and how history shapes institutions and 
decisions of present policies and reformation. I will be using Samuel Farber to explain how 
the Cuban rebellion rapidly evolved from a multiclass, anti-dictatorial movement into a full-
fledged social revolution.
96
 Also, the historical timeline of Skidmore and Smith is 
comprehendible and their writings focus in a large degree on politics and economics. 
97
 
Carmela Mesa-Lago have made a very interesting investigation addressing the revolutionary 
“cycles” of policies and the rigid political and economic system of Cuba, which helps us to 
observe how the revolution was governed between idealism and pragmatism. This 
investigation will be the framework for my context chapter.
98
 The extended picture of the 
Cuban context also helps us understand policies made towards the FDI sector.  
The historical development of Cuba has been deeply affected by its location in the 
center of the Caribbean, as it lies within a network of vital sea lines. The Cuban economic 
development has been a typical tropical-American one, with a mono-cultural, slave-based, 
export-oriented agricultural society. 
99
 The political experience was a rather typical Latin 
American one, with the USA “controlling” economy and democratic processes. The Cuban 
governments of the 1920s and 1930s were among the most corrupt and brutal in the republic´s 
history, and Gerardo Machado (from 1925) used his executive powers to make himself 
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unbeatable at the ballot box.
100
 There was also little change between 1934 and 1959. The 
electoral system had proved futile over and over again as the perennial strongman worked his 
will. All Cuban nationalist movements were rendered impotent next to the unbeatable 
combination of the Cuban elites, their political and military handmaidens, and the U.S. This 
strong group maintained the status quo as they maneuvered through democratic policy and 
capitalist economy. Still, in the shadows a socialist revolution began to materialize.
101
 
4.1.1 Towards Communism: the emergence of Cuban Socialism 
In this section, I wish to address the events that contributed to Cuba´s socialism through the 
steps taken by Fidel Castro and his Revolutionaries. It is important to understand the policies 
that occurred during the Cold War era, until the fall of the Soviet bloc, as Cuba played a 
major symbolic role in Latin America, the Soviet regime and the U.S foreign policy. Through 
past events outlined in this section I clarify how Fidel Castro´s revolutionary policies could 
survive economic hardships and institutionalize through the last part of the 20
th
 century. This 
will let us recognize the creation of an institutional framework that exists within the rigid 
system of what is today´s Cuba. This is important if we want to understand how it affects the 
country´s credible commitment and inflow current of FDI. The political analysis of Cuban 
socialism and Fidel´s policies is as vast as theory on FDI, but I will explain some of the most 
relevant events for our case.   
Fidel Castro represented an old Cuban tradition as an heir of a peninsular who had 
“made America”. Fidel, though, was not interested in enjoying the comfortable life his 
background and training in law could bring. He wanted a different America and proved to be 
strong-minded, articulate, ambitious and passionately nationalistic.
102
 Fidel was in strong 
opposition to the Batista tyranny, and he led a band of 165 men to attack the provincial army 
barracks at Moncada, Santiago July 26, 1953. The ambush did not succeed and most of the 
rebels were incarcerated or executed while Fidel and his brother Raúl were both sentenced to 
15 years in prison. However, in an attempt by Batista to court public opinion, they were both 
released after 11 months. They immediately fled to Mexico to begin organizing a new 
revolution.  
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During 1958, Fidel had already managed to establish a base in the Sierra Maestras 
with Che Guevara and his companions, from where they launched guerrilla attacks and spread 
propaganda against the sitting regime. Batista replied with paranoia and counterterror, and in 
that way he enlarged the support for Fidel and his band of revolutionaries, while the support 
for Batista himself evaporated. His greatest strength had been to maintain order and status 
quo, but now this was disappearing, as torture and executions only produced new rebel 
adherents. The U.S had great interest in the island, and had no reason to support a dictator that 
had outlived his time. New Year´s eve he called his aides together, designated a successor 
president, and took off with a planeload of relatives to the Dominican Republic. On the 1
st
 of 
January, Fidel Castro entered Havana in triumph, and crowds went wild in the cities.
103
  
These were the events that would lead to a new political and economic reality in Cuba. 
There is always a battle on history, and conservative exiled Cuban economists claim that 
Cuba´s prerevolutionary economy was extraordinary. According to them, the problems lay in 
the lack of a sufficient political and social consciousness and maturity, and not in the lack of 
economic development. In the other camp, supporters of the Cuban regime, as Francisco 
López Segrera who follow the dependence school, perceive only economic underdevelopment 
in prerevolutionary Cuba. According to Farber, both these camps have self-serving distorted 
views. The prerevolutionary Cuban economy featured contradictory and uneven development. 
For Fidel Castro and the members of the radical and politically conscious circles close to him, 
the problems of Cuba´s economy and society, and the failure of previous reforms, made the 
revolutionary road a possibility grounded in Cuban realities. The revolution would be a 
conscious choice compatible with the objective need to eliminate the contradictions of the 
Cuban economy and there would potentially be popular support for radical social 
transformation.
104
 At this moment the FDI was considered an imperialist means to control and 
extort resources from their “colonies”, and would not receive much thought and space in any 
economic policy, other than being expropriated. 
Fidel did not have any clear policy as he entered the political vacuum Batista left 
behind. His political ideology before he came to power remains unclear to this day, despite 
his claim that he had been strongly influenced by “Marxism-Leninism” before the 
revolution.
105
 The rebel army was to remain the key political institution. Fidel´s greatest asset, 
aside from his gift of leadership, was the desperate desire for change among his fellow 
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Cubans. The underprivileged, the rural poor, and the working classes in the cities had never 
counted for anything in the electorate system. In April 1959, he set out for New York to visit 
the UN headquarters. The visit was probably a success from Fidel´s side, as he managed to 
project the image of a nationalist reformer, strongly opposed to foreign intervention, but also 
not a communist. Fidel hammered on the need for radical reform in Cuba, especially land 
reforms. He expropriated farmlands with compensation to be paid in Cuban currency bonds. 
Foreigners would henceforth not be allowed to own agricultural land. The land was to be 
handed over to small private holders and cooperatives. This rang the alarm bell in the U.S as 
Fidel took quite communist measures to address his new gained country´s problems.
106
 This 
was also the start of a difficult relationship with FDI, which would be a highly appreciated 
means for development by developing countries during the last half of the 20
th
 century.  
In Fidel´s “second declaration of Havana”, his feelings toward the international 
economic and political leading sphere were condemning and overall negative.
107
 What 
policies were the U.S to expect from their neighbor with such a condemning rhetoric against 
western culture of economic and politics? We frequently apply the model of West European 
and North American political experiences to Cuba, and attempt to find familiar political and 
economic currents: conservatives, Communists, social democrats, or U.S-style liberals. These 
currents do not accurately portray Cuba´s political economic universe, which evolved in 
response to a variety of historically grounded issues and needs.
108
 To answer the initial 
question, we have to look towards a Cuban and Latin American political tradition that has 
often been downplayed or ignored, namely “populism”. Fidel Castro always resisted 
subordinating himself to any organizational apparatus and his considerable political talents 
were eminently tactical. His leadership resembled the Latin American phenomenon of 
“Caudillismo”, except Fidel Castro was a caudillo with political ideas. Although he did not 
necessarily foresee membership with the Soviet bloc, he did not preclude it a priori.
109
 
Carmela Mesa-Lago addresses Cuban policy and the social-economic evolution from 
1959-2012.
110
 To understand the reforms introduced by Raúl Castro (from 2006), he focuses 
on so-called “ciclos idealistas y pragmáticos”. He finds that the social-economic policy has 
changed ten times, each time seeking to shape Cuban economy, policy and society. The 
cycles that were of anti-market rhetoric are called “idealist” while those applied towards the 
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market are called “pragmatic”. The idealist cycles were very ambitious and contain goals for 
achieving the largest industrial production per capita in Latin America, or produce 10 million 
tons of sugar and double it, create the “new altruistic man” and other great projects which all 
failed, leading to crisis in most cases. The pragmatic cycles have produced moderate results in 
the economy and in living standards, but also created some negative social results, like higher 
unemployment rates and inequality. If a pragmatic cycle failed, an idealistic cycle was the 
answer, and vice versa, which created a vicious circle.
111
 I use this historical framework as it 
provides insight into the inconsistency of Cuban policies and to which frequency Cuba 
changes between idealism and pragmatism, though most of the period have elements of both.  
Since the victory of the Revolution in 1959 there has been eight cycles, the first of 
them is divided into three sub-cycles; four of them were idealist, while three were pragmatic 
and one of stagnation: 
 
1. 1959-1966, This first period was an idealist cycle divided into three: “Erosion of the Market”, 
“Orthodox Soviet centralized planning model”, and “The debate between two Socialist alternatives 
(idealist and pragmatic). 
2. 1966-1970, Was the strongest idealist cycle where the adoption and radicalization by Fidel Castro´s 
Guevarista model took place. 
3. 1971-1985, “Soft Soviet economic reform model”, the first clearly pragmatic cycle. 
4. 1986-1990, The “rectification process”, the third idealist cycle. 
5. 1991-1995, “Crisis, reforms and market”, the second pragmatic cycle, and the strongest so far, under 
the “special period in times of peace”. 
6. 1997-2003, “Deceleration and cessation of the reformation”, a cycle of stagnation of policies.  
7. 2003-2006 The “reversal of the reformation”, the fourth idealist cycle, but in diminished form. 
8. 2007and onwards, structural reforms of Raúl, the third pragmatic cycle and the strongest of the 
revolution.
112
 
 
 
The policies addressed under each cycle were a) the collectivization of the means of 
production; b) centralization of economic policies and decision making; c) the role of the state 
budget; d) Foreign investment; e) assignment of rationing of goods versus market prices; f) 
free agricultural markets; g) Jobs in the private sector; h) voluntary work and labor 
mobilization; i) egalitarianism; j) moral incentives versus material incentives, and k) 
expansion of free social services. The idealist cycles were characterized by an increase in 
collectivization and centralization of decision making, a suspension or loss of importance of 
the state budget, the closing or decrease of foreign direct investment, a predominance of 
rationing over market prices, a non-existent or heavily restricted free agricultural market and 
self-employment sector, a labor mobilization and the use of “voluntary” workforce, the 
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promotion of egalitarianism and the substitution of material and economic incentives with 
moral ones, and the expansion of free social services. In the pragmatic cycles, just the 
opposite happens, but the degree of commitment to the changes depends on the cycle. What 
occurs is the de-collectivization, decentralization of decision making, a greater role of the 
state budget and fiscal balance, the opening and increase of foreign direct investment, an 
increased use of market prices on goods over rationing, an introduction or extension of free 
agricultural markets and self-employment, a reduction or elimination of mobilization of 
voluntary labor, a decrease of egalitarianism and an increase on material incentives, and cuts 
or restrictions on free social services.
113
 While keeping these cycles in mind, let us address the 
historical development of Cuba under the leadership of Fidel and his revolutionaries, focusing 
on economy and especially the FDI sector and analysis in chapter 5.  
I will dedicate a longer explanation of the first cycle as it was here the established 
Cuban institutional system was founded, and would be the basis for latter cycles. During the 
first idealist cycle, four basic trends became clear by Fidel´s second year in power: 1) the 
nationalization of the economy, 2) a sharp turn to the Soviet bloc, 3) the establishment of an 
authoritarian regime, and 4) the launching of an egalitarian socioeconomic policy. When the 
U.S-owned refineries in Cuba refused to process the crude oil Cuba bought from Russia, Fidel 
expropriated all U.S oil companies’ activity on the island, and in retaliation, President 
Eisenhower suspended the Cuban sugar quota in the United States. The Cuban government 
responded by seizing virtually all the rest of U.S property and investments, and Washington 
reacted by embargoing all trade to Cuba, except medicine and foodstuffs.
114
 As Farber puts it; 
the social and political project that had taken place was fundamentally incompatible with the 
interests of the United States and of Cuba´s propertied classes. The radicalizing process of 
measures and countermeasures between USA and Cuba was no surprise. Any attempt at 
economic transformation when U.S companies dominated Cuba was bound to engender 
conflict. The incapacity of political revolutionaries to institute partial changes in the face of 
internal and external opposition led to a major confrontation with the U.S and eventual 
nationalization of all alien enterprises.
115
 This stripped Cuba from all forms of commitment 
and positive reputation as a trade partner, though ideologically they enjoyed support from 
different camps in the world. 
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The swing to the Soviet bloc was neither a cause nor an effect of the clash with the United 
State; it was part and parcel of the same process, initially how far Soviet might be willing to 
commit themselves in Cuba, and the Russians did not disappoint. Fidel now had an alternative 
source of technology and equipment, and the Soviets were getting ready to integrate Cuba as a 
socialist ally in the Third World. By the end of 1960, Cuba´s swing to the East was 
decisive.
116
 The U.S was now convinced that Fidel Castro was communist, even though Fidel 
had not announced Cuba´s total conversion to the Soviet brand of socialism.  
In the fall of 1960, Fidel moved to eliminate or neutralize the key institutions of the 
former “bourgeois” order which had been made to maintain status quo, and by December 
even the press was under Fidel´s control. He gained power to appoint new judges at will, and 
the universities and unions were also brought under absolute control. All private clubs and 
associations were subordinated to government direction. In the end, the only political party to 
survive the revolutionary transition was the Communist Party. Castro´s own ruling 
Communist party was fully established in 1965, when virtually all the major social and 
economic changes to Cuban society had already been carried out under his personal 
leadership and control.
117
 The development would later collide with what FDI theory claims 
to be the proper institutional framework for FDI to thrive in. 
The revolutionaries were determined to attack the legacy of the corrupt, capitalist 
Cuba: illiteracy, disease, malnutrition, and dilapidated housing. As the direction of the 
revolution became apparent, the rich began to flee. The government would distribute the 
refugee´s abandoned assets, homes, offices and farms.
118
 This would, as we shall see, affect 
the country´s level of credible commitment. Fidel and his clique in charge were leading Cuba 
toward communist totalitarianism. The failed U.S. invasion in the Bay of Pigs in 1961 marked 
a watershed in U.S-Cuban relations, and when Soviet installed intermediate-range rocket 
bases in Cuba the superpower confrontation reached a climax with Cuba as an aggressor. The 
missiles were withdrawn, to Fidel´s great disappointment. Still, he declared himself a 
Marxist-Leninist in December 1961, and continued to be the overwhelmingly dominant 
personality in the Revolution.
119
 Eventually, Castro´s radicalism overtook that of the Soviet 
Union, and the Cuban Communists. However, the Soviet Union was guided by tactical 
considerations influenced by a number of factors, including the existing state of relations with 
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Washington.
120
 Their policy cannot be explained in simple terms, and will not be further 
elaborated here as there is not enough space in the thesis. The cycles presented by Mesa-Lago 
show that Castro was not an idealist, he was very much a pragmatic, considering his 
opportunities and outcomes as he balanced policy between ideology and pragmatism. 
Eventually the revolutionaries could concentrate on the economic tasks facing the new 
Cuba. Fidel Castro was, by his own admission, an economic illiterate. This would become 
clear in his inclination towards showcase projects under the idealist cycles. His ignorance also 
explains his stubborn resistance, particularly during the early years of the revolution, when 
the reality was that material resources were limited and that an inescapable need existed for 
strict investment and spending priorities.
121
 The Cuban economy revolved around exporting 
sugar, and mostly to the U.S, which was a humiliating dependence. Cuba also lacked the raw 
materials and expertise to rush into industrialization, as trade between Cuba and the U.S had 
ceased, and this forced Cuba to depend largely on the Soviets and the Eastern bloc for 
equipment.
122
 An important point is that directions were to come from highly centralized 
planning bureaucracies, modeled after Soviet and Czech patterns, which was an ineffective 
and expensive effort. The Soviets (in 1963) demanded that the Cubans had to slow down the 
industrialization drive, improve their planning and recognize their comparative advantage: 
sugar.  
Under the second idealist cycle in 1966, Fidel endorsed a strong idealist period. Cuba 
would make a gigantic collective effort accompanied by moral incentives, and Fidel thus 
increased his own power as he took charge the central planning apparatus. After a 
considerable step-up commitment to social revolution abroad, Fidel pulled back from the 
Guevarist line as Che himself was killed by U.S trained Bolivian Ranger troops in Bolivia in 
1967. He signaled a return to Soviet orthodoxy, and began to downplay the export of 
revolution. Fidel embraced the sugar and announced that in 1970 Cuba would break all 
records for sugar production where they would harvest 10 million tons, later known as the 
“Year of the Decisive Endeavor”.123 That Fidel had planned for outcomes 7 years ahead in 
time would be a clear indication that he had no intentions of leaving his position, or the newly 
socialist agenda he pledged his allegiance to. However, the harvest failed and was a heavy 
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psychological toll as everything was sacrificed to release labor for the cane-fields.
124
 The 
Cuban leaders were going through a familiar dilemma of Communist regimes: How to 
reconcile Marxist idealism with a pragmatic economic policy.
125
 Still, “el Comandante” was 
about to change policies again. The Cuban policy turned more pragmatic as there were to be 
new management and planning systems, and more use of profits as a basis for decision-
making, the third cycle was of a pragmatic nature. The private sector was to be given a greater 
role in both agricultural and services, and there was to be greater economic interaction with 
the West. This economic policy was accompanied by a similar shift in institutional policy. 
The Communist Party was strengthened and the unions and other mass organizations 
were reorganized and given a greater role under state control. The central orthodoxy led to 
greater control over education and mass media. By 1971, the radical experimentation was 
over, and Cuba´s enormous economic and military dependence on the Soviets was being 
played out.
126
 
The revolution institutionalized itself as the decades passed. There had been more than 
two decades to educate and train new generations in the commitment to an egalitarian, 
communitarian ideal, and they were also able to train their own technicians, with Soviet and 
Eastern-European help to replace those who fled the radicalizing regime. The economic 
dependence on the U.S.S.R resembled the former U.S dependency. The integration of trade 
with the Soviet bloc was close to what it had been with the U.S, but the Soviet comradeship 
did not produce direct ownership which had created such a nationalist backlash against U.S 
economic penetration before 1959.
127
  
Cuban maneuverability came from having Soviet military and economic protection. 
The revolutionaries and the little Caribbean island did generate impressive results both 
domestically and internationally. Socialist Cuba managed to serve basic human needs such as 
wiping out illiteracy, introducing a comprehensive school system (with highly ideological 
teaching content), and providing basic health care. Cuba seemed to prosper and thrive under 
Soviet subsidies, and meeting basic human needs generated a lot of support for the Cuban 
regime.
128
 Still, with few personnel with actual experience of governing, the Cuban policy 
became an Ad hoc policy, a general political direction in which Fidel wanted to go, not 
pursuing a precise long-term economic strategy with a previously determined specific goal. If 
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the Soviet socialism was not the socialism Fidel sought, it was at least an important guide to 
how to unite Marxist ideology with pragmatic economics, but as we shall see, the Soviet 
model was not ideal at all.  
In 1986 Fidel launched the “rectification program” (Proceso de Rectificación de la 
Reforma) under the fourth idealist cycle, which abolished small-scale private business and 
reintroduced moral incentives, attempting to make a virtue of the country´s deepening 
economic crisis. This was precisely the opposite direction from the “perestroika” that was 
being launched in the Soviet Union.  
4.1.2 Cuba in Transition 
Cuba reached mid-1991, and the fifth pragmatic cycle, without the signs of mass discontent 
that doomed communism in Eastern-Europe. Still, several respected people from the army and 
air force defected to Florida. A key to the long survival of the Revolution was the ability to 
institutionalize the revolutionary process through the army, the militia, and the “Committees 
for the Defense of the Revolution”. The Communist Party was given a greater or lesser role at 
the initiative of Fidel and the top revolutionary leadership.
129
 The obvious means of extending 
the prerogatives of the Communist Party was to enhance control of society, reaching more 
people than existing institutions already were in touch with. Under the banner of “popular 
participation”, grass-root elections for regional assemblies were held, and this was according 
to Cuban government a much more democratic system that the one of the U.S, where only the 
richest would have the possibility to reach office.   
By the mid 1990´s, Cubans were complaining about a highly centralized, 
bureaucratized and inefficient state apparatus.
130
 The Soviet bloc collapsed and with it 
COMECON (the foreign trade authority for the U.S.S.R and Eastern-Europe), which brutally 
exposed Cuba´s economic vulnerability as the foreign underpinning of its economy vanished 
almost overnight. By 1992, all Russian economic and military aid was gone. The reason for 
the economic crisis that occurred was not hard to identify as Cuba had 85 % - 90 % of its 
foreign trade within the inefficient COMECON system. Cuba had failed to diversify its 
foreign commerce in the course of the past 35 years, despite that this had been a central goal 
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of the revolution. Cuba could not prevent the collapse or contain the damage from it.
131
 Oil 
shipments fell 86 percent from 1989 to 1992, and food imports dropped 42 % in the same 
period. Vital replacement parts for buses and other mechanical devices were nowhere to be 
found, and general economic activity fell by at least 29 % between 1989 and 1993. Cuba had 
suffered one of the greatest economic blows experienced in Latin America in the twentieth 
century.
132
 Few could foresee the downfall of the U.S.S.R, and Cuba had excessively 
concentrated its trade and finance with one market, about 84 % alone with COMECON. The 
security in the Soviet connection gave little need to diversify its exports or its markets. Again, 
Cuba became the ultimate example of dependency.
133
  
Cuba entered “the special period in peace time” as Fidel declared it, and this cycle was 
to be definitively pragmatic, where Cubans experienced a drastic fall in living standards. 
Monthly rationing quotas now covered only one or two weeks, electricity could only be 
enjoyed 4-8 hours per day, and bus services virtually disappeared because of fuel shortages. 
Fidel now had to protect the island´s sovereignty as well as the socialism. In 1993, he 
declared that: 
 
“Today we cannot speak of the pure, ideal, perfect socialism which we dream 
because life forces us into concession”.134  
 
Cuba was in need of hard currency, which led to the court of Western investment. The 
use of dollar was decriminalized, and in 1994 farmers was allowed to sell on the open market, 
while private taxis and family run restaurants (paladares) reappeared in the major cities. These 
enterprises were burdened through tough regulations and high taxes, as Fidel was determined 
to throttle the spread of capitalism as long as he could. Still, severe shortages and virtually 
zero investment (aside from tourism) plagued every sector of the economy, worsened by the 
U.S embargo and the lack of foreign exchange. Even though the laws could be ignored by 
most countries, the incentives to invest or do business with Cuba would in most cases not be 
worth the risk of facing dominant capital giant U.S. I will return to the history and effects of 
the embargo. 
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In 1995, decree law 77 was enacted to pursue the goals of the economic austerity 
program. It set out specific guarantees for foreign firms by establishing full protection and 
security against expropriation and it opened all sectors of the Cuban economy (except public 
health, education and the military). Tourism became an essential source of hard currency, 
matched only by remittances from Cubans living abroad, and several joint ventures appeared 
in cooperation with European investors. The sharp contrast between tourists and locals set 
another tone to society. Were Cubans supposed to work for moral incentives while they 
observed the material goods, and heard stories of better lives from the tourists, and family 
members living abroad?  
In 1997, the cycle of stagnation had begun as Fidel and his followers feared the de-
collectivization, decentralization and the delegation of financial power with an increased 
independence to farmers, self-employed workers and other sectors that displayed the state as 
weak. An increase in employment rates and inequality was too far a stretch from the 
ideological guidelines.
135
 Still, on the fortieth anniversary of the revolution, in the cycle of 
stagnation, on January 1. 1999, Fidel reaffirmed his commitment to saving the country, 
revolution, and the conquest of socialism from the “new religion” of neoliberalism, which had 
turned the planet into a giant casino.
136
 Again he introduced restriction on private sector, but 
during the hard 90´s the flirting with capitalism had already made some balls rolling. 
Venezuela became a substitution of the U.S.S.R as the big subsidizer of Cuban 
socialism and economy under the Chavez government. Between the years 2001-2007, Cuba 
received $4000 million U.S. worth of credit, investment and financial support from 
Venezuela. The accumulation of debt reached $2500 million U.S. for the importation of 
petroleum, which Cuba paid with 20 000 doctors, teachers and health personnel. Investors like 
Sherritt International from Canada and Meliá from Spain increased investment in mining and 
tourism. These positive economic trends gave Fidel the confidence to make some cuts in the 
strict reforms of the 90´s, which challenged his ideology. The trend of “thinking capitalism, 
but continue being socialists” became more adequate as the deep economic crisis of the 90´s 
left its mark in Cuban society and the leaders of the republic. The U.S embargo remained, but 
in 2001, it opened for selling foodstuff and medicines to Cuba.
137
 
A new idealist cycle was initiated between the years 2003 – 2006, but as the former 
cycle of the same character, it came out negative. The anti-market cycle of the mid 2000s may 
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have increased state control over the economy, but it lacked the idealistic character of 
previous idealist cycles. Raúl´s initiatives now represent a much-needed departure from 
previous ways of managing Cuban economy.
138
  
With Fidel´s ambiguous class commitment and the nature of populist politics, he 
became different things to different people, but in August 2006, at the end of the 7
th
 idealist 
cycle, Fidel transferred the power to his brother Raúl Castro. Due to the serious situation of 
Cuban economy, Raúl called for structural reformation and reached consensus in the 
government. He entered the 8
th
 cycle of structural reforms. In 2008, Raúl was declared 
“Presidente del Consejo de Estado y de Ministros” and confirmed the direction he was taking. 
From 2010, the reformation process accelerated further as he implemented, in a moderate 
form, approval of private initiatives and market mechanisms.
139
 For Raúl, it was clear that the 
failure of the idealist cycles would strengthen the support of the structural reforms. The 
frequent changes to economic ideology created opposite indications that led to instability and 
insecurity, and affected development as there never was time enough to consolidate with one 
policy and harvest any potential fruits it would carry.
140
  
4.1.3 Summary 
The first 40 years, Cuba played its role as a symbolic piece in the Cold War, heavily 
subsidized by the U.S.S.R. At this time, it was not at all that bad being Cuban, and there were 
even people of ideological conviction that immigrated to the island. Still, Fidel Castro and his 
revolutionaries had to balance Marxist ideology with pragmatic economics, but had more 
leverage in this period than after the fall of the Soviet bloc. The first decades after the 
revolution were used to find an ideological stand and consolidate with it, maybe it was 
socialist or maybe a form of nationalism, but events pushed Fidel to declare it as 
Communism, as their comrades in the east. Still, Cuban socialism is considered a term of its 
own, by Cubans themselves and academics.
141
  
A number of policy shifts, as noted by Mesa-Lago and described above, have occurred 
since the beginning of the Revolution. In the post-Cold War period, the structural 
adjustments, in the wake of the Soviet demise, resulted in the enactment of limited capitalist-
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style reforms, subsequent retrenchment during an economic boom, and market-based reforms 
by Raúl in the midst of the global economic crisis and domestic financial problems. It was 
here the real foundation for FDI was established, and considered an important strategic 
economic means to attract the necessary capital for the Cuban political and economic system 
to survive. However, the political considerations have always contributed to determining the 
nature and scope of economic policymaking. Some objectives seem to have changed though, 
as “the defense of socialism” became “the defense of the achievements of socialism” as 
nationalism replaced Marxist-Leninism as the guiding principles of the revolution in 1992. 
In research question 3, I asked “what are the Cuban political, economic and cultural 
contextual experiences, and how do they affect credible commitment and FDI?” In this 
chapter, we see policy shifts that affect Cuba´s credibility and reputation. If we go back to the 
theory North mentions that, “how to bind players over time?”, and the time it takes to 
establish a reputation, affect the nation´s credibility. However, Cuba has seldom let policy 
operate long enough to establish consistency or reputation, which again leads to a reputation 
of inconsistency. There are reasons to believe that the inconsistency of Cuban policies, going 
back and forward between idealist and pragmatic reforms, would appear less favorable for 
foreign investors, as there is no legal framework to control the authority´s decision to 
drastically change policy direction. These shifts of Cuban authorities are fair to consider of 
negative influence on the country´s credible commitment. 
With the political, economic, societal and cultural context in mind, I will in the next 
chapter address, analyze and discuss the empirical data and material. The contextual 
framework facilitates the analysis and contributes to understand the data I have considered to 
be of most relevance to my case-study.      
63 
 
5 Empirical Findings and Analysis 
In the previous chapter, we saw how the political and economic institutional framework of 
Cuba was established during the Cold War era, and during the sudden fall of the Soviet bloc. 
In this chapter, I will analyze the relevant Cuban institutions, their formal/informal rules and 
norms, and how they affect the level of credible commitment of Cuba, which again affects the 
inward flows of FDI. I have chosen to analyze the formal and informal parts of Cuba´s 
institutional framework that I find most precarious, based on the theory elaborated in chapter 
2. This will make us able to categorize Cuba´s degree of credible commitment using Singh´s 
“degrees of commitment”, discussed in section 2.2.5, to measure if there is a correlation 
between degree of credible commitment and inward flows of FDI. 
First, I will address the centrally planned and rigid system of the Cuban institutional 
framework leading to the MINCEX. Second, I will analyze the status of FDI on the Island, 
and the degree of economic freedom in which the FDI sector operates. Thirdly, I analyze how 
the “Special economic and development free trade zones” actually affect the country´s FDI 
sector and the policies behind it. Fourth, though this thesis mainly addresses internal elements 
that function as obstacles for foreign investors, I choose to add an external factor because of 
how it affects the country´s credible commitment: the U.S. embargo. In section 5.2, the main 
emphasis will be on the formal laws concerning FDI, in order to establish an understanding of 
the formal rules passed down by the Cuban government. The laws are accompanied by a set 
of informal norms, which are more difficult to detect and study, but still they have a 
significant effect on the execution of the laws. In 5.3, I will discuss the findings from the 
empirical material used partly in chapter 4 and 5, in the context of credible commitment and 
the effect of FDI.   
 Institutions 5.1
5.1.1 Centrally Planned Rigid System and the MINCEX 
In the theory 2.2.1, I talked about that if you want to achieve a satisfying degree of safety and 
to have low cost enforcement of contracts in international trade, you have to have third party 
enforcement, which ultimately means polity or the state. You have to establish a political 
system that will create rules and laws and enforce them at low cost. In chapter 4, I mentioned 
64 
 
Cuba´s history with capitalism and democracy, and elaborated on events that contributed to 
forming the Cuban political system of today. How does Cuba play its part as “third party 
enforcement”, and is the political system efficient in creating necessary rules and laws in the 
institutions related to FDI? 
As mentioned before, Cuba is constitutionally defined as a Marxist-Leninist social 
state guided by the principles of José Martí, and the political ideas of Marx, Engels and Lenin. 
The Communist Party of Cuba is, by constitutional right, the leading power of society, and of 
the state, which has the capability of setting national policy.
142
 Cuba considers itself a 
“people´s democracy” as opposed to the “liberal democracy” of Western States. The Cuban 
government claims that the nomination of candidates at neighborhood level is even more 
representative than the U.S model, still, Cuba is internationally considered to be 
undemocratic.
143
 
The executive power lies with the Cuban government, represented by the Council of 
State and the Council of Ministers. The Legislative power is exercised through the unicameral 
National Assembly of People´s Power, which is constituted as the maximum authority of the 
state. The judiciary branch is the “People´s Supreme Court”, which rule in constitutional 
matters and review final appeals from lower courts including all criminal, civil, 
administrative, labor law, and economic cases. Every province has a superior court; they 
decide which cases are able to pass to the Supreme Court.
144
 Since the final establishment of 
the Communist Party of Cuba in 1965, Cuba has been governed by a highly centralized 
system headed by the party. Fidel Castro has been the head of state, but he passed the power 
to his brother Raúl Castro in 2006. This made Raúl the first secretary of the Communist Party 
of Cuba, the President in the Council of State, and the President of the Council of Ministers. 
Raúl exercises control over all aspects of societal life through the Communist Party and its 
affiliated mass organizations, the government bureaucracy headed by the Council of State, 
and the state security apparatus. The CCP controls all government positions, including 
judicial offices. In theory, the different branches of government have separate and defined 
areas of authority; in practice, the executive retains clearly full control over all levels of 
power.
145
 Article 98 in the constitution states that the role of the Council of ministers is: 
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“…organizar y dirigir la ejecución de las actividades políticas, económicas, 
culturales, científicas, sociales y de defensa acordadas por la Asamblea Nacional de 
Poder Popular…”146 
 
Along with several other responsibilities elaborated in the same article. Article 98 illustrates 
that, within this system, all channels leads to the top where Raúl has complete power. 
The state may enforce rules and laws, but they are alone to do so, with absolute power 
to do as they see fit. Often, the Cuban government has changed the course of the country, 
accommodating to the circumstances. In section 4.1.1, I addressed the idealist and pragmatic 
cycles of Cuban politics. These cycles shows how easily the government changes course 
between market and anti-market reforms and policy, never really giving the policies enough 
time to be able to harvest from potential gains. Though the pragmatic cycles offer a higher 
possibility of economic gains, it also includes market reforms that imply that the government 
has to relinquish control, meaning loss of power. 
 
According to the constitution, the economy is to be guided as follows:  
 
“El Estado organiza, dirige y controla la actividad económica nacional conforme a un plan que 
garantice el desarrollo programado del país, a fin de fortalecer el sistema socialista, satisfacer cada vez 
mejor las necesidades materiales y culturales de la sociedad y los ciudadanos, promover el 
desenvolvimiento de la persona humana y de su dignidad, el avance y la seguridad del país…El 
Estado dirige y controla el comercio exterior.”147  
 
 
To invest in Cuba you have to go through the “Ministerio de Comercio Exterior e Inversión 
Extranjera” (MINCEX) institution, formerly known as the “The Ministry of Foreign 
Investment and Economic Cooperation” (MINVEC), founded when law 77 was created.148  
Investors have to go through a tedious process to invest (see appendix 1). As mentioned in 
point 9 (Appendix 1), when reaching the 5
th
 point in the process of approbation, two years 
may already have passed. The timespan was an important issue in law 77, and as we recall 
from the theory section 2.2.1 and 2.2.2, the enforcement of commitment is contingent upon 
the domestic institutions. When domestic institutions cannot successfully realize the 
commitments they will lose credibility. Although the law sets deadlines for approval to a 
certain level, it is generally understood that the investment process on Cuba is slow, costly 
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and less transparent than in other regions. The timespan of two years or more, with no clear 
definition of the interests of Cuba in the business seeking to invest, will only leave the most 
eager and dedicated investors interested. Even then it is not determined that they will obtain a 
permission to invest or form a joint venture with the Cuban authorities. They spend long 
periods without information, and once the decision has been made, reasons will not be 
explained. The Cuban business partner actually has little power to decide, and ultimately the 
final decision is made by the government. The evaluation of the contributions made by both 
parties, for establishment of joint ventures and international economic association contracts, is 
done by methods freely agreed upon by the investors, and its value can be determined by the 
expert certifications issued by entities that have authorization from the Ministry of Finance 
and Prices. In the case of companies of completely foreign capital, a certificate issued by 
authorized national entities is always required.  
In terms of the institutional design and with respect to consistency with the underlying 
belief system in that society, the constitution in place must be self-sustaining. Cuba´s 
constitution has a rather aggressive tone towards capitalism as a whole. In article 3 it states: 
 
“El socialismo y el Sistema político y social revolucionario establecido en esta Constitución, probado 
por años de heroica resistencia frente a las agresiones de todo tipo y la guerra económica de los 
gobiernos de la potencia imperialista más poderosa que ha existido y habiendo demostrado su 
capacidad de transformar el país y crear una sociedad enteramente nueva y justa, es irrevocable, y 
Cuba no volverá jamás al capitalismo.”149 
5.1.2 The FDI Sector 
In the previous chapter I addressed the historical experiences of the political and economic 
management of the revolution, and the road towards Communism (or Cuban socialism), 
through the idealist and pragmatic cycles of Mesa-Lago. In this section, I will address the 
experiences Cuba had with FDI and how the FDI sector looks today. I will pay specific 
attention to decree law 77 of 1995 and decree law 118 of 2014, as they were both supposed to 
generate an inflow current of FDI, and rapid capital, sorely needed on the island.
150
 I will in 
be using Paolo Spadoni´s newly released work on “Cuba´s Socialist Economy” to address the 
status of Cuban FDI sector, together with the work of the CEEC on “La inversión Extranjera 
y De la Unión Europea en Cuba”.151 To further explore the laws, beyond the official versions 
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published by “Gaceta Oficial”, I will use the articles of Matias F. Travieso-Diaz, Charles P. 
Trumbull,
152
 and Armando A. Musa.
153
  
In section 2.1.2, we established that there is no detailed, authoritative and universal 
legal definition of what constitutes foreign direct investment. That is why it is important to 
explore the definition within the host nation in which one wish to invest, instead of solely 
trusting the benchmark definition established by OECD. It is fair to assume that the OECD 
covers most of a host nation´s definition, and that most nations will be close to the definition. 
In a case like Cuba, it would be considered wise to make sure. 
In the “investment guide” that was created for foreign investors by the enactment of 
law 118 in 2014. The role of FDI is defined as followed:  
 
“Como parte de la actualización del modelo económico cubano, la inversión extranjera en Cuba se 
orienta a la diversificación y ampliación de los mercados de exportación, el acceso a tecnologías de 
avanzada, la sustitución de importaciones, la obtención de financiamiento externo, la creación de 
nuevas fuentes de empleo, la captación de métodos gerenciales y la vinculación de la misma con el 
desarrollo de encadenamientos productivos, así como el cambio de la matriz energética del país 
mediante el aprovechamiento de fuentes renovables de energía.”154 
 
 
On this notion, it should be understood that foreign investment in Cuba is considered 
complementary to national investment of medium-long term economic and social 
development, as a part of the state-led strategy for development under a centrally planned 
system. This system generates a condition of highly selective and discretionary approval of 
projects, while reducing the degree of freedom in the business management.
155
 This restrictive 
and selective operation may also become a relative advantage for investors abroad since it 
operates without significant competitors with greater possibilities for expansion. Today, Cuba 
has no laws on competition or antitrust, although price regulations are made in almost all 
economic sectors. When an investor has passed the initial process of approval, it is easier to 
expand into other sectors leveraging new business opportunities. Several companies are 
currently simultaneously operating in more than one sector, being subject to various kinds of 
contracts. These advantages companies have can be quite insecure, depending at all time on 
the policies defined by the Cuban government.
156
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During the period 1959-63, Fidel Castro expropriated the assets of foreign nationals, 
which led to the submittal of claims by the affected parties before their respective 
governments. In the U.S, the “Federal Settlement Commission” (FCSC) received demands 
from thousands of U.S. nationals whose properties in Cuba were confiscated. FCSC certified 
5911 claims with a total value of $1.8 billion in 1960 dollars. Investment by other countries 
amounted to $350 million.
157
 Cuba strongly rejected foreign direct investment as a positive 
factor in economic development the thirty years that followed the revolutionary takeover in 
January 1959. Ideologically, in Che Guevarian faith, FDI was a mean to exploit “third world 
countries” and to control their economics and political sphere. Relations with the capitalist 
countries was modest as Cuba perceived them to be unfair and inadequate, compared to the 
preferential terms of trade and subsidized financing of economic projects offered by the 
Soviet Union.
158
  
FDI disappeared from Cuba for three decades, and there was close to zero foreign 
investment since the expropriations until the 1980´s (except subsidies from Soviet and trade 
with COMECON). The necessity of capital and the willingness to “think capitalism while 
staying socialist” resulted in a new attitude towards foreign investors, though keeping 
socialist goals ever important, and in some cases as a bias to criticize investments and end 
joint ventures, throwing out the foreign partner. Well before the fall of the Soviet bloc, an 
important law concerning foreign investment was enacted in Cuba. Decree law 50 of 1982 
admitted and codified the juridical form of an economic association with foreign capital and 
allowed overseas firms to hold equity positions in Cuba. The legislation was designed for 
joint ventures and aimed at stimulating the tourism sector as a recipient of FDI inflows, but 
also a way of advertising the revolutionary ideas, and the “socialist Caribbean paradise”. 
Despite its existence, no convincing attempts to attract FDI were made throughout the 1980s, 
and by the end of 1989 only two joint ventures with foreign companies had been formed in 
Cuba.
159
 However, the law created the foundation for future laws.  
As previously noted, when trade with the Soviet Union and COMECON collapsed, the 
response from the Cuban government was the implementation of “the Special Period in Time 
of Peace” in September of 1990. This economic austerity program consisted of a series of 
measures intended to conserve energy and raw materials, stimulate food production, expand 
markets for exports and imports, and accelerate the development of international tourism. 
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What is important for this case is that with it came the first real opening for FDI to the island 
in the search for markets, technology, and financing that disappeared with the demise of the 
socialist bloc.
160
 Still, it was a cautious start during the worst years of the economic recession 
when only a handful of hotel and oil exploration joint ventures were formed in Cuba. In 1992, 
the Constitution was modified to recognize property rights of society and “Asociaciones 
Económicas con Capital Extranjero” (AECEs).161 Inflows of FDI increased after 1993 as 
Cuba´s economy began to show signs of a modest but constant recovery, and MINVEC was 
created in April 1994 to deal with the foreign investment and help investors by guiding them 
through the Cuban bureaucracy. Since then, several foreign companies entered the Cuban 
market, despite of the extraterritorial Helms-Burton law that I will address later in this 
chapter.  
The biggest share of FDI arrived after law 77 was declared in 1995 where joint 
ventures (empresas mixtas), international economic associations (contratos de asociación 
económica internacional) and companies with only foreign capital (empresa de capital 
totalmente extranjero) were allowed to invest on the island, the first two referred to as IEAs 
(international economic associations). I will elaborate further on these types of investments 
under law 77. By 2009 there were 307 foreign businesses operating in Cuba, and most of 
them joint ventures or international economic associations (IEAs).
162
 Companies with entirely 
foreign capital have never surpassed 1 % of established investments on the island. By 2012, 
there were only 6 of them, 3 operating in the petroleum sector, 2 in maritime transportation, 
and 1 in financial activities. The investors were from Venezuela, Panama, Virgin Islands and 
the Antilles. Some special contracts have also been given (“Contrato de Administración 
Hotelera”, or “Hotel Management Contracts”) to the “Melía de España” chain of hotels.163 In 
figure 4, we observe the number of FDI in different types of businesses, which shows that 
IEAs has been the preferred type of business in front of hotel management contracts.      
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Figure 4: Number of FDI in different types of businesses 
Source: Pavel Vidal Alejandro and Pérez, “La Inversión Extranjera y de la Unión Europea En Cuba”164 
 
The last twenty years, the policy of assimilation of investment and contracts has been 
far from stable. There was a certain “boom” of investments in the nineties due to the crisis, 
but from 2003, this projection changed radically as Fidel introduced his idealist cycle. In that 
year, Cuba took a much more selective policy towards investments, prioritizing only projects 
of great economic impact, and began to review the results of existing firms, liquidating those 
not meeting approved social and corporate goals, or those that did no honor the agreed export 
figures or those that had generated losses.
165
 Still, after more than a decade of uninterrupted 
growth, the number of international economic associations has fallen since 2002 as a result of 
Cuba´s increasing selectiveness toward FDI and its unwillingness to create a more attractive 
business environment.
166
 Politically and economically, this correlates with the idealist cycle 
and the process of recentralization of the Cuban economy introduced by Fidel Castro in 2003.  
I consider the reintroduction of idealist policies a as a countermeasure to the 
unforeseen effects of the mid 90s policies, through which transmission of power and capital 
may have leaked. Also, it confirms the instability and hasty changes of policy, which we 
elaborated through Mesa-Lago´s cycles in chapter 4. At this time, former MINVEC minister 
Marta Lomas announced that Cuba would be selective in future validation of foreign 
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investors. The authorities primarily wanted to first be able to identify what kind of FDI Cuba 
need, and then choose who would be able to invest. In addition, the state would not allow 
investment that directly competed with the state, but only those who contributed to the 
development of Cuban companies.
167
 Then again, in 2007 the minister declared that Cuba was 
not interested in having too many joint ventures on the island, only those that had a direct 
effect on economy and the strategic sectors such as energy, mining and tourism. What can be 
observed in the idealist cycle initiated in 2003, through figure 5 and 6, is the Cuban 
authority´s regaining control of one of the most capitalist experiments executed on the island. 
It is a “two steps forwards, one step back” strategy, where the Cuban government wishes to 
slow down the rate of development, and analyze results before they reinitiate an “improved” 
strategy towards FDI. This could be considered a form of “cherry picking”, where the state 
wanted to choose freely between relevant FDIs. Cuba remained interested in FDI proposals, 
but only in those that suited its development plans and came from major players. The Cuban 
government also have preferred partnerships with state-owned firms (especially for 
Venezuela, China, Brazil and other politically friendly nations) and with private investors 
relying on government financial assistance.
168
  
Figure 5: Evolution of dissolved International Economic Associations 
Source: Pavel Vidal Alejandro and Pérez, “La Inversión Extranjera y de la Unión Europea En Cuba” 169  
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In Figure 5 we observe a drastic increase of dissolved IEAs in 2003, before an equally 
drastic decrease after Raúl came to power. Figure 6 shows the number of IEAs in the period 
of 1990 until 2009. Looking at both models we see a correlation between total number of 
IEAs and the evolution of dissolved IEAs.  
Figure 6: Number of total IEAs in Cuba 1990-2009 
Source: Pavel Vidal Alejandro and Pérez, “La Inversión Extranjera y de la Unión Europea En Cuba”170 
In the process of dissolving FDIs, the Cuban government has kept the bigger investors 
a priority above the smaller, and medium sized companies. This remains a priority today as 
the bigger investments have managed to maintain the positive trend in average results of total 
FDI.  
Raúl set a goal of increasing foreign investment in Cuba´s economy with the 
“lineamientos”, which reiterated the need for FDI and called for acceptance of projects 
according to broader criteria than those used until then. With the lineamientos, they would 
officially be looking for projects that would meet other goals such as job creation and 
increasing national production in strategic areas, rather than projects that would only bring 
capital, technology, or new markets. They also called for more rapid decisions on potential 
projects, consideration of business models other than “joint ventures”; and pursuit of 
investments from countries not active in Cuba.
171
 In March 2009, as a part of a wide cabinet 
reshuffle aimed at streamlining government administration, Raúl Castro merged the 
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Ministries of Foreign Investment and Foreign Trade to from a new entity, the Ministry of 
Foreign Trade and Foreign Investment (MINCEX). In December 2012, Raúl Castro 
announced to the National Assembly that Cuba had taken a measure aimed at “re-establishing 
the credibility of our economy” by ending its freeze of the bank accounts of certain foreign 
companies that do business in Cuba. Years earlier, the accounts had been frozen when the 
Cuban government faced a liquidity crisis and could not back the companies deposit with hard 
currency. This way the companies could not repatriate revenues and profits.
172
  
Figure 7: Annual FDI in Cuba, 1993-2011 
Source: Paolo Spadoni “Cuba´s Socialist Economy Today”173 
 
Figure 7 shows the annual FDI income in Cuba between 1993 and 2011, measured in 
U.S. dollars. Compared to the Dominican Republic, another state in the Caribbean basin, we 
observe that Cuba is far from the results of the D.R, although Cuba´s gross domestic product 
exceeds the GDP of the D.R (see figure 8).   
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Figure 8: Annual FDI in D.R, 1993-2011 
Source: the World Bank data bank: http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports 
These are the last registered numbers the World Bank operates with concerning Cuba. 
Compared to the Dominican Republic, Cuba´s annual income of FDI is considerably lower. 
The states are both Spanish speaking with close to 11 million inhabitants on both islands, but 
Cuba is double the size. The main difference is between political and economic system where 
the DR is a Unitary Presidential Republic, Cuba is a Marxist-Leninist single party state. 
However, according to the World Bank, DR´s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is lower than 
Cuba´s. In 2012 the respective numbers (in US$ million) of Cuba´s GDP was $6,448.2, and 
DR $5,651.9. Still, the DR has over double the FDI of Cuba. This illustrates the condition of 
the FDI sector in Cuba, and the long road that lies ahead if they want to achieve the numbers 
they are aiming for.     
By 2014, it may have appeared clear to which sector, and with which strategy, FDI 
will bring the most benefits for the Cuban state. I purposely say “benefit the Cuban state”, and 
not the “economy”, as the desired effect so far has appeared to be direct capital for the 
government and the state, rather than indirect spillovers to the people and society. However, 
since 2007, Raúl and his cabinet have formulated themselves wisely, and formally enacted 
rules and norms that comply with investors critique on the first experience with opening of 
the economy to FDI with the law of 1995. The new FDI law 118 also came with “the 
Portfolio of Foreign Investment Opportunities”, which suggests that the Cuban government 
has adopted a proactive posture and is clear as to where it wants to direct and promote 
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investments. However, the legal framework is not enough. It is necessary to organize and 
adjust the entire environment for doing business on the island, which includes banking 
system, customs and the tax system, as well as telecommunication, domestic trade and the 
real estate market (private property rights).
174
 I will address these factors more thoroughly in 
the following section. 
5.1.3 Economic Freedom 
The economic freedom of a country is of great importance for foreign investors. The 
economic freedom contributes to enhancing the country´s credible commitment through the 
freedom of economic transactions, property rights, labor, business, investment and more. 
Policies that promote freedom, whether through improvements in the rule of law, the 
promotion of competition and openness, or suitable restraints on the size and economic reach 
of the government, in reality turn out to offer and advance practical solutions to a wide range 
of economic and social challenges that face societies.
175
 Cuba scores very low on the “Index 
of Economic Freedom” at a 177th place (see figure 9), only beaten by North Korea. This index 
is an annual guide published by “The Wall Street Journal and The Heritage Foundation”, 
which is an analytic think tank of Washington. The index covers 10 freedoms from property 
rights to entrepreneurship in 186 countries on a scale from 0 - 100. The economic freedom is 
measured based on 10 quantitative and qualitative factors, grouped into four broad categories, 
or pillars, of economic freedom. 
 
1. Rule of Law (Property rights, freedom from corruption) 
2. Limited Government (Fiscal freedom, government spending) 
3. Regulatory Efficiency (Business freedom, labor freedom, monetary freedom) 
4. Open Markets (Trade freedom, investment freedom, financial freedom)176  
 
Countries that score between 0-49,9 are considered repressed, 50-59,9 are mostly 
unfree, 60-69,9 are moderately free, 70-79,9 are mostly free and 80-100 are considered free. 
Cuba has a generally low score since 1995, ending up around 30 on the scale, but we have to 
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take into consideration the difficulty of extracting precise data from the country. However, 
difficulties extracting data does not make the score higher, rather the opposite. Also, the index 
is neoliberally positioned, where free markets and society in a capitalist context gives top 
score. I think it fails to consider the governmental spending on education, health and social 
security in Cuba. Cuba is doomed to score low on this index because of it political regime, but 
the numbers can still tell us something about the signals such statistics give to foreign 
investors, and help us categorize the level of commitment and liberalization. 
Figure 9: 2015 Score Comparisons  
Source: Terry Miller and Anthony B. Kim, 2015 Index of Economic Freedom (Washington, DC: The Heritage 
Foundation and Dow Jones & Company, Inc., 2015), http://www.heritage.org/index  
Investors look for economic freedom, but they are perfectly aware it is not easily 
found in Cuba. Most investors would like to see a transformation of the economic model, but 
would be willing to take the risk of investing early and gain from the liberalization process. 
An important element of transformation of the economic model is based on the method of 
management of the economy. If the state wants to maintain power and control they will, at 
least, have to give state enterprises more control. The role of the market in resource allocation 
is almost never recognized, considering the elimination of monopolies, greater 
decentralization of foreign trade, and increased competition in the business sector.  
The Cuban guidelines of the economic model specify that it will continue to give 
priority to the planning and not the market, without setting clear boundaries between the two 
and specifying the role that the market will have, or changes that will be made to economic 
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planning. Entrepreneurs´ perceptions so far are that central planning has increased rather than 
become more flexible.
177
 Ian Livingstone, London & Regional co-executive chairman, has a 
500 million dollar investment plan with Cuban authorities to develop a luxury Cuban tourist 
resort. Livingstone warns other investors that:  
 
“…if you are an investor focused on quarterly results and internal rates of return with 
immediate exits, Cuba might not be for you, rather, Cuba is for long-term investors with 
patient capital.”178 
 
The investment in Cuba mostly consists of joint ventures and “Special Hotel 
Contracts”, this way the state keeps a close control over investment on the island. As seen in 
the numbers presented by the “investment guide”, joint ventures dominate the FDI sector. 
Considering that the total amount of FDI income in figure 7 has been stable since 2011, the 
FDI was by 2013 scattered between the sectors noted in figure 10, and business modalities as 
seen in figure 11.  
Figure 10: FDI per Sector 2013 
Source: “Cartera de Oportunidades de Inversión Extranjera”179 
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FDI per sector (2013) 
Energy and Mining: 13 %
Tourism: 42 %
Industry: 10 %
Foodstuffs: 7 %
Contstruction: 6 %
Agriculture: 2 %
Transport: 4 %
Communication: 2 %
Sugar and derivatives: 2 %
Other: 12 %
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Figure 11: Businesses with FDI modalities 2013 
Source: “Cartera de Oportunidades de Inversión Extranjera”180 
This shows us that by 2013, the tourism sector was where most FDI went. Still, hotel 
management contracts were only the second most preferred type of business modality. The 
state has more control over investments through joint ventures, but tourism is also a great 
channel to retrieve direct capital, without it having any direct effects on society. The tourist 
leaves after having spent his or her money, but the tips left for Cuban workers have made the 
tourist sector extremely popular. Cuba experiences some unforeseen effects of tourism such 
as doctors, lawyers, teachers and highly educated parts of the population leaving their 
occupation to serve in the tourism sector. It is important for Cuba to maintain the most 
important recourse they have, namely their human capital. As noted in figure 12, the highly 
educated workforce is one of the absolute positives for foreign investors.    
In Pavel Vidal Alejandro and Pérez, "La Inversión Extranjera Y De La Unión Europea 
En Cuba.", a set off interviews was conducted with the embassies of 15 different EU 
countries, regarding the experience of investing in Cuba by investors from the respective 
countries. Potential investors, that have visited the island to learn about investment 
possibilities and the domestic market, were also included. The survey interview structure 
presented large subject of areas of economic and institutional frameworks, that may benefit or 
affect FDI in Cuba with the possibility to include and comment on other aspects deemed 
appropriate. The different embassies were asked to conduct an assessment of the impact 
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Businesses with FDI modalities (2013) 
Joint Ventures 51 %
Hotel Management Contracts
28 %
Economic International
Associations 12 %
Companies with only Foreign
Capital 4 %
Production Management
Contracts 4 %
Cooperated Production
Contracts 1 %
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(positive, negative or neutral), and indicate the degree of impact intensity on a scale of 0 to 3 
or -3. Where one indicates little impact, two half- and three strong- impact (negative or 
positive).
181
 15 interviews is probably not enough to have any significant statistical value, but 
the results are interesting for this case as they are addressing the importance of how different 
elements are emphasized by foreign investors, and where they lack confidence in the host 
nation. 
 
Figure 12: Elements considered important for investment environment by EU investors  
Source: Pavel Vidal Alejandro and Pérez, “La inversion Extranjera y de la Unión Europea en Cuba”182  
The results show that the most attractive (positive) elements that Cuba can offer is 
personal safety, which is important for the investors that wish to move with their family to the 
island to follow up on their investments. Also, the possibility of expanding had a higher score 
than one might expect as the regime is quite strict about what, and where, investments are 
placed. Still, once the investor passes the approval process and receives authorization, it is 
relatively easy to expand towards other sectors. The competition in the internal market is 
relatively low and this is considered an advantage by some of the interviewees. On the other 
hand, the risk is that most of the remaining competition is larger state owned companies 
where the state does not wish any competition whatsoever, but is willing to merge into joint 
ventures to some extent.  
Political stability and the low levels of competition were also positive elements, 
though questions about what kind of transfer will take place when Raúl signs off and who will 
take over affected the results moderately. If Cuba was to see a democratic transition, current 
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Positive Elements 
•Personal security (2.7) 
•Expansion possibilities (1.7) 
•Workforce quality (1.5) 
•Political stability (1.1) 
•Level of competence (1.0) 
Neutral Elements 
•Taxation (0.4) 
•Planned national economy system (-0.1) 
•Exportation condititons (-0.3) 
Negative Elements 
•Labor regime (-1.9) 
•Financial system (-1.5) 
•Macroeconomic stability (-1.1) 
•Athorization process (-1.1) 
•Establishment costs (-1.0) 
•Legal framework (-1.0) 
•Property rights (-0.8) 
•The state as partner (-0.8) 
•Importation regime (-0.7) 
•Intern distribution channels (-0.7) 
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investors may encounter individuals (with legal claims form the period of expropriations) 
with inventive grounds for taking legal action against them through multiple private lawsuits. 
Investors would take this risk into consideration when formulating business strategies in Cuba 
under the current government. Cuba´s human capital is also an important resource, perhaps 
one which remains to be exploited properly. 
The tax regime, the system of national economic planning, and the conditions for 
export, did not have any imperative significance for the investors. Though they could be 
better, they did not appear too unattractive and thus find themselves in the “neutral” section of 
the table. 
Under “limitations”, or “negatives”, in our table, we find more elements than 
anywhere else, as well as factors that investors find to be at an insufficient level. The main 
constraint on Cuba as a place for investment is the labor regime; this is the element that 
received the worst negative score. Most investors who are interested in the possibilities in 
Cuba are not willing to accept having no control over their labor resources, and systematically 
having to depend on a state employment agency. The cost of wages paid to the agency is 
generally high compared to the regional average (700 USD on average), also counting the 
“bonuses” the investors have to pay workers to enhance commitment and motivation as the 
state only gives 5% to the worker in local CUP.
183
 
The authorization procedure for new businesses was also a considerable minus for 
investors. The costs of establishment may be on the regional average, except for labor costs 
and other telecommunications that are much higher. Also, there is a long time lag in the pre-
authorization of the investment negotiations, which may take up to ten years in extreme cases, 
and the foreign party has to make multiple trips and fund the design of the project proposals. 
The approval process of new businesses is very much considered a limitation, also due to lack 
of information and transparency.
184
 
We also reckon a major concern towards the financial sector with the second highest 
negative score, and macroeconomic stability. The obligation to operate through Cuban public 
banks remains a latent risk as financial imbalances at the government level will automatically 
be transferred to the accounts of investors by blocking transfers. Although Cuba has gradually 
fulfilled its debt obligations, in the perception of the investors, Cuba remains a country with 
very high financial risk.
185
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The legal framework is of specific interest for our case, and was described as neutral 
or negative, and never a favorable element. The legislation is too open to different 
interpretations. The space left for discretionary decision making does not provide protection 
to investors, and on the other hand, the mechanisms for resolving conflicts and even national 
BITs (or APPRIs in Spanish “Acuerdos Bilaterales para la Promoción y Protección Recíproca 
de Invesiones), are considered insufficient. The feeling of little protection is closely related to 
what is considered an imbalance in the balance of power, given the state as a partner. Not 
only in terms of direct negotiations in a production contract or partnership, but also in every 
area of the environment. In general, foreign companies may face different conditions 
depending on which company is the Cuban counterpart and the subordinate body.
186
 Also, the 
negative perception of respect for property rights influence long lead times for the transfer of 
the amounts received upon liquidation or sale of the business, as well as the lock on transfers 
and dividends. In figure 13 we observe the low score Cuba operates with on the international 
arena compared to Vietnam, China, who also score quite low, all of them significantly under 
world average.  
 
Figure 13: Property freedom comparison 
Source: The Heritage Foundation
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According to article 14, 15, 16, 18 and 19 in the constitution, the property rights and 
handling of resources are to be treated as followed: 
 
“En la República de Cuba rige el sistema de economía basado en la propiedad socialista de todo el 
pueblo sobre los medios fundamentales de producción y en la supresión de la explotación del hombre 
por el hombre…Son de propiedad estatal socialista de todo el pueblo las tierras que no pertenecen a 
los agricultores pequeños o cooperativas integradas por éstos, el subsuelo, las mina , los recursos 
naturales tanto vivos como no vivos dentro de la zona económica marítima de la República, los 
bosques, las aguas y las vías de comunicación…b) los centrales azucareros, las fábricas, los medios 
fundamentales de transporte, y cuantas empresas, bancos e instalaciones han sido nacionalizados y 
expropiados a los imperialistas, latifundistas y burgueses, así como las fábricas, empresas e 
instalaciones económicas y centros científicos, sociales, culturales y deportivos construidos, 
fomentados o adquiridos por el Estado… Estos bienes no pueden trasmitirse en propiedad a personas 
naturales o jurídicas, salvo los casos excepcionales en que la trasmisión parcial o total de algún 
objetivo económico se destine a los fines del desarrollo del país y no afecten los fundamentos 
políticos, sociales y económicos de Estado, previa aprobación del Consejo de Ministros o su Comité 
Ejecutivo…Las tierras de las cooperativas no pueden ser embargadas ni gravadas y su propiedad 
puede ser transferida a otras cooperativas o al Estado, por las causas y según el procedimiento 
establecido en la ley”188 
 
 
However, article 23 states that the state will recognize the property of joint ventures 
and other IEAs as long as they conform to the law, and the use and disposition of the property 
that belongs to the state is governed by the provision of the law and treaties. This shows a part 
of a rather well written and comprehensive legal framework, still open for interpretation, but 
as my study implies, it is not the formal rules and norms that provide challenges and obstacles 
for investment. 
A positive element, not accounted for in the tables, is the fight against corruption. 
Corruption has manifested and institutionalized itself throughout the third world, and is now 
as a big part of “new” democracies as representative governments and other democratic 
functions. It is a bi-product of a naïve policy by the western, modern states that have been 
promoting neo liberal reforms without taking institutional theory into consideration. Raúl 
Castro has given corruption a priority with the creation of “Contraloría General de la 
República”, and an increase in supervision and control over public resources throughout the 
entire institutional framework. This effort still lacks the creation of a legislation that is 
required to undergo public bidding projects and supply contracts with state companies (that 
handles with FDI) and requires them to make the conditions of adjudication public. Policies to 
increase transparency to help in the fight against corruption are still on hold.  The 
International Transparency index considers the reforms that Raúl initiated to have had a 
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positive effect on corruption. In 2014, Cuba was ranked as 63 out of 175,
189
 and scores just 
over world average on the statistics shown by “World Heritage Foundation/Wall Street 
Journal” (see figure 14), beating both Vietnam and China on this field since the middle of the 
first decade of 2000.  
 
Figure 14: Freedom from corruption comparison  
Source: The Heritage Foundation
190
  
Since some of the economic reforms in 2011, Cuba has closed more joint ventures 
than it has opened. Unilever, an Anglo-Dutch consumer goods group, ended a 15-year joint 
venture after failing to resolve a dispute with the government over who would have the 
controlling interest.
191
 Imprisonments of British executives in British investment and trading 
firm Coral Capital Group Ltd, and Canadian businessman CY Tokmakjian on the basis of 
fraud and bribery, does not further strengthen the level of “credible commitment” or 
economic freedom. More than anything, it may contribute to fear of investing as Cuba 
previously were more likely to deport such suspects, but now show that they are willing to 
find executives criminally liable.
192
 Michel Villand, the founder of a chain of bakeries called 
Pain de Paris, stopped doing business with Cuba as government partners defrauded him by 
keeping two sets of books. They then offered a ridiculously low sum for his stake. The 
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bakeries are now in the hands of the government. Small or medium sized foreign businesses 
seem to have little or no leverage when dealing with the state. While bigger companies like 
the Swiss food giant Nestle, Britain´s imperial Tobacco Group, Spain´s Melías Hotels 
International, and Canada´s Sherrit International, have all prospered in joint ventures with 
Cuba.
193
 
5.1.4 Special Economic Free trade zones 
Brazilian development bank BNDES has financed a new special economic trading 
zone, with an expansion built by the Brazilian construction company “Odebrecht SA”. Cuba 
has put a lot of effort and prestige into their “Mariel Special Development Zone” (ZEDM) 
outside Havana. It has a 700-meter dock for boats longer than 40 feet to access, and a terminal 
with annual capacity of between 850,000 and 1 million containers. ZEDM is so far the most 
advanced project in the Cuban economy, and is a would-be capitalist enclave in what is a 
staunchly socialist country.
194
 However, Mariel will have to compete with ports such as those 
in Panama and Kingston, and transshipment is a price-sensitive business. A further 
complication is that the embargo forbids ships entering U.S waters if they have berthed in 
Cuba over the past six months. The special development and economic zones are defined as: 
 
“...demarcated geographic areas contained within a country´s national boundaries where the rules of 
business are different from those that prevail in the national territory. These differential rules 
principally deal with investment conditions, international trade and customs, taxation, and the 
regulatory environment; whereby the zone is given a business environment that is intended to be more 
liberal from a policy perspective and more effective from an administrative perspective than that of 
the national territory.”195 
 
 
With ZEDM, Cuba let market mechanisms work for them to attract investors and 
capital to update and finance the Cuban Socialism. The investment guide, which I further 
elaborate in section 5.2.2, is organized by sectors in the economy. Because of ZEDM´s 
importance and priority, the first section in the investment guide is dedicated entirely to 
project proposals for the ZEDM. It encompasses 32 of the 95 projects presented in the guide. 
Five of projects were in agriculture and the food sector, fifteen in 
biotechnology/pharmaceutical sector, ten in the industrial sector and one solar panel farm to 
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generate electricity for consumption in the ZEDM, and one to provide ancillary services for 
the biotechnology/pharmaceutical industries.
196
  
The promotion of ZEDM is a favorable change, as it should present opportunities for 
domestic and foreign companies in an environment of low cost and simplification of 
administrative and customs formalities. The concept diverges from the old and non-
productive commercial free zones, as it aims to develop high- tech projects that contribute to 
increasing sources of employment, exports and import substitution. The hope with the special 
development an economic zones, is to attract foreign capital not supported in tariff and tax 
exemptions, but in providing competitive infrastructure and logistics.
197
 Still, the labor regime 
and the lack of dynamism in the laws would give the impression of a Cuba not interested in 
more than the direct effect, which is capital, rather than the indirect effect of FDI through 
spillovers. 
  Even though many firms stand ready to invest in the Port of Mariel free zone project, 
the process is taking time. During the “XXXII Feria International de la Habana”, the Cuban 
government presented law 118´s “investors guide” to the island. The guide included material, 
characteristics and possibilities in the Mariel terminal, and in which sectors investment is 
desired.
198
 Still, investment in the establishment of an industrial park takes several years to 
provide a return on the investment: in good conditions, around 7-12 years. This means 
investors often want to locate to free zones where everything is in place. In a historically 
volatile region like Central America, foreign investors also want to see that domestic 
companies take risks and show commitment by investing in bricks and mortar. Investment by 
domestic entrepreneurs signals to foreign investors that returns are possible.
199
 The Cuban 
“free zone” is not for Cubans, which makes it difficult to achieve such a commitment from 
domestic actors, and if returns take 7-12 years, it would demand a further dedication to 
Cuba´s more pragmatic political cycles to eventually be able to harvest any gains from the 
project. The free-zone initiative is a positive measure, but it does look like an enclave 
economy where the capitalist project of market dynamics and functions are to work in its 
basic forms, while the regular Cuban is standing on the outside looking over the fence without 
the possibility to participate.  
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For investors, Cuban bureaucracy still creates obstacles for an effective introduction of 
FDI. Still, by June 2015, eighteen months after it opened, just six projects have been approved 
and authorized by the Council of Ministers. All projects but one, involves just a few million 
dollars, employing only dozens of workers. This is because of the lengthy process of 
developing a joint plan with one or more ministers, which can take months or even years.
200
  
Formally, the zone has a 60-day approval timeframe, but it takes much longer to treat an 
application for investment into the economy (free-zone or not), and the process of permission 
can still last up to a year, without any promises of being granted. Foreign investors also 
complain about the strict labor system, where they have to hire workforce through the state-
run labor company which pays the workforce low, causing the investors to having to stimulate 
workers “under the table” to create motivation. The strict supervision, the conflict resolution 
through Cuban entities, and having to be insured through Cuban state companies are all 
elements which make the free zone just as unattractive as the former investment environment 
on the island.  
The potential investors visiting have still left little or nothing in the Port. Some are 
looking to set up shop in the next few years, but most await further evidence of a new Cuban 
attitude, and that the change in U.S. policy will lead to more progress in the contentious 
relationship. The Port is ready to boom if the U.S. embargo is lifted. It anchors the zone, with 
a competitive tax and customs regime. Still, it lacks infrastructure, development and a 
competitive edge in terms of property ownership, labor policy and the legal environment. As 
noted earlier, investors must go through a governmental hiring hall for labor, designed to 
“protect” Cubans from capitalist labor practices. 201 
5.1.5 The Embargo 
The Cuban embargo is known as the most comprehensive set of U.S. sanctions towards any 
country, including those states designated by the U.S. government as states that sponsor 
terrorism. In this thesis I mainly address the internal factors that complicate the current of FDI 
to the island. The embargo is an external factor, but its extensive effect and reach requires that 
it is at least mentioned. Therefore, I would like to give it a brief introduction and direct it 
towards actually economic damages it has inflicted upon Cuba, its credible commitment and 
flows of FDI.   
                                                 
200
 Frank, "Cuba´S Free Trade Zone: A Would-Be Capitalist Enclave." 
201
 "Cuba Likely to End Dual Currency System," Financial Times  (2015). 
87 
 
The U.S. trade embargo against Cuba was imposed after Fidel Castro had nationalized 
all U.S. properties without compensation, and edged toward alliance with the Soviet Union. 
The embargo was designed to punish Cuba for the expropriations and to raise the cost to the 
Soviet Union of maintaining its new relationship with Cuba. Other governments in the 
“Organization of American States” (OAS) initially joined, in fear of Castro´s promise of 
guerilla warfare throughout the hemisphere to expand the social revolution. By the early 70´s, 
Castro´s attempt to export armed struggle had failed and he was under pressure from Moscow 
to change rhetoric and strategies towards other nations to avoid harming the Soviet 
relationship with Washington. In 1975, a meeting of Foreign Ministers in OAS voted for 
lifting the embargo, and from that point onwards it was up to each country to decide if they 
wanted to maintain diplomatic and trade relations with Cuba. Virtually all Latin American 
states resumed those relations, and no one supports the embargo. 
202
 The U.S. was willing to 
go the same way but they had to be compensated for the expropriation of U.S. properties. 
Cuba recognized its obligation under international law to compensate the owners, but 
countered that it had claims of its own from damages incurred during the Bay of Pigs invasion 
and from the embargo. If the embargo was not lifted, Cuba claimed it would not have 
sufficient funds to pay the claims. It was informally agreed on that these issues would be 
negotiated. However, Cuba became involved in African conflicts, first in Angola, then in the 
conflict between Somalia and Ethiopia, which made the Carter administration add two more 
conditions for progress toward normalization: that Cuban troops to be removed from Africa, 
and that Havana show greater respect for human rights.
203
  
IN 1989, there were significant movements to meet in two of the conditions set by 
U.S, that could improve U.S. – Cuban relations. The U.S. and Soviet Union had made several 
international agreements, and Namibia became independent, South African troops withdrew 
from Namibia and Angola, and Cuba began a phased withdrawal from Angola. Cuba did not 
improve with respect to human rights though, and a significant number of political prisoners 
sat in Cuban jail.  
When the Soviet Union fell in 1992, U.S. imposed conditions to begin a process of 
reconsolidation. Conditions seemed ideal to ease tensions and to begin a dialogue. However, 
the embargo was tightened through a Cuban Democracy Act signed into law, supported by 
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President Bill Clinton. This was a move supposed to terminate the Castro regime within 
months, or as stated: 
 
 “…seek a peaceful transition to democracy and a resumption of economic growth in 
Cuba through the careful application of sanctions directed at the Castro government 
and support for the Cuban people.”204  
 
The law wanted to encourage other countries´ governments to restrict their trade and 
credit relations with Cuba, while trying to limit international cooperation by imposing 
sanctions on any country that provided assistance to Cuba. This did not generate the results 
planned, and Havana initiated a number of reforms in 1993, entering the “special period in 
times of peace”, which many Cubans consider the hardest years they ever lived under the 
revolution. The reforms opened for farmers markets and small private enterprises, the use of 
U.S. dollar as legal currency of payment and eventually more favorable terms for FDI. By 
1995, Cuba was registered with a 2.5 percent growth rate, and by 1996, 7.6 percent.
205
 The 
Cuban Democracy Act was not an effective instrument for suffocating the Cuban economy 
and political system. At this stage, Cuba had come a long way toward complying with the 
U.S. conditions for engagement, but rather than responding positively the U.S. adopted new 
punitive measures. The incentives to comply with the U.S. demands grew more absent. The 
United Nations General Assembly has since 1992 had an overwhelming majority voting 
against the embargo. Israel, Panama, Uzbekistan, and some nations in need of U.S. protection 
or aid have voted for the embargo, or cast blank votes. The international community has 
denounced the U.S. embargo because it violates international law, and on moral, political and 
economic grounds.  
In March 1996, the U.S. tightened its grip, once again by introducing the Helms-
Burton Act that was signed into law. President Bill Clinton was initially against it and 
considered putting down a veto, but on February 24, 1996, Cuba shot down two small planes 
flown by Brothers to the Rescue (a Cuban-American organization) over the Straits of Florida 
in Cuban air space. The mood in the Congress turned ugly, the Helms Burton swept through, 
and Clinton signed the bill into law.
206
 The law violated international law and broke with U.S. 
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goals of free trade and a more predictable world order. It aimed to multilateralize the embargo 
to the extent possible. It prohibited Cuban participation in international financial 
organizations, and threatened sanctions against countries that provided anything that could be 
defined as “economic assistance” to Cuba, also by attractive terms of trade. The Helms-
Burton act imposed sanctions on third country nationals who would do business involving 
properties expropriated from U.S. nationals. The EU, Canada and Mexico all protested against 
the law and threatened to bring the U.S. to the WTO tribunal.
207
 
What especially damaged Cuba´s opportunities to attract FDI, other than having a 
major conflict with the world´s only economic and military superpower, was that the law 
allowed U.S. nationals to sue foreign companies or other entities, including the Cuban 
government itself, in U.S. federal courts for “trafficking” in properties taken from them 
during the early days of the Revolution. This was highly controversial, as the U.S. does not 
have the right to bring the citizens of another country into the U.S. courts over properties lost 
in another country under international law. Also, the law locked U.S. policy in place 
indefinitely. The embargo was originally based on executive orders and could be modified or 
rescinded at the president´s discretion. Now, they became embedded in law. The lifting of the 
embargo and normalization of relations will have to be preceded by a repeal of the Helms 
Burton Act and ratified by the congress.
208
  
The economic embargo from 1960 that broadened into what is today´s embargo 
consist of a set of economic, financial and commercial sanctions which rest principally on the 
following statutes and regulations:” 
 
 Trading With the Enemy Act of 1917, section 5(b) 
 Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, section 620(a) 
 Cuba Assets Control Regulations of 1963 
 Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, the Torricelli Act 
 Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996, (Helms-Burton Act 
 The Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000”209 
 
Internationally, the U.S. embargo has not been taken into consideration by everyone, 
as many countries have continued investing into the Island. Investors admit that the embargo 
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may complicate factors like transactions, papers for docking, entering or leaving territorial 
grounds, but it is mainly internal elements of the Cuban economy that have the greatest effect 
on the credibility of the island. As the U.N. generally assembly shows, there is a large 
international agreement that the embargo is illegal and should be removed, which also creates 
some safety for investors. It is doubtful that the U.S. would try to bring large Chinese, 
Brazilian or EU investors to court for investing on Cuba, because it would damage U.S. 
foreign relations. Ironically, by enacting the laws and maintaining the embargo, counter bills 
have been enacted to create maneuverability in trade with Cuba, this principally through 
lobbying from U.S. domestic industry. On the 111
th
 Congress, convened on 6
th
 of January 
2009, there were five bills that promoted greater commercial and trade openness towards 
Cuba: “ 
 The Promoting American Agricultural and Medical Exports to Cuba Act of 2009, 
reintroduced in the senate (S.1089) and House of Representatives (H.R. 1531) in 
2009. It was first introduced in 2007. 
 The Cuban reconciliation Act (H.R. 188) which aims at lifting the trade embargo on 
Cuba and repealing the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 and the Cuban Liberty and 
Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996. 
 The United States-Cuba Trade Normalization Act of 2009 (H.R 2272) which amends 
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to lift the embargo on trade with Cuba. 
 The Free Trade with Cuba Act (H.R. 1530) 
 The Freedom to Travel to Cuba Act introduced in the Senate (S.428) and House of 
Representatives (H.R. 874).”210 
 
The UN Secretary-General has documented negative economic, social and cultural 
impacts on the Cuban people due to the embargo. Cuba had by 2009 achieved three out of 
eight Millennium Development Goals, and was close to achieving the five others. In spite of 
Cuba´s achievement, the U.S. embargo has been a significant factor in hindering further 
progress towards meeting the goals.  
The Obama administration has taken necessary steps towards for lifting the embargo 
with the reopening of embassies and reinitiating communication. This strategy is probably 
preparing U.S. interests on the island towards the resignation of Raúl Castro in 2018. It would 
appear that U.S. policies towards Cuba always end with the opposite effect of what was 
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initially intended, because Cuba enjoys respect and admiration throughout Latin America and 
within anti-U.S. circles all over the globe. Also, the fact that the Castro´s have been at the 
helm for half a century by now implies that policies have failed. On the other hand, there 
seems to be an internal embargo as well. If the embargo was lifted, the Cuban government 
would to a much greater degree be exposed to international law and obligations, and a 
considerable loss of power to individual freedom and entrepreneurship would be demanded 
from the international environment. Cuba would not be able to hide behind the necessities the 
embargo imposes on Cuban society. However, these are only speculations and I will not 
elaborate further on U.S. policies towards Cuba, the embargo, and future perspectives 
concerning this issue as it is not a part of this thesis. The important thing to remember is that 
it is an external factor that to a certain degree affects tan investor´s will to take chances in 
Cuba.      
 Formal/informal rules and norms. 5.2
In the previous chapter, I addressed the history and the factors of “Economy, politics, society 
and cultural heritage” on the left hand side of “table 1”, also to be found in the right hand 
bubble of figure 2. In this chapter, I will focus on “center/left” part of Figure 1, and the 
elements concerning formal/informal norms and rules within the institutions, and the effect on 
credible commitment and FDI. 
As noted in table 1, I find that the State, with CCP and the MINCEX are the most 
important institutions as we investigate the effects on credible commitment and FDI. The 
formal norms and rules within this institutional framework are the centrally planned politics 
and economy, with market mechanisms existing only under the rules of special economic free 
zones. Additionally, Law 77, law 118, property rights and the constitution are the most 
important materialized formal rules concerning FDI. The informal part, that I will investigate, 
coexists with the formal rules and norms. They are much harder to observe and study, but we 
find them in informal constraints such as behavior, actions, commitment and rhetoric towards 
investors and the international investment society.   
5.2.1 Decree law 77 of 1995 - 2014 
The opening for foreign investment and international tourism led to an increased interest, but 
also growing complaints from foreign companies. Decree law 50 was limited for foreign 
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investors as they only could owe 49 % of the share in a joint venture, and there was a low 
level of investment protection. According to Article 24 in Decree law 50 of 1982, if Cuba 
unilaterally terminated the activities of a joint venture, the Cuban National Bank guaranteed 
to foreign investors only the ability to repatriate the proceeds of their share after 
liquidation.
211
  
In 1995, decree law 77 was enacted to pursue the goals of the economic austerity 
program. It set out specific guarantees for foreign firms by establishing full protection and 
security against expropriation and it opened all sectors of the Cuban economy (except public 
health, education and the military). It also abolished the limit of 49% of foreign shares for 
joint ventures and authorized the possibility of 100% foreign- owned investments, and topped 
it by introducing an attempt to speed up the process of authorization. The law required that 
approval or denial of an investment must be given within sixty days of the presentation of the 
formal request.
212
 As Cuban officials actively promoted investment on the island through 
visits to other countries, participation in international investment events, and meetings with 
potential investors, the international associations grew and expanded to different sectors of 
the Cuban economy such as mining, construction, light and food industries, agriculture and 
services other than tourism.  
Law 77 of 1995 apparently offered, for the first time, substantial guarantees for 
investors: 
 
“Las inversiones extranjeras dentro del territorio nacional no pueden ser expropiadas, salvo que esa 
acción se ejecute por motivos de utilidad pública o interés social declarados por el gobierno, previa 
indemnización en moneda libremente convertible por su valor comercial establecido de mutuo 
acuerdo.”213  
 
“Se garantiza la libre transferencia de beneficios al exterior, así como las cantidades derivadas de la 
expropiación, liquidación o venta de las participaciones en el negocio, sin pago de impuesto o ninguna 
otra exacción relacionada con dicha transferencia.” 214 
 
“Se otorgan incentivos tributarios a las empresas mixtas y a las partes en los contratos de asociación 
económica internacional: exención del impuesto sobre los ingresos personales y menores tipos 
impositivos para el impuesto sobre utilidades, el impuesto por la utilización de la fuerza de trabajo y 
la contribución a la seguridad social.”215 
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Also, Cuba signed 62 BITs which guarantee that the firms from a country within the 
treaty does not suffer from conditions less favorable than others, and offers a system of 
arbitration for the resolution of conflicts, with resolution deadlines. Cuba has also signed 11 
agreements to avoid double taxation (Convenios para evitar la Doble Imposición y la Evasión 
Fiscal) (see appendix).
216
  
In law 77, there were no great restrictions written, and it opened practically every 
sector for investment without any limits on foreign capital. But in practice, the characteristics 
of Cuban institutional environment (an economy with high prevalence of state property, 
centrally planned, and poorly developed market relations) conditioned the possibilities of 
foreign investment, restricting it to certain sectors or forms of investment in terms of the 
public interest at each particular time.
217
 As mentioned, the law allowed companies to be 
entirely owned by companies of foreign capital. Still, a strong tendency of maintaining 
favorable ratios for the Cuban side in the structure of capital, preserving in almost all cases 
more than 50 % in Cuban hands. This rule resulted in the reduction of partners in favor of 
greater use of resources or external debt, thereby increasing leverage levels in companies. The 
most concerning issue for a foreign investor who have less than 50 % of capital, is lower 
control over business decisions, and the effect it has on the autonomy of the company as a 
whole.
218
  
The joint venture was the preferred business type of investment by the Cuban 
government, even though international economic associations and companies with entirely 
foreign capital were allowed. However, all modalities of FDI in Cuba could potentially be 
subject to adverse action following a political transition as seen in the idealist and pragmatic 
cycles. The joint venture is the type of investment most exposed to these kinds of transitions 
because the foreign investor often develops facilities or spends money directly in the country, 
and is therefore more vulnerable to unfavorable governmental, or private, action.
219
  
Law 77 also provided guarantees for property rights. Foreign investors had the right to 
sell or otherwise transmit their properties before the end of the authorization granted ended. 
The negotiation was commonly done with the state. Investors could also request an extension 
of time to operate in the country, which was provided if the proceedings were conducted 
before the end of the contract. The law guaranteed that the investment could not be 
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expropriated, except for legal or constitutionally qualified reasons, as a cause of public utility 
or social interest and with an establishment of compensation by mutual agreement.
220
 How the 
Cuban authorities measure the constitutionally qualified reasons is difficult and controversial, 
as it to a large degree leaves the Cuban government to decide how to interpret the law. The 
expropriation is considered to be a coercive transfer of private property to the state without 
there being any purchase. The purifying process of FDI on the island started in 2003´s idealist 
cycle, which resulted in the dissolution of at least 200 associations before 2009 (see figure 5 
and 6). This was primarily based on the non-renewal of contracts that were to expire, or 
through negotiations culminating with sale of foreign property to the State. This clarification 
of the term “expropriation” is unable to relieve the investor´s uncertainty concerning the 
duration and stability of their business.  
Reasons for why a contract is not renewed or canceled are almost never exposed and 
discussed with transparency, which investors have had a hard time understanding. Often, 
partnerships have been dissolved suddenly while showing prosperous results, showing the 
investor that Cuba assumes the foreign participation to be a temporary element, needed only 
in the initial stage of production development and market positioning. The Cuban 
government, on the other hand, claims the contracts have not fulfilled the agreed terms and 
fundamental objectives of the FDI on the island. There have also been reports of canceled 
contracts given the existence of conflict between the parties, arising, for example, before new 
regulations or conditions that the foreign part is unwilling to accept. The resolutions of 
conflicts between the parts in a partnership with foreign capital are settled abroad, while the 
conflicts that arose between a Cuban entity and a foreign partner were subjected to the 
Chambers of the Economy of the People´s Courts established by the Governing Council of the 
Supreme Court. This court would rarely favor the foreign side of a partnership.  
According to the law, the state guarantees the foreign investor the free transference 
abroad, in freely convertible currency, without payment of taxes or any related duty in case of 
expropriation, liquidation, or sale of the business as well as net profits or dividends obtained 
by exploiting investment. Similarly, foreign workers that provide their services to these 
companies, and who are not permanent residents in Cuba, have the right to transfer the 
income they receive abroad, within the agreed amount, and complying with the regulation 
issued by Cuba´s Central Bank. However, in 2009, the impact of the 2008 financial crisis 
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delayed the transfers from Cuban banks due to liquidity problems and the loss of the 
convertible Cuban peso convertibility.
221
  
On the access to financing, the legislation allow loans to be conducted with any state, 
mixed or foreign owned financial institution, within or outside the country. Still, it should be 
noted that no country in the European Union guarantees official credit safety lines to support 
investment in Cuba.
222
 The self-enforcing function of implementing, to some extent, liberal 
legislation varies. This shows that the informal side of the execution of law, cultural heritage 
and reputation has left financial institutions of the European Union to consider Cuba on a low 
level of credible commitment, even though the foreign investor enjoys a high level credible 
commitment, and a sound history of paying back loans. 
As a rule, on the regulation of receipts and payments, foreign investment cannot use 
non-convertible currency (CUP) in their operations, so it is subject to the exchange rate 
regime of Cuban convertible peso (CUC). Law 77 states that businesses with foreign 
investment must use an account in freely convertible currency in any bank in the national 
banking system, to make receipts and payments related to their operations. While it is possible 
to open and use accounts in freely convertible currency in banks abroad, with the 
authorization of the Central Bank of Cuba, the most widely used instruments for payment are 
the irrevocable letter of credits, bills of exchange (with or without endorsement) and 
commercial invoices. A final consideration is the need to avoid the payment in USD currency 
and transit by a correspondent in the US, since the law of the US embargo would block 
payment.
223
 
The most important element, within the monetary paradigm, is the measures 
implemented to eliminate monetary duality. The Cuban state controls more than 75 % of the 
economy and most wages and local goods are priced in CUP, while the CUC is used in 
tourism, to price imports, and other business related sectors. The manner and speed in which 
the devaluation of the Cuban peso in the business sector is carried out and the impact of these 
actions will define the effects on inflation, the fiscal accounts, the balance sheets of 
companies and banks and FDI. The elimination of the dual currency would open new 
opportunities and participation in the domestic market for FDI, in addition to benefits from 
the outset reports on monetary and fiscal transparency. The restoration of full convertibility of 
the CUC, and possible devaluation against international currencies, may also be a central 
                                                 
221
 Ibid. P. 15 
222
 Ibid. P. 15 
223
 Ibid. P. 15 
96 
 
element of the monetary tightening required with any direct and indirect impacts on FDI.
224
 
Cuba is likely to eliminate its dual currency system soon, in a first step to simplifying 
multiple exchange system that investors have viewed as a serious obstacle to business. It 
would improve accounting transparency and the efficiency of state companies. However, as 
everything else on Cuba, it is a slow process which began already in October 2003, and the 
devaluation process will proceed cautiously and only in tandem with a strengthening 
economy.
225
 Also, a full unification and convertibility of the currency would typically require 
the backing of large hard currency reserves, often supported by the international Monetary 
Fund loans, but Cuba is not a member of the IMF. Cuba does not report its holdings of foreign 
currency, but the Economist Intelligence Unit estimates it has $11 billion of reserves against a 
forecast 2015 current account deficit of £524 million as of May 20.
226
 A real monetary reform 
would change the financial situation of state companies, improving competitiveness of the 
sector operating in the global economy and promote more transparency in financial accounts.  
Perhaps the most debated obstacle for investment is the system of hiring labor. It is of 
a controversial sort and has been criticized by several investors. The hiring of labor cannot be 
done directly in Cuba, but through state employment agencies as ACOREC SA and Palco. 
This mechanism limits the selection of workers, the negotiation of wages and other terms of 
employment, as well as possibilities to make adjustment in the number of employed, which 
particularly affects the tourism sector given the high exposure to seasonal cycles.
227
 As 
mentioned in section 2.1.3, a restrictive labor regime has frequently affected the spillover 
effects negatively. Cuba´s restrictive and complicated system not only regulates wages to 
workers to maintain socialist goals, but it also contributes to lack of trust from both investors 
and employees. The great difference between what the foreign company agency pays for the 
employee and what the worker actually receives is unproportioned. The first transaction, 
which is between business and agency, is made in CUC, according to a standardized 
occupational category and type of business rates. The second transaction, between the agenc 
and the worker, is performed in CUP, where the exchange rate is 1 CUC= 24 CUP. The wages 
that the agency pays workers represents less than 5 % of what the foreign company actually 
paid for them, causing great demotivation for workers and requiring the foreign party to give 
additional bonuses directly depending on the results, this to avoid that employees steal from 
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the production or perform their duties poorly (which is the case in state sector). Table 2, is 
taken from Archibald R.M. Ritters “The Cuban Economy”, and gives a picture of what the 
hiring and payment of a Cuban worker costs on a monthly basis. The numbers are from 1995, 
but aside form a potential slight increase in prices, the table still is actual today.  
Table 2: Monthly employment cost of Cuban workers in FDI companies (1995) 
Source: Jorge F. Pérez in Archibald R.M. Ritter, “The Cuban Economy” 228 
As mentioned above, the labor regime is one of the main drawbacks for Cuba as a 
place for investment, as investors have no control of hiring workers, the wage costs are high 
and the workforce is demotivated. In the case of foreign workers, they need a work permit 
issued by the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, which should deal with the company that 
is hiring and be renewed annually, at a cost of course. The restrictive labor systems often 
generate poorer results from spillovers than liberalized systems. The Cuban case, however, is 
even more complicated, as it barely takes the theory of spillovers into consideration, but bets 
on the static goal of being able to extract as much capital as possible on each worker that 
works in a foreign company. The reason for this is ideological as it would deviate from 
socialist goals, and it would be considered highly unethical to let some lucky few earn up to 
1000 % or more than other citizens. It would, according to the Cuban government, create 
inequalities in the society that the revolution undertook to defeat, and break with early idealist 
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thought that Cubans would work for moral rewards which would reflect his or hers higher 
level of political consciousness.
229
 
5.2.2 Decree law 118 of 2014: same law, new wrapping 
In 2014, Cuba declared its economy open (again) for business with a new foreign investment 
law as law 118 was enacted 29
th
 of March, unanimously by the “National Assembly of 
People´s Power of Cuba”, together with other relevant legislation. The law is closely related 
to the “Guidelines for Economic and Social Policy” set by the Cuban government to promote 
sustainable development. In it, FDI is officially considered a source of economic development 
in the short, medium and long term perspective, as it will provide access to advanced 
technologies, management methods, diversification and expansion of exports markets, import 
substitution, external financing, new jobs and more income from productive linkages with 
domestic economies.
230
 This formally complies with what we elaborated on in the theory 
section on FDI and spillover effects. At the time of the enactment, there were around 200 joint 
ventures and other projects involving FDI on the island, compared with more than 400 just 12 
years ago. 
Law 118 embraces foreign capital as crucial to Cuba´s development. Cuba states that it 
needs $2-2.5 billion a year in FDI to reach the target of 7 percent growth a year, but 
economists estimate current FDI at a few hundred million, and a growth at just 2.2 percent in 
2014.
231
 The law plays a part of the restructuration reforms enacted by Raúl, and is 
supposedly one of the more serious elements in the reforms. It appears to be a genuine 
attempt to join the global economy. However, Cuba´s past dealings with foreign investors 
suggest caution. 
The law itself does not bring anything new to the table. The type of investment it seeks 
are joint ventures, International Economic Associations (including hotel administration, 
production or services, contracts for the provision of professional services, contracts at risk 
for exploration of non-renewable natural resources, for construction and agricultural 
production), and 100% foreign capital-owned businesses.
232
 This is much of the same as in 
law 77, but with some of the newer resolutions that have been developed between 1995 and 
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2014 incorporated. Law 118 is most notable for halving the tax on profits in half from 30 % to 
15 %, and for eliminating labor tax while granting new investors an 8 year exemption on the 
profits tax of any industrial or other major investment project.
233
 By comparison, in the 
special development zone investors receive a 10-year reprieve from paying a 12 % tax on 
profits and are exempted from the labor and income tax. 
What is interesting with the law is that it came with an “investor´s guide to 
investment” (Cartera de Oportunidades) that is, according to MINCEX, an important tool to 
attract investors, while summarizing the interest of business developed by foreign capital and 
information on sectoral policies approved by the Cuban government. This document is a great 
insight into what the Cuban government seeks to achieve with FDI, though one should always 
have a critical mind towards statistics and data presented through governmental channels: 
there are few countries in the world that can predict the result of their state budget on the 
dollar like Cuba. The Minister of MINCEX, Rodrigo M. Diaz claims that the initiatives do not 
constitute a list developed by the government, but by Cuban enterprises, according to the 
government priorities.
234
 The companies again, are state owned and are complying with the 
government guidelines. I would rather say that it is the enterprise´s experience that forms the 
desired investment plans within the guidelines of the government. What is noteworthy is that 
only State-owned enterprises propose businesses, which practically means they seek for joint 
ventures. Despite the expressed will of the government to support and develop the non-state 
sector of the economy, there are no agricultural, industrial or service cooperatives. In reality, 
this means that the various national entities that are charged with implementing these 
decisions still do not align with the policies put forth by the leadership of the country.
235
 
Even though Cubans residing abroad are now allowed (to a certain degree) to invest, 
those residing in the country are excluded as potential investors (except for U.S .Cubans who 
are restricted by U.S. government and law). MINCEX claims that FDI is promoted in the need 
of foreign capital, which state-owned enterprises and Cuban residents do not have, to achieve 
the level of economic growth required. The law, however, does not distinguish between the 
sources of capital invested in the island. This selective approach emphasizes the experience 
and prestige of the foreign entities partnering with the Cubans. Still, as noted in section 2.1.4, 
some of the most important assets for export oriented FDI were skilled and productive labor, a 
                                                 
233
 Frank, "Cuba Cuts Taxes for Foreign Investors." 
234
 Rafael J. Betancourt, "Analysis of the Portfolio of Opportunities 
for Foreign Investment in Cuba." P. 2 
235
 Ibid. P. 3 
100 
 
line of efficient suppliers, and competition in the domestic market with support institutions 
and services. When Cubans are excluded from investment, it is also difficult to achieve the 
level of services desired as the workforce lack experience with large investment projects. If 
Cuba wants to attract the mobile assets of FDI, they need to improve the quality of their 
immobile assets and create an unhostile investment environment, something that is hard to do 
with some of the restrictions put on labor and domestic investor´s possibility to participate 
and evolve.    
Despite past failings, some investors and analysts believe the new law shows that 
Cuban authorities at the highest level agree that they need to attract more foreign investment, 
and that this marks a true change of course by a secretive government that has been in power 
since 1959. Thomas Herzfeld, of the Herzfeld Caribbean Basin Fund, believes it will be of 
value if the U.S. economic embargo ends. If that were to happen, investors will probably be 
encouraged to look at Cuba.
236
  
 Discussing FDI  5.3
So far, I have analyzed and elaborated on important elements which concern foreign 
investors. I will now discuss the top center, right and left factors of figure 2 and how these 
elements affect Cuba´s degree of credible commitment and inflow of FDI, I will especially 
connect it to the country´s degree of credible commitment. 
In figure 1, we observed a rather pessimistic future perspective by the World Bank on 
Cuba´s economy. Cuba has decided on FDI as the development model for its economy. FDI is 
a popular measure for development in capitalist neoliberal theory, but countries like Vietnam 
and China who are both Communist have also opened their markets and economies to FDI. 
Countries that have kept the single party state have actually been quite successful. It is 
understandable that Cuba might look towards these countries when considering the 
possibilities to successfully implement FDI without losing control or power. However, 
attempts so far have led to less impressive results, as seen in figure 7. It could be worth 
considering that their regional context is quite different. China and Vietnam are located in 
what has been an authoritarian region, while Cuba is located in a democratic Latin America, 
with the USA as neighbor.  
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Although the outcome of FDI has been heavily debated, the general understanding is 
that host nations need FDI to develop their economy, and that this happens mainly through 
spillovers. Given the theory we established in chapter 2, we should expect certain effects from 
FDI in the host nation. However, Cuba does not play the theoretical game to its fullest. The 
intention of keeping foreign ownership in Cuba at a minimum level has never been concealed 
by Cuban authorities. They have always said that FDI is a complementary tool to help 
strengthen and improve the country´s socialist system. New investment from abroad is based 
on strict consideration of what they can bring in terms of capital, technology, and markets. 
The Cuban government has been clear that it wants to preserve substantial control over the 
economy and the primacy of socialist property.
237
 We observe following trends in the empiric 
data presented in chapter 4 and 5: 
I. Cuba´s attitude towards FDI has changed the last 20-25 years, in line with what the 
theory states about other LDCs. However, the Cuban government did not actually 
rethink their role, but the role FDI could have within the socialist system. There was a 
consensus that FDI would lead to a higher income of capital. The most important 
formal elements that prove this are the laws of 77 in 1995 and 118 in 2014. Still, there 
are many informal constraints in the institutional framework that makes the 
investment environment insecure. 
II. According to figure 10, the biggest share of FDI invested in Cuba is found in joint 
ventures with state companies. The second biggest type of investment is the hotel 
management contracts. This leaves the state with full control and insight to the 
investments on the island.  
III. As previously stated by Livingstone in this chapter: “if you are an investor focused on 
quarterly results and internal rates of return with immediate exits, Cuba might not be 
for you”, rather, Cuba is for long-term investors with patient capital”. The formal 
law may give safety to investors through promises of transfer or reinvestment of 
profits in freely convertible currency. However, actions like those of 2009, where 
foreign profit was frozen in the banks due to liquidity problems and the loss of the 
convertible Cuban peso convertibility, illustrate how easily these promises are 
broken. Also, several investors have experienced being shut down or thrown out 
because they, according to the Cuban government, have not delivered the results 
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agreed upon in initial contracts. Between the pragmatic and idealist cycles, the 
number of dissolved FDI and existing FDIs on the island varies greatly, as shown in 
figure 4 and 5. The juridical system seldom gives a verdict in favor of the foreign 
partner, and does not appear to be independent. Often, the foreign partner is not given 
any reason or explication for the takeover, or the Cuban government finds sufficient 
ideological reasons of contract breach within the legal framework, which is quite 
open for interpretation. Cuba has also showed that they are willing to incarcerate 
foreign company leaders on dubious grounds, rather than expelling them from the 
island.    
IV. Cuba has developed their legal system. Since Raúl came to power, several projects 
and measures to attract more investment have been initiated, law 118 amongst them. 
Still, Cuba scores low on important issues such as property rights as seen in figure 13, 
only beaten by North Korea, which is an essential element for investors. The 
conditions for property rights to be ensured need an effective regulator, and neither 
these conditions, nor an independent regulator exist in Cuba. The formal legal 
framework appears to be friendly towards creating a better environment for FDI, but 
the execution and the interpretation of the laws vary too much. Processes such as the 
approbation for investment, is lengthy, and authorization sometimes comes all the 
way from the top before any decision is made. In chapter 4, we could observe the 
development of the Cuban institutional framework, and it does not appear to be a 
political system that creates rules and laws that can be enforced at low costs. Rather, 
they are Ad Hoc policies that the leaders sees fit or necessary to secure some elements 
of the system that is more important than economic and societal development, that 
does not comply with Cuban socialism. 
V. When it comes down to the very essence of FDI effects on a host nation, it is the 
spillover that most economies hope to take full advantage of. However, in our Cuban 
case, it appears that Cuba has an extraordinary attitude towards the indirect effects of 
spillovers. In essence, they do not want them at all. By creating special development 
and economic free trade zones, they have the possibility to isolate the effects. Within 
these free zones, the Cuban government lets market mechanisms function as intended, 
which leaves Cuban economy with only the gains of capital. According to theory on 
FDI, the spillovers are supposed to develop society through wages, know-how, 
technology, management, and more. This should create competition, and stimulate 
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entrepreneurship in society. However, the issue is that this also leads to the citizens 
being strengthened in relation to the state, which the Cuban state does not want. 
Through the strict labor regime, the state has managed to avoid workers achieving 
greater economic and personal autonomy and freedom. Potential extra capital for 
workers to re-invest is in this way excluded as a possible effect, and taxation is also 
secured as the state takes 95% of the payment for each worker.           
When it comes to the Cuban system, it is worth noting that the vertical hierarchy 
makes no, or little, room for competition. If the restructuration program (lineamientos), that 
Raúl initiated, is meant to create change within the institutional framework through the formal 
and informal rules and norms, the flawed incentive structure of the statist economic model is 
what makes it inefficient. As I established in theory section 2.2.3, all economic organizations 
are under state control, meaning that they almost operates as state institutions. If these 
“organizations” are the primary sources of institutional change, and the competition between 
them is the incentive to invest in skills and knowledge to enhance survival, then the vertical 
hierarchy of the Cuban state will take away the incentives. Rather a “minimum 
accomplishment culture” of what state regulation requires is observed. Their incentives are to 
execute tasks and orders from above to a satisfying degree. The horizontal pressure is close to 
zero and their position is safe. This also makes decision-making a lengthy process, as some 
decisions may have to be taken by Castro himself.      
Except for taxes, little has changed in the new law, which means Cuban authorities´ 
attitude has not changed. Cuba´s approach to foreign business has been arbitrary. If a venture 
is successful, the government often wants a bigger stake. Foreign financing is welcomed, but 
once a project is operational the Cuban government wants to take charge. Cuban reforms 
seem to be moving at two different velocities: one very slow within the medium and large 
state companies, and one faster within the companies of smaller scale which tend to liberalize 
and transfer themselves to the non-state sector. This will create new opportunities for FDI, 
which may angle their investment towards liberalized rooms. Still, the undercapitalization and 
accumulated needs require a quicker pace, with agility in the decision-making process, which 
is an essential component in order for foreign capital to arrive as quickly as Cuban economy 
requires.  
Law 118 from 2014 shares considerable elements with the old law 77 from 1995. If 
the former law was not successful, there are few reasons to believe that the new law will be. 
There been few formal problems with legislation on FDI. The problems are found in the 
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institutional framework surrounding them, and the credible commitment of those regulating 
the laws. Are the authorities now willing to take a higher risk than they did 20 years ago? As 
late as 2003, Fidel returned to an idealist policy to retain control over the economy and state 
after the first law and project on FDI. Even though law 118 is newer and modernized with 
better language, the framework surrounding it is still the same. The institutional, cultural, 
economic, societal frameworks we addressed in chapter 4 and 5 create the obstacles that 
prevent the laws from functioning as planned. However, the “investor´s guide” to investment 
on Cuba that came with law 118 suggests that the Cuban government has adopted a proactive 
posture, and is clear as to where it wants to direct and promote investments, which makes it is 
easier to stimulate the influx of foreign capital. The guide underscores large investments, 
largely excluding small and medium ventures, as if they were mutually exclusive (which they 
are not). Medium enterprises often tend to be more active in FDI than larger MNE, which 
have other interests associated with global value chains. This shows that the selectiveness of 
Cuba is pointed directly to investment that will generate a larger amount of capital, having 
direct effects on the economy, as desired by the government. This type of “cherry picking” 
could indicate that the Cuban authorities have misunderstood the effect FDI is supposed to 
have on the economy. 
It seems like Cuba does not want spillover effects, and instead only wants those 
projects that directly provide capital for the Cuban economy. The theory states that spillovers 
create growth through local surplus, taxation of workers, entrepreneurship, innovation and 
more, but if the spillovers are left out, then the point is gone. It is a mismatch between formal 
written rules and statements from the Cuban government, and the actual actions of selecting 
FDI (mainly through establishing joint ventures). Receiving direct effects of FDI is interesting 
to most countries, but not the goal. The goal is for FDI to have indirect effects on the host 
economy so the domestic sector can evolve and generate more income to the state, in essence 
expanding the local economy. The legal framework is therefore not enough. It is necessary to 
organize the entire environment for doing business in the country through revising, not only 
formal norms and rules within the institutions that handles FDI, but also the informal part. 
Together, they make the investment environment that foreign investors analyze before 
involving themselves in any business, with or without state-owned firms. From a legal and 
economic viewpoint it appears that the various reforms made from 1995 – 2003 were of poor 
quality as the commitment of these rules and norms was low. As Investors initiated projects 
on the island, they experienced what could be referred to as a frustrating bureaucratic 
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nightmare. With law 118, investors will still face Cuba’s complicated approvals process, 
tough supervision, high communication costs and conflict resolution through state entities, 
unless stipulated otherwise in contracts, all of which could hold back the country’s 
possibilities for investment since the fall of the former Soviet Union. 
As previously established, the impossibility of increasing state sector salaries and free 
hiring of labor makes productivity low, and the workforce suffers from “indiscipline” and 
“lack of interest in work”.238 From the theory, we recognize the informal constraints being 
crucial for efficiency. That the Cuban says “The state pretends to pay us, and we pretend to 
work” is an example of how informal constraints may affect elements as “labor” within the 
FDI paradigm. The ideological morality would claim that the Cuban workforce is 
undisciplined. I would say it is the observation of injustice, wealth amongst tourists, and 
information of how salaries and work are measured and valued in other countries, that negates 
the ideas of moral incentives. Most Cubans survive on some kind of informal economic trade 
after work hours, and some even during work, cutting three slices of meat, putting the fourth 
aside for own winning and survival. 
An internationalized company often decides to concentrate production in a country 
that caters to a wider geographical area, where the country shows significant competitive 
advantages over other countries in the region in terms of labor costs, raw materials, tariff 
rates, infrastructural ports, logistics and other infrastructures. Cuba is not that country today; 
they have the challenge of building a suitable institutional, macro and micro environment that 
allows companies and their production to be internationally competitive. However, companies 
like Havana Club (rum, alcohol, culture) and Habanos SA (Cigars) have been smart enough to 
take advantage of the international prestige of the country in its respective areas. While 
others, like ALCATEL (telecommunication) has taken advantage of Cuba´s integration and 
membership in “Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América” (ALBA).  
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5.3.1 Credible Commitment 
Previously in this chapter, I analyzed some of the formal and informal rules and norms within 
the most important institutions that handle FDI. Moving down to credible commitment in 
figure 2, this section will see how Cuba´s credible commitment is affected by all of the above 
factors. I will also take into consideration other elements investors point out as important for 
them before considering investing.  
As noted in the theory, the degree of commitment represents the variation of FDI that 
exists in a country. Both domestically and internationally, states can make commitments 
toward reformations. Most existing commitments at the international level often reflect the 
level of commitment domestically. The formal ways to conclude international commitments 
(highly valued commitments) is through the framework elaborated by WTO, the GATS 
(Uruguay round in 1986-1994), and through BITs with other countries. While according to 
North, the problem was “how to bind the players to agreements across space and time?”, the 
issue is not only solving a commitment problem, but also specifying the correct content to the 
commitment. In other words, what you are credibly committing to matters even more than 
whether you can commit to the policy rules required for reform. 
Bilateral agreements and international treaties signed by Cuba have formally been kept 
throughout the revolution, but it is not these agreements that challenge Cuba´s credibility. It is 
the agreements made between investors and Cuba that often seem to be the focus of 
controversy as Cuba has tended to end cooperation, throwing the foreign investor out, when 
the business is up and running. However, the formal efforts made to provide assurances of 
legal protection to foreign investors should be taken to consideration. As mentioned earlier, 
Cuba has signed over 60 BITs with other countries. These are intended to protect and promote 
foreign investment focusing on the conditions for the approval of FDI, the treatment of 
foreign investors by the state, expropriation and resolution of disputes between the foreign 
investors and the host country.
239
  The BITs have been negotiated generally following the 
international norms and standards for such agreements. Still, it is not the quantity of engaged 
BITs that imposes the biggest impact on investors´ will to invest, but how the BITs are being 
upheld and executed. If the BITs were to improve the elements mentioned above, I will dare 
to say they have had little effect because approval of FDI is still a lengthy process.  
Foreign investors have since the implementation of law 77 experienced state takeover 
and imprisonments, and experienced to be offered poor compensation for lost investment. The 
                                                 
239
 Musa, "Cat on a Hot Tin Roof: Tha Status of Current Foreign Investors in a Post-Transition Cuba." P. 7-8 
107 
 
possibility that Cuban state ends cooperation, throwing the investor out, is an important 
concern that foreign investors have. The Cuban state, on the other hand, say they fear 
investors will exploit Cuban resources without the investment being mutually beneficial. 
However, I find that even though Cuba has established that they will not sell their lands, and 
that all property is in the nation´s ownership, it is the fear of loss of control and power that 
generates the takeover or closedown of joint ventures and other FDIs.     
The communist party adopted a comprehensive reform plan in 2011 that pledged to 
enhance Cuba´s credibility in its international economic relations by strictly observing all the 
commitments that have been entered into. The reform plan called for hastened rescheduling of 
Cuba´s foreign debt and flexible restructuring strategies for debt repayment. Cuba has 
restructured its debts with Russia, China, Japanese commercial creditors and Mexico as a 
prelude to more investment, and has made payments on time to suppliers and creditors. When 
French president Francois Hollande visited Cuba he told the companies in his delegation that 
Havana and the Cuba Working Group of the Paris Club of western creditor nations had 
reached agreement on the amount owed from a 1980s default. Cuba owes Paris Club members 
about 15 billion dollars in default debt, interest and service charges. France, Japan, Spain and 
Italy hold much of it. The Paris Club negotiations will be the first multinational attempt at 
restructuring in 15 years. It could also lead the way to settling old commercial debt held by 
the London Club and eventually to access to multilateral lending organizations if the US lifts 
opposition to Cuba´s membership.
240
  
The connection with credible commitment is clear: if the country does not pay its 
debts, why should any investor take the risk doing business. The repayments are a way of 
actually taking action to recompense for wrongful economic action towards former partners 
and investors. It is a sign of dedication to restructuration worth taking into account, and it 
could have an impact on Cuba´s credibility for foreign investors. Still, as noted in the theory, 
progressive social change, as the restructuring of Cuban economy, is not only about the shift 
in the rules. It is also about the content of those rules to limit the predatory proclivities of 
man, which are nowhere as dangerous as in the monopoly of coercion known as the state. In 
this case, the state and one man´s predatory proclivities is unanimous, making any promises 
or commitment volatile.   
Cuba is juggling various initiatives and trying to play by established international rules 
as it seeks billions of dollars in investments. By trying to improve relations with the US; 
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negotiating to normalize relations with the EU; restructuring debts, Port of Mariel, tax 
incentives for investors; and expansions of a private sector and market forces,
241
 the level of 
credible commitment should also increase. However, from the theory of institutional change 
and credible commitment we have learned that; the informal rules and norms have as much, 
or more, effect on host nation´s credibility, as formal initiatives and changes. The 
improvement of laws and investment environment should be able to generate capital, but the 
restructuring should also be dynamic, moving towards greater property rights and a greater 
liberalization of politics and economy. If the time it takes to enhance reputation is not 
accompanied by credible commitment to rule of law and liberalization, Cuba may yet again 
turn towards a more idealist cycle, retracting reforms and maneuverability for investors. As I 
mentioned in the theory 2.2.1, the time it takes to establish a credible reputation is crucial. 
Time is important for the investors since the uncertainty about the ruler´s behavior can only 
be diminished by the ruler establishing a reputation and by learning on the part of the 
investors. The Cuban government likes to take its time and to consider every possible 
outcome of letting an investor enter to a certain sector with a certain project. It shows that 
keeping control and power is more important than increasing the reputation, and thereby 
Cuba´s credibility.  
It does not hurt the island that ties with the U.S have re-emerged and embassies have 
been opened in both countries. Also, prominent state leaders (and the pope) as the president of 
France, the foreign ministers of Japan, the Netherlands and Norway, the commerce secretary 
of Spain and EU´s foreign policy chief, Federica Mogherini, have all visited since the 
conversations started.
242
 These kinds of visits contribute to the strengthening of the credible 
commitment of the island, as it gives the process of liberalization and structural reforms 
political weight. Also, the visit of celebrities like Rhianna, Jay-Z, Beyoncé, Mick Jagger and 
other great artists helps improving the view of the island, maybe not directly for investors, but 
the perception of Cuba, and Cubans, affects investors through informal channels. Still, many 
government stalwarts are wary of the new U.S. approach after half a century of smear 
campaigns towards each other; the opening is like a Trojan horse for them. Others see the 
process as an opportunity for themselves, their families, and their country.
243
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5.3.2 Foreign Frustration 
The vision of the Cuban authorities concerning FDI is that it is not desirable that foreign 
investors transfer profit that is obtained in the domestic market abroad. Cuba wants foreign 
investors to channel external resources towards the island.
244
 From the perspective of the 
foreign investor, Cuba is a small market and a country with poorly developed production 
systems, in which almost everything needs to be done. However, Cuba currently imports 
much of its consumer goods. In the eyes of the investors, this means countless possibilities or 
market niches, which are the prime motives to engage in investment with the country.  
The companies that want to invest in Cuba are not solely interested in only minority 
shares in joint ventures, which is mainly what Cuba offers. Cuba is proud of not having any 
foreign companies owning pieces of their country. It appears to be as much a nationalistic 
idealist problem as it is a communist-pragmatic problem. The state insists on having a 
majority stake in partnerships with foreign companies, but few companies want to give away 
a 51 % share and lose control. Investment is inefficient because of bad data and a workforce 
with little experience with big projects. Also, Cuba’s dual-currency system effectively 
functions as a tax in most sectors. The difficulty of finalizing details in agreements and lack 
of government clarity or changes they wish to impose, creates not only frustration among 
investors, but also a rumor which negatively affect the country´s reputation and thereby its 
credibility. Investors that have signed agreements years ago, still wait for projects to be 
realized, as the Cubans become unclear when details are being discussed.
245
 Similar obstacles 
arise in other sectors, and they all point to the same conclusion. The promise of closer 
diplomatic ties is exciting, but without an end to the embargo and a further liberalization of 
the Cuban economy, investors will wait, watch and prepare on the sideline while the world 
carefully approaches Cuba. As an investor puts it in “Financial Times:  
 
“Cuba is not like other places where all, not just some of, the rules are clear and 
standard across the board…Every deal will have to be negotiated”246 
 
While a foreign banker had a slightly more optimistic angle to Cuba saying that: 
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“Everything that has been going on here since Fidel Castro took ill has been a work 
in progress; including relations with the United States…Mariel is no exception. Only 
time and plenty of tweaking will tell if it is truly a success”247   
 
Investors fear a reversal of the reform process and other counterproductive effects, like 
those observed within the idealist and pragmatic cycles. However, the opposite could happen, 
since it would be easier to advance reform at this stage than reverse them. It would also be 
easier to advance the reform having sufficient resources to establish the elimination of the 
dual currency, to create new capacities in institutions implementing change and to overcome 
the domestic financial crisis.
248
 Still, the state fear losing control and power, which affects the 
ongoing process of economic liberalization, where as we registered in figure 9, Cuba scores 
very low.  
On the basis of my data, I have identified the main Cuban obstacles to be tied to the 
labor regime, authorization processes, legal framework, property rights and the state as a 
partner. Most of what I found relates to the CEEC report, elaborated upon in section 5.1.3, 
which confirms my analysis and my suspicion, that much of the formal legal framework is 
possible to work on or improve, while the informal constraints found in the institutional 
framework surrounding the laws, are not easily changed.   
5.3.3 Concluding FDI   
Taking everything into consideration, we now move to the last part of figure 2 from credible 
commitment to FDI. I will first return to Singh´s “degrees of commitment” from the theory 
chapter 2.2.5, with a comparative view. I would consider Cuba´s formal commitment during 
1995-2006 to be a “reasonably strong commitment”. During this period, they actually did 
adopt some measures (like law 77) to open markets on various areas and sectors, two to four 
years after having committed themselves to GATS. Still, they retracted contracts and 
dissolved many of the joint ventures and FDIs in the early 2000s (see figure 7 and 8), as they 
yet again entered an idealist cycle. During this period, I will also consider liberalization on 
Cuba to be a “weak liberalization” because by 2006 it did have some foreign entry to the 
island by having passed down law 77, but it did not change the monopoly of the state 
considerably.  
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During the period from the takeover of Raúl, and the initiation of the structural 
reforms, until today, Cuba has deepened their commitment towards foreign investors. Still, 
foreign investment is not pouring into the economy through the free trade zones, as the 
government had planned for. The reform plan from 2011 that pledged to enhance Cuba´s 
credibility in its international economic relations may have been the first significant action to 
enhance credibility. After that, the FDI law of 2014 was the next improvement of investment 
environment, but it offered few changes from the previous law from 1995. However, the fight 
against corruption has been a positive element for investors, which I have taken into 
consideration. Still, I would consider this period to be barely within the “reasonably strong 
commitment” with “weak” to “reasonably strong“ liberalization, because the first significant 
measure took 4 years to present, and it took 3 more years to present law 118 and re-open all 
sectors for investment, except health, education and military.  
This certainly seems like a positive categorization from my side, not shared by foreign 
investors who still thinks of the obstacles as too problematic, and would place Cuba under 
“weak commitment and liberalization”. However, this is exactly my point, because in order to 
evaluate countries like Cuba we have to look beyond Singh´s categorization. Even though 
Cuba has initiated reforms through formal rules and norms, the obstacles investors meet in the 
informal constraints in the execution of these laws, make Cuba´s credible commitment 
unsatisfying. Formally, my categorization can be accepted, but practically, Cuba still needs to 
convince the international society of their commitment. Also, the liberalization of the 
economy needs further depth beyond free trade zones, which are a debatable measure of 
liberalization. 
My point is that Singh focuses on the formal side of the laws, but to understand the 
informal constraints you have to consider elements surrounding these laws. The formal side of 
law 77 and 118 looks legitimate, but when we study countries like Cuba we will be deluded 
by only addressing the formal side seeing the laws are both well written and well accounted 
for. The institutional framework surrounding the laws shows that the timeframe for 
authorizations are lengthy, the cost of labor is disproportionate in terms of payment to the 
state and compared to what the employee receive. Also, the way state manages business is 
controversial because they may suddenly abort the cooperation with investors. The authorities 
seek FDI and spillover effects, but do not want all of the effects to take place. These actions 
have more effect on credible commitment, and FDI, than the formal laws, which remains the 
same. 
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6 Conclusion: signs of change signs 
of continuity 
In this thesis, I have argued that the lack of FDI inflow is due to obstacles in the formal and 
informal rules and norms in the institutional framework that handles FDI. The lack of credible 
commitment especially affects the inflow as the investors hesitate with investment due to lack 
of confidence. 
 I have analyzed the laws, rules, institutions, history and elements which all concern 
Cuba´s degree of openness and economic freedom, with a particular focus on FDI: in order to 
elaborate on how different factors affects the degree of FDI inflow to the island. We have 
seen that Cuba has a low degree of FDI (figure 7), which can be explained by the set of 
informal constraints that follow the formal rules and norms. I have also analyzed the most 
recent law of 2014, which formally does not appear to differ much from the law of 1995, 
which means they formally do not appear to be of a major obstacle for investors. However, 
the regime still is the same, and their interpretations of the laws, their actions towards foreign 
investors and their willingness to transmit power and control to other actors have remained 
mostly the same. I speculate that unless more profound changes occur in the political and 
administrational institutional sphere, the initiatives discussed in this thesis will not be further 
successful.    
Are there any stories of the restructuring and reforming of societies that have not 
resulted in hardship and difficulties in the beginning before being able to prosper? Cuba will 
probably have to go through tough times before being able to harvest from reforms 
liberalizing the FDI sector and the economy as a whole. This includes the transmission of 
power from the Cuban authorities to other actors in the economy. Still, it seems like the 
government introduces reforms that help generate capital, while still retaining total control of 
society and economy. The idealist and pragmatic cycles of Mesa-Lago show the impatience of 
the Cuban leadership, who changes policy as soon as they observe some degree of loss of 
power and control. The structuration reforms of Raúl are some of the more liberal and 
committed reforms we have seen during the time of the Revolution, the question is if Cuban 
leaders are patient enough to go through a period of hardship before potential gains can be 
harvested? Mesa-Lago is skeptical to call these reforms “deeper or sufficiently profound” than 
earlier, in his conclusions: 
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“No veo un cambio estructural importante en….la planificación, hay que otorgar mayor espacio al 
mercado…regulándolo con instrumentos indirectos de penalización y estímulos, no un sistema 
centralizado que ha demostrado una y mil veces ser ineficiente en Cuba y fuera de Cuba…Sànchez-
Egozcue advierte la dificultad de cambiar la cultura administrativa vertical que ha prevalecido por 
décadas y ha demostrado exhaustivamente su inviabilidad hacia una descentralización a los gobiernos 
locales y la incorporación de los sectores privado y cooperativo. La descentralización requiere una 
cuidadosa implementación, con adecuados tiempos y secuencias no revelados hasta ahora”.249  
 
My findings are compatible with those of Mesa-Lago in terms of the centralized 
system being ineffective in the promotion of FDI, and that the government struggles every 
time pragmatic decentralizing policies towards the market have been introduced. I find that 
there is a tension between how slowly things need to go given the government´s desire to 
retain control, and how fast they need given the precariousness of the economy. The Castro 
family has ruled through consensus, rather than through decree, and that takes time.  
Still, Cuba will eventually undergo transition beyond the mere replacement of the 
Castro family as head of Cuban state. Some predict that after a short period of continuity 
meant to reassure Cubans and foreigners about the system´s stability, significant institutional 
changes in Cuban economic, social and political life will occur. Much has been written about 
the likely changes in Cuba; much less discussion has concerned the changes in the ideological 
and political landscape that are likely to accompany such institutional transformations. Any 
significant institutional change in Cuba will need to be supported and justified in political and 
ideological terms. In light of the strong pro-capitalist ideological tendencies that have 
developed in all post-communist transitions, and the existing tendencies in Cuban political 
thought that have been strengthened since the 1990s, we can expect the renewed formulation 
of certain positions regarding the background and early origins of the Cuban Revolution.
250
  
Cuba´s geographical position and its proximity to the U.S constitute a potential for future 
currents of FDI. Should the U.S. embargo be removed and Cuba is able to attract mayor U.S 
players, it would strengthen the incentives to follow the rules of engagement, and demonstrate 
to others that investment is safe. Although Cuba has expropriated U.S property in the past, it 
is unlikely that they would repeat the deed as their terms for introduction of FDI has changed. 
If the Cuban government can have an inward flow of FDI on their premises, there will be no 
economic incentives to intervene, although moral incentives have proved to have a strong 
position in the Cuban politics.  
The signs of change, we find in formal norms and rules generated through reforms are 
set to liberalize Cuban economy. However, we see continuity in how government executes the 
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laws, and treats foreign investors. Investors may have be given more liberties as Cuba have 
established free trade zones, but the obstacles investors have experienced earlier, and still 
observe, are deeply embedded in the international perception of FDI policies in Cuba. It is 
reasonable to presume that real institutional change and larger flows of inward FDI will take 
place first after the Castro family has retired, and a new generation has taken over. 
Based on this case-study of Cuba, I have learned that the informal norms and 
constraints are of crucial importance for FDI to be successfully integrated into an economy. 
To the theory on FDI, I cannot contribute with more than what my results on the Cuban case 
reveals, which is “what is important for foreign investors when they seek to invest in Cuba”. 
Based on Singh´s theory, my findings would contribute to more emphasis on the informal 
elements of credible commitment and degree of liberalization. As we have seen above, the 
formal rules, norms and commitments may be of “reasonably strong” nature, but it does not 
cover the informal constraints that affect reputation and timid foreign investors. To North´s 
theory on institutions and credible commitment I do not bring much new to the field, but I 
confirm his theories and I apply them to a narrowed field which is the FDI sector in the Cuban 
economy. I think it will be of great use, for both investors and Cuban authorities, to apply 
institutional theory when facing the challenges ahead as Cuba enters a new political and 
economic era. Cuban authorities use an extensive amount of time to consider the best possible 
measures to take when improving state, economy and society. Further studies should 
investigate how institutional theory could help guide the cautious Cuban authorities towards 
liberalizing reforms, and how make the reforms more efficient.    
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Appendix 
Appendix I 
“Para establecerse en Cuba con fines productivos, sea cual sea la modalidad 
pretendida, se deben seguir los siguientes pasos (www.cubaindustria.cu): 
1. Identificar las empresas cubanas con posible interés en proyectos de inversión 
conjuntos con personas naturales o jurídicas extranjeras. Para ello es posible: 
• Contactar al Departamento de Promoción Comercial y Desarrollo Industrial 
perteneciente a la Cámara de Comercio de Cuba, responsable de promocionar la 
cartera de proyectos en los que existe interés de utilizar inversión extranjera. 
• Contratar los servicios de una consultoría radicada en Cuba 
• Contactar a los Ministerios y grupos empresariales correspondientes. 
2. En caso de existir interés de desarrollar el proyecto de inversión, se subscribe una 
Carta de Intención de Negocios o Acuerdo Marco y se comienza el proceso de 
negociación. 
3. Durante la negociación se prepara la documentación económica y jurídica que 
requiere la asociación propuesta, que en lo fundamental incluye: Proyecto de 
Convenio de Asociación y de Estatutos; y Estudio de Factibilidad Económica. Además 
el inversionista extranjero deberá presentar una acreditación de su identidad y 
solvencia, así como poderes que prueben su representación legítima en caso que 
concurra con el carácter de persona jurídica. 
4. La documentación anterior será discutida con un representante del organismo 
patrocinador hasta obtener su aprobación. 
5. Presentación de la documentación al Ministerio de Comercio Exterior e Inversión 
Extranjera (MINCEX), quien la somete en calidad de consulta a cuantos otros 
organismos e instituciones corresponda. 
6. El MINCEX eleva la propuesta al Comité Ejecutivo del Consejo de Ministros (CECM) 
o a una comisión de gobierno designada por éste al efecto, para su aprobación o 
denegación. Dicha decisión no debe exceder los 60 días naturales contados a partir 
de la fecha de presentación de la solicitud. 
7. Emisión de un Acuerdo o Resolución Gubernamental autorizando la creación de la 
Asociación. En la autorización se consignan las condiciones a que estará sometida 
ésta, el objetivo y el término de la forma de inversión de que se trate. 
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8. Constitución de la Asociación mediante Escritura Pública en la Notaría Especial del 
Ministerio de Justicia. 
9. Inscripción en el Registro de Inversiones Extranjeras de la Cámara de Comercio. 
Para el registro inicial se establece un límite de 30 días a partir de la fecha de 
emisión del Acuerdo o Resolución Gubernamental a que se hace referencia en el 
punto siete. En el caso de una empresa de capital totalmente extranjero, también se 
debe contactar al Organismo Estatal rector de la rama de actividad que sea de interés 
y proseguir con el resto de las aprobaciones y pasos. En la práctica, el tiempo 
requerido en todo el proceso de negociación y aprobación es superior al de otros 
países y por tanto más costoso. Tan solo en las conversaciones iniciales (hasta el paso 
5) pueden transcurrir alrededor de 2 años.”251 
 
 
 
Appendix II 
Source: Cuba’s Economy during the Special Period, 1990-2010 Archibald R. M. Ritter, October 12, 2010. 252 
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Appendix III 
 
Source: Cuba’s Economy during the Special Period, 1990-2010 Archibald R. M. Ritter, October 12, 2010. 253 
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